The Future of the DPD

For two days, April 2 and 3, the public  witnessed a power struggle taking place in the Regional Representatives Council (DPD).  To win power, common sense was no longer an option. A political hall that was supposed to be a stage of civil debate had changed into an arena of violence.

All arguments over truth were buried in debates that were characterized by fights involving loud vocal cords and the durability of neck veins. Truth involving legal reasoning was dead and turned into the rubble of destruction. It all ended with the election of three Senayan senators with Sapta Oesman Odang as the DPD speaker.

The results were a culmination of a long series of crises that have hit the DPD.

When tracked back to the 2014 to 2019 period of DPD membership, the road to this crisis began with a debate to cut the tenure of the DPD leadership from five years to two-and-a-half years. The move to cut the tenure began slowing rolling in 2015 and gained momentum during a revision of the Rules of Conduct of the DPD No. 1/2014 (Tatib No. 1/2014).

Even though several issues were changed in Tatib No. 1/2014, the biggest idea was to shorten the leadership tenure. Therefore, almost throughout 2016 the energy of the DPD was drained in debate over the pros and cons of the proposal. In the empirical stretch, DPD members were divided into two major groups, namely the supporters of the cut and those who rejected it.

It has been widely understood that the state institution that was designed to represent regional interests at the central level has not been able to prove its significance. Therefore, this power struggle has led to fundamental questions about the future of the DPD.

Indecision

The DPD as designed by Article 22D of the 1945 Constitution has not been an ideal legislative institution.

Once the DPD\'s authority was approved in the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution in 2001, there appeared many criticisms that its members would not be able to represent regional interests, since Article 22D of the Constitution provides limited space for them to fulfill their responsibilities.

The article limits the DPD\'s jurisdiction with phrases like "may file" and "participating in discussing" draft bills that are related to relations between central and regional authorities. The subordinate function of the DPD is increasingly clear because it only has the limited power to “give consideration” in discussions over state budgets and bills related to taxation, education and religion.

The DPD got a fresh wind when the Constitutional Court granted most of the judicial review requested over a number articles in Law No. 27/2009 on the People\'s Consultative Assembly (MPR), the House of Representatives (DPR) and the DPD and Provincial Legislative Councils [(DPRD) MD3] and Law No. 12/2011 on the establishment of legislation.

As written in the "New Legislation Paradigm" (Kompas, 30/5/2013), the spirit and substance of the Constitutional Court Verdict No. 92/PUU-X/2012 gives a wide opportunity for the DPD to optimize its role as the representation of regional interests in the establishment of laws: at least the optimization of the legislation function of the DPD related to the authority in Article 22D Paragraph (1) and (2) of the 1945 Constitution.

Many DPD members may try to strengthen the body in the spirit of the Constitutional Court verdict, but short-term political interests continue to undermine it and the maneuvers around the latest leadership election will become a burden.

The weakness of the DPD is also related to the fact it is a secondary assembly in a bicameral legislature. Because of this, some people call the DPD a senate and a some of its members call themselves senators.

When interpreting the 1945 Constitution this is not entirely appropriate, since the Constitution does not refer to the legislature as a bicameral institution, but a tricameral one as it has three chambers, since the DPD and the House of Representatives combine to become a third entity.

In this uncertain situation the members of the DPD would be able to strengthen their position if they could define it clearly, but when asked about their role they are usually unable to explain it or provide convincing evidence to support their assertions. As a result, more people are questioning the relevance of the DPD in governance.

The future

The vague design of the representative institution coupled with the implications of the chaotic election of the DPD leadership, the future of the “Senate” will be interesting. For example, the Constitution Court rulings concerning legislative functions will increasingly be difficult to follow.

The reason is simple, the spirit and substance of the rulings have been partially annulled by the latest MD3 Law, which has sidetracked the body from its efforts to strengthen itself by revising Law No. 12/2011.

However, what is more worrying, elements that have until now been a part of the efforts to strengthen the DPD have instead become involved in partisan politics and the election of Oesman Sapta Odang as DPD speaker can be interpreted as a move by the Hanura Party to bolster its position in the DPD.

Why are various parties so critical when a number of DPD members move to the Hanura Party? It is due to the fear that the Hanura faction in the DPD will come under the shadow of the Hanura Party in the House.

In fact, if it is returned to the arrangement in the 1945 Constitution, the position of DPD members is different from members of the DPR. In this case, Article 22E Paragraph (3) and (4) of 1945 Constitution provides a demarcation line that DPD members sit as individuals, while members of the DPR sit as members of political parties. Now, with many DPD members part of the executive board of Hanura, it is difficult to imagine the future of the DPD.

In conclusion, even though the DPD has limited authority, it gets more than enough support from civil society. Many worry that the support will drastically shrink. If this really happens, the DPD will be in the grip of political parties. Within the limits of reason, there is no need to question too deeply the future of DPD, in case the Supreme Court does not have an ambiguous attitude.

SALDI ISRA

Professor of Constitution Law and Director of the Center for Constitutional Studies of the School of Law, Andalas University, Padang