Political Parties and Corruption in Regions

Kompas/Handining

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The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has detained a total of 75 regional heads from 2004 to 2017 and as many as 144 members of the House of Representatives (DPR) and Regional Legislative Councils (DPRD) from 2007 to 2017 (Kompas, Feb. 14 and Feb. 15, 2018). Since Feb. 15, 2018, the KPK has arrested two regional heads, the Kendari mayor of and the Central Lampung regent. Because the regional heads and legislative members of the DPR/DPRD all hail from political parties, the issue begs the question as to why some cadres of political parties become involved in corruption.

Political parties are indispensable for representative democracy and a democratic government to function. However, political parties alone are not enough to run representative democracy and democratic governance. A number of other factors, such as rule of law, national unity, equally shared power and supervision, and active public participation are needed.

Two key roles of political parties

Political parties are deemed absolutely necessary for representative democracy and a democratic government to function, because they fulfill two important roles.

First, prepare (for political regeneration), select and offer prospective leaders to the people through the general elections. The regional head candidates that are offered to the people through the general and regional elections are products of a hierarchy of cadres (basic, middle, and top), with the selection made by the top-tier cadres.

The people in the regeneration process are party members who have been selected according to the requirements regulated by law and upon the party’s criteria. The purpose of regeneration does not focus merely on improving organizational skills or expanding and deepening competence in governance as well as political leadership. What is also important is the understanding and commitment to political parties as a means of serving the public interest (aspirations of the state and nation) in keeping with the party’s ideology.

Preparing potential leaders is not instantaneous. The regional head candidates that are offered to the people through the general elections emerge from preliminary elections conducted internally by party members that select from among their nominated cadres. The nominated cadres are selected through the tiered regeneration process. Therefore, the regional head candidates that are presented to the voting public are not just selected arbitrarily based on their popularity or wealth, but have been selected by party members through a top-tier regeneration process.

Second, political parties formulate public policy plans based on public aspirations and guided by party ideology, and are then offered to the public as the parties’ electoral campaign platforms. The policy plans are not a vision or mission, which tend to be abstract and immeasurable. Instead, they are a series of concrete, measurable programs to address the problems the people face. The policy plans derive not only from studies and analyses into national and regional problems, but also from the people’s aspirations.

The party ideology provides guidance in formulating the policy plans. The measurable policy plans will be fought as part of the decision-making process for the public interest. Therefore, political parties are not simply known from their chairpersons or popular elites, but also from the policy plans they promote.

Four patterns of party behavior

Have Indonesia’s political parties carried out the two roles adequately? Apparently not yet, as noted in the following, as political parties display at least there are four patterns of behavior.

First, political parties are not democratically managed (weak internal democracy), but are managed oligarchically, even individualistically. Democratically managed parties make decisions on important issues – such as selecting the DPR/DPRD legislative candidates, the presidential candidate pairs and regional candidate pairs, and formulating party policy plans – by involving their members.

This is in line with the rights of party members as stipulated in the Political Party Law, which reads: "Every member of a party is entitled to a vote and to be elected.” However, in practice, these members’ rights are transferred to senior party officials in the party statute. Determining the DPR/DPRD legislative candidates does not involve party members, but is determined entirely by the party\'s senior leadership. Determining the regional candidate pairs also does not involve party members, but is determined entirely by the party\'s senior leadership. Determining the presidential candidate pairs also does excludes the party membership.

Therefore, political parties tend to organize their administrators more than the ordinary citizens who compose their membership. Leaving the selection of electoral candidates entirely to senior party leadership is the cause of political dowries: The candidates are nominated because they have contributed a sufficient amount of funds, and if they are elected, they must repay the funds from the proceeds of corruption.

Second, the parties do not carry out a systematic regeneration of their leadership in a tiered, comprehensive manner. A number of parties open schools for regional candidates or candidates for party regeneration at the national level, but they are neither tiered nor sustainable. Even if the regeneration is carried out, the process tends to be instantaneous. Several regional and legislative candidates were only admitted as new members after they agreed to stand as candidates.

Instant regeneration will not inform the cadres with understanding, insight and commitment of the party’s vision and mission to serve the public interest according to its ideology. Party leader candidates that do not emerge from a tiered regeneration process – that emerge from instant regeneration – will lead to regional and legislative candidates that view political parties as serving the public interest, but instead as a means of obtaining seats, money, facilities and political access. The efforts to prepare candidates as political leaders that will view parties as serving the public interest cannot be instantaneous.

Elaborating on the party ideology in various public policies should be included on the regeneration curriculum. If this is done, it will have two positive effects.

The first impact is that the electoral candidates that emerge from the regeneration process will view the political party not as a means of obtaining seats, money, facilities and political access, but instead will have an understanding of political parties and a commitment to viewing and treating them as a means of serving the public interest in accordance with the party ideology. The party ideology will no longer seen merely as a show of color, public figures, images, marches and fiery speeches, but will be seen and used as guidance in formulating public policies and in the behavior of party administrators and cadres.

As for the second impact, the general public will identify a party not from its popular figures, but from the public policies that its cadres champion. The two things sould certainly help prevent cadres from becoming involved in corruption as political leaders.

Tend toward fragmentation

Third, the composition of the DPRD membership tends to be fragmented, that is, too many parties hold seats in the DPRD, but the number of the seats are relatively balanced: No party has a majority in most DPRDs, and no party has 20 percent or more seats in most DPRDs. The consequence of such a fragmented composition is a pattern of decision-making that uses the "bancakan" model (a division of chapters, of budgets, or positions) that is collusive, rather than deliberation toward a consensus or by majority vote. The fragmentary DPRD structure causes regional heads to tend toward transactional leadership in an effort to gain the DPRD’s support and approval for the Regional Budget Draft (RAPBD).

Fourth, political parties do not have an adequate source of revenue. Parties fulfill an important role under the Constitution, but the state provides only Rp 1,000 per vote to finance party activities. The main source of a party’s revenue is not membership dues, but donations from cadres who hold seats in the DPR/DPRD, deducted from their salaries, and through the fund-raising efforts of party executives and central administration to seek other sources of revenue.

Kompas/Arbain Rambey

Ramlan Surbakti

The consequence of the situation is that only those cadres with adequate financial resources (self-financed or able to attract funding from entrepreneurs) are willing to stand as legislative or regional candidates. Once elected, they tend to utilize their positions to make money, not only for renomination, but also for reelection.

If this observation is correct, Indonesia’s political parties do not exist in full accordance with the two roles stated above. The inability of political parties to fulfill their two key roles does not only indicate the level of democracy in Indonesia, but also becomes one of the causes of politicians to engage in corrupt practices. Political parties seem to still be a source of more problems rather than solutions for the nation and state.

Ramlan Surbakti, Professor of Comparative Politics, School of Social and Political Sciences, Airlangga University; Indonesian Academy of Sciences member