Ideological maturity can occur when its ecosystem matures or become conducive, and a conducive ecosystem reflects its growing legitimacy among the public, or at least moral support.
By
Sarie Febriane
·5 minutes read
In the 20 years since the reform movement triggered a struggle for democracy in 1998, the country has been hit by various terror attacks. The perpetrators, who have deceitfully claimed religiosity, are riding on the wave of democracy – which they consider thagut (infidel) – to disseminate their ideology. This ideological marketing also aims for public legitimacy, and this could happen when the societal ecosystem is left to mature.
The suicide bombings on Sunday (13/05/2018) morning of three churches in Surabaya, East Java, call to mind three similar incidents that occurred early in the Reform Era: In Padangbulan, Medan, North Sumatra, on Sunday, May 28, 2000; the Christmas Eve bombings on Dec. 24, 2000 in 11 cities, and the bombing of two Jakarta churches on July 22, 2001. The Padangbulan church bombing was the first terror act of the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) organization in Indonesia.
The type of targets, namely houses of worship (a soft, or non-combatant, target), gives a fairly straightforward clue about the perpetrators’ ideological background. However, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, terrorism in the 21st century has been strongly characterized by religious terrorism or apocalyptic terrorism, with a background of deceitful religiosity. Despite its recent recording, the faith-based terror is not new to human history.
The phenomenon of apocalyptic terrorism is influenced by religious views or speculations about a dark world future and the total destruction that may take place. Collin S Gray (War, Peace, and International Relations, 2007) simplifies it as an act of terror motivated or inspired by religious ideology or dogma. In this case, issues about heaven and hell, for example, are the narrative.
The Al Qaeda era was a benchmark for such acts of terror. After Al Qaeda\'s downfall, Islamic State (IS) emerged as the new global patron, originally from Al Qaeda cells in Iraq (AQI). This IS entity then continued the global terrorist movement under the doctrine of Salafi jihadism. Even though it contains the term "Salafi", its understanding is not singular and not solely synonymous with violence.
Shiraz Maher explains in Salafy-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (2016) that the doctrine of Salafi jihadism, which the IS claims to follow, is characterized at least by an understanding of takfiri, which labels religious brothers as infidels, and extreme/radical jihad that raises violence/war.
‘DIY’ terrorism
Even though at its core, the strength of IS – or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria – has subsided, it has popularized a style of terrorism that was not propagated by its elder brother, Al Qaeda. This form of "Do It Yourself” terrorism has become a widespread phenomenon, including in Indonesia. The spread of the diaspora that follows radical teaching is supported by communications technology, which facilitates everything and anyone, even terrorism convicts in prisons.
The practice of "DIY terrorism" does not need the usual structural command within an organization. Small groups -- terrorist researcher Marc Sageman also calls it a "bunch of guys" – can simply carry out violence/war in the name of jihad at any time and anywhere. In Leaderless Jihad (2007), Sageman predicted this terror phenomenon, which is now widespread. In Indonesia, a concrete example of the phenomenon are groups such as Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD), which was allegedly responsible for the three church bombings in Surabaya yesterday.
JAD cannot be regarded as an organization, as said the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) report of February 2016, "Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence".
JAD is a kind of generic entity in Indonesia that supports IS and swears allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, 46. The perpetrator of the Mako Brimob headquarters riot, Wawan Kurniawan, 42, alias Abu Afif of JAD Pekanbaru, for example, swore allegiance to Baghdad on his own in July 2014.
The phenomenon of "DIY terrorism" and JAD in Indonesia is a portrait of today\'s very fluid, flexible and active practice of terror that can be conducted at any time, and anywhere, by anyone.
Public legitimacy
In its strategy, ideological marketing, which, wrapped in religious dogma, has made it easy for the "market" to absorb – the market being the public majority that adheres to a religion whose dogma has been hijacked to justify terror. The involvement of women (and their families) as the vanguard of the terror attacks in yesterday’s three Surabaya church bombings at the very least showed the increasing maturity of extreme ideology in the present market.
The involvement of women as suicide bombers, such as in Surabaya yesterday, was actually predicted more than a year ago, at least according to an IPAC study that released its reports on Jan. 31, 2017.
Ideological maturity can occur when its ecosystem matures or become conducive, and a conducive ecosystem reflects its growing legitimacy among the public, or at least moral support. Gaining public legitimacy is clearly important for terror groups in carrying out their agenda more smoothly.
An ecosystem that enables extremist ideologies to rally public legitimacy can be seen through the symptoms that have been easily and recently observed, starting from intolerance against minorities that the state responds to in a vague way, the steady promotion of identity politics, including by representatives of the people, to the introduction of discourse on the application of the Religion Law and to the establishment of a religious state, and to the spread of religious conservatism, including among the urban middle class that sharply polarizes fellow adherents.
Therefore, it is not surprising that public opinion is divided whenever a terror attack occurs or terrorist groups are arrested. A part condemns the attacks, but others accuse the attacks of being engineered with a dose of conspiracy theory.
The range of public moral support for terrorism stretches widely, from open support through hate speeches to support with concealed in various packages of behavior.