Maritime Terrorism and the New Commander

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The promotion of Air Chief Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto to commander of the Indonesian Military (TNI) brings something new to efforts to strengthen the TNI.

After all, global, regional and national dynamics are giving Indonesia a new challenge to face: terrorism in maritime territory. The fact is that terrorism in maritime territory has not received any attention in the revision of the 2003 Terrorism Law.

The real threats to national security, especially maritime territory, cannot be disregarded. Such threats have appeared since the finding of documents in Osama bin Laden’s headquarters that disclosed his interest in targeting maritime industry as a terrorism method in provoking an extreme economic crisis in the West as reported by the British newspaper, The Guardian (20/5/2011).

Responding to such a possibility, TNI has taken various initiatives. One of them being when in 2014 a team of the Western Fleet Quick Response (WFQR) was formed to respond to security threats on the Malaka Strait, including against the possibility of maritime terrorism. This initiative booked successes in reducing the rate of crimes on the Malaka Strait, with its operation design later applied as a model for all of Indonesia’s waters, including the border areas.

The birth of the operation design cannot be disassociated from the increasing awareness that the geographical constellation makes Indonesia a maritime state. This is strengthened by increased sea territory of up to 100 nautical miles based on the provision of Law No. 4 of 2017 on the ratification of an agreement between the Indonesian and Philippine governments on the determination of the Exclusive Economic Zone (ZEE).

Moreover, Indonesia has a strategic position for the regional and global maritime activity axis. Of course, this condition is very beneficial on the economic side because Indonesia has to present as a provider of trade routes on the sea. However, on the other hand, the position has the potential to cause threats and challenge the complexity of national security stability, especially the sustainability of natural resources and access security. Say, for example, fish thefts, kidnapping and pirating on the sea, smuggling of goods, human beings and narcotics, pollution on the sea environment, navigation safety, natural disasters and terrorism. These of course become priority challenges being faced by TNI now and in the future.

Maritime terrorism

One form of threat in the maritime domain that is often missed by the public is  maritime terrorism. The complexity of terrorist acts on the sea is frequently neglected, even though its probability is steadily increasing. Still fresh in our minds, how panicky the government was when 10 Indonesian crew members of Brahma tugboat were taken hostage by the Abu Sayyaf group on March 26, 2016.

After that, crew members of the Henry and Charles 00 ships and two Indonesian fishing boats again became the target of kidnappings by militant groups operating on the Sulu Sea, the Philippines. Even though they were eventually freed, the threats from the terrorist groups to kidnap ships’ crew members are still real and will continue as long as they exist.

Even though several parties view that the attacks against ships that sail on the Sulu Sea constitute purely pirating acts with the economic motives because the perpetrators ask for a ransom for the release of the hostages, criminal acts on the sea using violence by the terrorist groups or affiliated to certain terrorist groups will increasingly become complex, especially from the legal act aspects or the impacts.

For the TNI, to respond to such a threat, several unilateral or multilateral options through cooperation with neighboring countries or one region have been carried out. The TNI has deployed its war ships to patrol the territory. This is a preventive and repressive act against any threat that will or has happened.

In cooperation with the armed forces of the Philippines and Malaysia, the TNI launched a coordinated sea operation named ”Indomalphi” on June 19, 2017.

This initiative constitutes a very relevant approach and is expected to bear significant results with the falling number of attacks by militant groups against ships on the Sulu Sea waters and its surrounding area.

However, this effort is still simply incidental and has not been able to get rid of the real maritime terrorism threats. The main objective of terrorist groups is to send a political message and force the government or the state to do something as the last target to be achieved. Destruction of maritime installations or vital objects through attacks with violence against ships and their crew members is only a way to convey the political message.

However, such acts have significant impacts since public infrastructure in the maritime territory is become increasingly diverse, such as sea ports, oil and gas pipelines, fiber optic communication cables, offshore exploration facilities, and tourism objects, which will have widespread impacts globally.

Terrorism draft law

Evidence of the absence of government attention to terrorism crimes in maritime territory can be seen from the failure to make crimes on ships an offense of the terrorism crime acts. Provision of Article 8 of Law No. 15/2003 on the Eradication of Terrorism Acts only includes the offense of terrorism acts on airplanes.

Nevertheless, the public understands lawmakers in 2003 did not include the crime offense on ships, ports, and maritime territory as a part of the terrorism crime acts because at that time terrorism threats had not spread widely like today. However, efforts to amend Law No. 15 of 2003, which is  considered to have not been able to catch up with the development of the global terrorism crimes at present, has to be carried out comprehensively.

The failure to include the crime offence on vital and strategic objects on the maritime territory will only help terrorists find loopholes. Complexity in handling crimes on the maritime territory actually cannot be settled through conventional crime approaches. Adding the crime offense on the ships, ports and maritime territory as a part of the terrorism crime acts absolutely has to be carried out.

Inevitably, an amendment to the law on the eradication of terrorism crime acts, which is currently being worked out at the House of Representatives (DPR), serves as the right moment to include the maritime terrorism provision as part of efforts to combat terrorism crime acts.

Of course, the public has high expectations from the new TNI commander. A strong commitment to protect the sovereignty and integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia has now absolutely become the main duty of TNI. In order to answer the crime complexity in the maritime territory, it needs a guideline, strategy and  priority in the national strategic, operational, and tactical level, especially in getting rid of the maritime terrorism crime threats.

This condition increasingly demands the TNI as the state defense tool to adapt and search for innovative strategies that are able to answer or settle the various challenges. Of course, it has become a new challenge for the TNI in formulating the best way to act in anticipating, especially to review legal regulations about the prevention of maritime terrorism in Indonesia.

Finally, it is time to anticipate the maritime terrorism threats and at the same time search for the best strategy to deal with them. In this aspect, the TNI is considered to have the main capacity and capability in the efforts to prevent terrorism, notably in the sky domain. Hopefully, Commander Air Chief Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto will also start to give more attention to  national maritime security, especially maritime terrorism.

This can be seen from the operation design and efforts of modernizing the main tools of the weaponry system (alutsista) as to what will be carried out for TNI in the future and the involvement of TNI as one of the state tools in preventing terrorism. We wait for what will be carried out by the TNI commander in the future.

AMINUDDIN ALBEK

Commander of KRI Diponegoro-365