Turning Point in Dealing with Terrorism

ANTARA FOTO/INDRIANTO EKO SUWARSO

A police officer salutes the ambulance carrying the body of police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) member Chief Brig Marhum Prencje to his house from the Brimob headquarters in Kelapa Dua, Depok, West Java, on Friday (11/5/2018). The policeman was stabbed to death by an unidentified assailant on Thursday night in a separate incident following a riot at Brimob headquarters.

Five members of Densus 88, the National Police’s counterterrorism squad, were killed on active duty on Tuesday. They were sadistically murdered by several of 155 detainees – many of whom are supporters of Islamic State (IS) movement – at the headquarters of the National Police’s Mobile Brigade (Mako Brimob) in Kelapa Dua, Depok, West Java.

Responding to the latest terrorist act, President Joko Widodo said the state must not be defeated by nor afraid of terrorists. The President’s statement is important in the context of the heating up of national politics plus the uncertainty in the global political landscape mainly related to the Islamic world and the Middle East.

How will the terrorist threat develop in Indonesia after this deplorable incident? Aside from the role of the state, is there a role for civil society in the handling of terrorism?

These questions are raised in an effort to see the terrorist act at Mako Brimob not as the final act of a small group, which considers itself oppressed and relates its actions to the conflict in the Middle East, mainly in Iraq and Syria.

Through IS official media outlet the Amaq news agency, the group described the terrorist action as “crossfire that occurred between the Daulah Islam [Islamic State] fighters and Densus 88 personnel at a prison in Depok City, south of Jakarta”.

Structured resistance

Taking the classification of political movement strategy from Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) in The Prison Notebook (1971), these terrorists applied two resistance strategies. Gramsci called the first the war of movement or carrying out direct confrontation against the apparatus through violent acts against Densus 88. In order to boost their hate and make it into a religiously nuanced belief, the terrorists call Densus 88 anshorut thaghut (an Arabic term meaning the supporter of a satanic regime). The second strategy is the war of position, the terrorists and their supporters engage in resistance through the creating of a counter culture against the status quo. By culture here we mean all activities that support their stance when they are not in physical confrontation with the state.

This cultural movement is reflected in their daily attitude, starting from the way they dress, the music they listen to, the choice of language, the way they choose spouses, set up educational institutions to how they operate houses of worship.

Without trying to spread fear, the writer believes the terrorist act at Mako Brimob should be understood as the tip of the iceberg of a structured and planned resistance, which is related to individual, national and global groups.

Terrorist ideology

In the micro analysis, the frequent question is what kind of people are these terrorists who, because of a dispute over food, could turn into monsters that ruthlessly took out the teeth of First Insp. Sulastri, 39, the only female member of Densus 88 and murdered five male members of Densus 88? Are they normal people? What kind of ideology drove them?

Ironically, they used religious symbolism, mainly Islam. Nevertheless, the use of violence to achieve political goals is not the monopoly of Muslims from developing countries like Indonesia.

As an academic and security practitioner, National Police chief Gen. Prof. Dr. Tito Karnavian carefully explained there are dynamics within this terrorist group. This means that although they were detained by the security apparatus for acts of terrorism, not all of them were the main players and they became radicalized while in prison.

Quite a few of them, while in prison, have become enlightened and when they are released they have become peace activists. A real example is the charismatic figure of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Ali Fauzi, the stepbrother of perpetrators of the first Bali bombing, Ali Ghufron and Amrozi, who now lives in Lamongan and leads a nongovernmental organization to counter radicalism.

What is the difference between old terrorists from JI like Ali Fauzi and new terrorists who support IS in Mako Brimob? I raised this question with one former terrorist convict. He replied immediately, “IS supporters have a more extreme understanding because of their narrower thought. They get recruited individually through the influence of propaganda and radical views on the internet and social media. This makes them egoistic and harsh against those on the other side.” Perhaps, he wanted to say JI terrorists are more civilized and that even they respected the police officers interrogating them.

De-radicalization program

Then, why does the terrorist network keep growing? The writer concludes it is not easy to change someone’s ideology.

Moreover, it will get harder if the ideology is internalized over years. That is why the writer chooses the more pragmatic method of disengagement. This method focuses on the aspect of behavioral change in former terrorist convicts rather than changing their thoughts.

This means as long as the former terrorist convicts do not use violence to attain their political goal, the writer believes that social intervention is successful even if ideologically they cannot be changed 100 percent.

In the context of terrorism in Indonesia, these actors often get oxygen from their social and political environment. They live in a community that sees terrorism as the work of Western countries that corner Islam or an intelligence game, or other minority viewpoints.

Such a view may be valid. A former Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) leader Dr Busyro Muqoddas in his book, Hegemoni Rezim Intelijen Sisi Gelap Peradilan Kasus Komando Jihad (Hegemony of Intelligence Regime: The Dark Side of the Trial of Komando Jihad) concluded that the Komando Jihad was an intelligence special operation led by Ali Murtopo targeting former leaders of Darul Islam.

The writer agrees the internet has changed the recruitment pattern and propaganda dissemination by the terrorist group. What unites them is the shared idea and fantasy of becoming soldiers under Abu Bakar Al Baghdadi.

The writer thinks the state will not be able to solve the terrorism problem alone. The role of society, mainly religious leaders, educators and parents, is very important.

Terrorism is a problem of humanity that will not end in the near future. That is why, whatever our political preferences, we must make the terrorist action at Mako Brimob a turning point in comprehensively and seriously improving how we handle terrorism.

As a nation, terrorism must be the common enemy, the enemy of our unity in diversity principle. Wallahualam.

Noor Huda Ismail , Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation Founder