Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander Gen. Gatot Nurmantyo leaves the State Palace after attending a limited cabinet meeting with President Joko Widodo and Vice President Jusuf Kalla on Thursday (28/9).
Many observers believe Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander Gen. Gatot Nurmantyo has started to campaign. Specifically Gatot is believed to have begun mobilizing support from political parties and Islamic organizations. The stoking of fears about the Indonesian Communist Party’s revival and the mobilization of the public to watch the G30S/PKI film are considered part of the strategy reportedly being used to gather support and raise his popularity as a candidate. Many political parties have asked him to resign from his position as TNI commander.
In reality, Gatot\'s maneuvers are seen by many observers to not only represent his personal ambitions, but as representative of the disappointment and frustration of the TNI, especially the army, which has seen a decline in its role and access to material resources. Departing from the understanding of capital in Indonesia, it is very important to formulate polices on TNI\'s professionalism and its financial implications.
Domestic capital
Richard Robison in his classical book, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (1986), shows how the New Order regime awakened domestic capital. He describes the four major domestic capitals: Chinese-owned capital, indigenous capitalists, state-owned capital — namely state-owned enterprises (BUMN) — and military-owned businesses.
With support, facilities and protection, the four domestic capitals grew across various sectors. However, the economic crisis in 1997 was followed by the downfall of the New Order causing the domestic capitals to face difficult situations. Reformation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cut all the facilities and protection for the domestic capitals.
Meanwhile, the privatization and liberalization polices opened the door for international capital, which became a competitor to the domestic capitals. The present period is a difficult time for the domestic capitals.
Robison and Vedi Hadiz in the book Reorganizing Power in Indonesia (2004) discuss the revival of oligarchy. Instead of being marginalized, the political economic elites woke up after the reformation.
So, what has been the development of domestic capital? Christian Chua, in the book Chinese Big Business in Indonesia (2009), describes how democracy and decentralization facilitated the expansion of Chinese-owned capital. With huge financial resources at their disposal, the role of businesspeople became important in a political system colored by money politics.
The second capital, namely indigenous capitalists, also managed rise, not only in the economy, but also in politics. Aburizal Bakrie in 2007 was named the richest man in Indonesia. Bakrie, a former chair of the Golkar Party, now faces difficulties from the huge debt burdens of his business group. However, he remains among the richest people in Indonesia and an influential figure in Golkar. Another example is Vice President Jusuf Kalla.
The third capital, state-owned enterprises, has been revived and has come to dominate various sectors. The focus on infrastructure development by President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has put state-owned businesses (BUMNs) in an important position. The injection of capital and infrastructure development has seen BUMNs grow even larger. Previously BUMN reformation programs, which were encouraged by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), managed to realign the BUMNs. In the first semester of 2017, the total assets of BUMNs reached Rp 6,694 trillion (Kompas.com, 30/8/2017) or nearly 50 percent of the Indonesia\'s gross domestic product (GDP).
What about the fourth capital, military businesses? Different from the other three domestic capitals, military businesses are shrinking. Article No. 34 of the 2004 Law on TNI strictly prohibits soldiers from doing business and ordered TNI to hand over its businesses to the state. As of yet it is unclear how the handover of military businesses has gone, but I suspect, the businesses were lost or have been taken over by their business partners.
Another factor, which has caused the decline of military businesses, is the clear-cut separation between security and defense. Soldiers not only have to distance themselves from businesses, but also from security, which has becomes the duty of the police. Separating the TNI from security duties limits soldiers\' access to the financial sources, be they either informal or illegal, related to protection and security.
Besides the decline of military businesses, soldiers are losing access to material resources through political positions. The generation of Gen. Gatot belongs to a group of soldiers who when they joined the TNI hoped that after the pension age, they would be able to hold important positions in the bureaucracy, the House of Representatives, or regional administrations.
In the democratic political landscape, those positions can only be taken through tight competition with politicians. Of course, it is difficult for soldiers to compete with politicians who have developed skills and networks even since they were students.
Professional soldiers
In connection with the maneuvers of Gen. Gatot, which are under the spotlight, there are two important things to discuss. First, with the TNI’s withdrawal from the House of Representatives and the decline of military businesses, in general soldiers have returned to the barracks. However, now even civilian politicians are "inviting" TNI members to return to politics.
Secondly, returning soldiers to the barracks and making it a professional army costs money. Regardless of this cost, the invitation of politicians to invite General Gatot, as well as later generals, will continue to recur. Therefore, it is urgent to define what the professional army is and how much it will cost.
Making the TNI a profession military will require significant costs, but it is crucial for the future of politics and democracy in Indonesia.
