Two Decades of Reform

Kompas/Eddy Hasbi

University students from Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi lay siege on the House of Representatives in this May 1998 file photograph. They demanded reforms and called for then-President Soeharto to step down.

One of the important milestones on the journey of the nation and state to realize political civilization is political reform in 1998. The event "overturned" a power structure that had not only monopolized power but also monopolized the truth. The pillars of the New Order power -- Golkar, bureaucracy, military, and Soeharto\'s "institutions" -- dramatically collapsed.

Therefore, political institutions and the constitution had to immediately be drawn up to support people\'s sovereignty. The main goal of reform was to establish a strong democratic government; effective, and free from corruption, collusion and nepotism.

The agenda of urgency was to prevent and anticipate the threat of a return of the militaristic power or a social anarchy. Ideally, the formation of a political party was preceded by offering a specific idea as the foundation and ideals of the struggle.

However, because of the urgency of time, it was not possible to do. The agenda of constitutional reform should also be based on the principles of constitutionalism. But, because of the limited time, the constitutional amendments were done partially as well.

As a result, the pillar of democracy -- political parties -- was merely a building structure without any spirit. The constitution was amended four times, but because it was not done by the principles of constitutionalism, among others, establishing a national consensus on the concept of comprehensive state power, it produced articles which are not coherent and cohesive to each other.

For example, the debate about the form the state whether a unitary or federal one, a presidential or parliamentary governmental system, as well as other issues related to the organization of state power was not mature enough in the dialectics of public debate. The limited national consensus of the public participation, mainly it was not accompanied by widespread public discourse by competent and committed figures in realizing the ideal constitution, was incapable of presenting a constitutional spirit. The constitutional reform failed to establish an ideal constitution.

Based on such limitations, the process of state power management continues. Post-reform power holders are products of "disabled" institutions and constitution from their birth. The management of state power is increasingly mismanaged because the power holders, who are not properly prepared by the political parties, have been exposed to enjoy the power honey. Abuse of power has been rampant throughout the power structure.

Therefore, after two decades of reform, many circles have questioned, even doubted, the direction of reform. Not a few components of society want the return of the New Order regime, which is considered stable and safe. Others are very worried about the emergence of social anarchy because the country is very weak. The confusion is increasingly culminating with the widespread phenomenon of populism and the emergence of a teaching which believes in misguided opinions rather than facts.

However, if it is studied more thoroughly, carefully, and in detail, there is a ray of pearls from reform results which give hope for the challenges ahead. First, even though the post-reform constitution has many weaknesses, it is generally more democratic, guarantees human rights, and minimizes multi-interpretation compared to the 1945 Constitution. Amendments to the 1945 Constitution also liberate the Indonesian nation from the mythical hostage of the sanctity of the 1945 Constitution, which was sacrificed to legitimize authoritarian powers.

Second, the level of public confidence in political parties is very low. However, not a few party cadres who feel anxious and want political party reforms to produce instruments which are capable of realizing noble ideas into public policies; not a collection of power-hungry elites.

Third, the credibility of the people\'s representatives  institutions continue to deteriorate. The peak of public resentment is the issuance of the Law on the People\'s Consultative Assembly (MPR), House of Representatives (DPR), Regional Legislative Councils (DPRD), and Regional Representatives Council (DPD) or MD3, which is considered to dampen critical votes. However, these institutions used to produce several regulations which have benefited in common life, such as the Law on Corruption Eradication, Money Laundering Law, and Law on the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination.

Fourth, the reform of the Indonesian Military (TNI). The institution, which had initially  been the instrument of the state to mobilize political power, has returned to its main function and main task, upholding sovereignty from foreign military threats. However, the transformation must be continued in line with dynamic challenges of the increasingly complex global threats and the demands for the increasingly sophisticated weapons system.

Kompas/Heru Sri Kumoro

J. Kristiadi

Fifth, a decentralization policy which recognizes local cultural diversity and customs. The regime of regional uniformity has passed. However, this agenda should be done with a clearer direction in the future as well as the great design of regional autonomy, which provides a decentralized framework that prioritizes the diversity of local communities.

Sixth, a firm civil society. The invulnerability of civil society appears to have alleviated the wave of the recent primordialistic hatred utterances. Events that undermined the  Indonesian-ness have been relatively quickly mitigated by the appeal of various figures and the alertness of the government. Armed with the capital of political reform, the realignment of state power organization in the future is expected to bring closer the ideals of the nation to realize the increasingly civilized politics.

J. Kristiadi, Senior Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)