Indonesia, Palestine and the UNSC
Indonesia must be proud of its successful campaign to become a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. As a UNSC member, Indonesia holds a larger responsibility for safeguarding world peace and resolving global security issues.
The results are announced during a General Assembly meeting to elect the five non-permanent members of the Security Council June 8 at the United Nations in New York.
Indonesia must be proud of its successful campaign to become a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
As a UNSC member, Indonesia holds a larger responsibility for safeguarding world peace and resolving global security issues. One of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s commitments is resolving the Palestinian conflict.
Thus far, the main idea for resolving the Palestinian conflict has always been achieving independence for Palestine in a two-state solution. Within this framework, there are three key variables that determine the progress of Palestine’s struggle for independence.
The first variable is the strategy for Palestine’s independence struggle. The second variable is the presence of a pro-peace alliance within the Israeli government. The last variable is the presence of external actors in mediating the peace process and directing it towards Palestine’s independence. Of these three variables, Indonesia has only missed the second one – due to its refusal to build a diplomatic relationship with Israel. Thus, what contributions can Indonesia make at the UNSC to push for Palestinian independence?
A shift in the Palestine strategy
Palestine’s independence struggle is divided into three options, the first being bilateral negotiations with Israel. Initiated through the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, the negotiations ran aground after the failures of the Camp David and Taba summits in the early 2000s. The main champion of this method was the United States. The bilateral negotiations failed after the US decided to no longer be a mediator. The US still attempted to mediate talks from time to time, but it was mostly unplanned and intermittent.
The second option is an armed struggle. This method is espoused by Hamas. Prior to 1993, Palestinian resistance groups had led armed struggles to achieve independence. However, after the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles, this method was abandoned.
Palestinians wave national flags during a gathering in the Northern West Bank city of Jenin on November 29, 2012.
Since the Second Intifada began in 2002, the paramilitary Al-Aqsa Brigade, which was affiliated with Fatah, has resorted to armed struggle once more. Currently, several military wings affiliated with internal groups of the PLO, Hamas and several other entities, are resorting to armed struggle to achieve Palestinian independence.
The third and most recent approach is to use international organizations, such as the United Nations, to seek recognition of sovereignty. This was initiated by Mahmoud Abbas amid stymied bilateral negotiations and Abbas’ consistency of not resorting to violence. This method has produced the most progress. Currently, Palestine is a non-member observer state of the UN and a member of several UN bodies.
Furthermore, a majority of UN member states recognize Palestine’s sovereignty. The largest obstacle for full UN recognition resides in the UNSC. It is in this context that Indonesia can campaign for Palestine’s freedom and sovereignty.
The largest hurdle for Indonesia to achieve this is the United States’ strong interest in protecting Israel through the UNSC. Between 1972 and 2017, the US has issued 43 vetoes on UNSC draft resolutions related to Israel – 10 of which are draft resolutions related to Lebanon and one related to Syria. A majority of the draft resolutions are related to Palestine.
Four of these drafts were related to Jerusalem and four others were related to Jewish settlements. The rest were related to military operations and security issues. In many cases, the US was the sole objector to the drafts.
The US often vetoes draft resolutions deemed to be harmful for Israel. A prominent example of the US not using its veto right is UNSC Resolution No. 2334 on Jewish settlements. The Obama administration allowed the draft resolution that cornered Israel to be adopted by the UNSC.
It needs to be noted that the resolution is non-binding and was taken at a time when tension peaked between Israel under Netanyahu and the US under Obama. Nevertheless, despite the US not vetoing the resolution, it still provided military assistances to Israel throughout 2016.
The succession of the Obama administration by the Trump administration was marked with the US vetoing a UNSC draft resolution on the status of Jerusalem in late 2017. Egypt’s draft resolution was a reaction to the US’s plan to move its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The Trump administration finally did this in 2018. That shift marked the return of a pro-Israel stance in the US government.
(Left to right) The Foreign Ministers from Germany, Heiko Maas; South Africa, Lindiwe Sisulu; Dominican Republic, Miguel Vargas; Indonesia, Retno Marsudi and Belgium, Didier Reynders; pose for photos on the floor of the Security Council afetr a General Assembly meeting to elect the five non-permanent members of the Security Council June 8 at the United Nations in New York.
Indonesia’s solution
Of the two variables, there are three important notes that the Indonesian government must heed throughout its membership at the UNSC.
First, the thing that has been missing in the first variable is a well-structured scheme for the Palestine’s independence struggle. The three strategies to reach independence are not carried out with a singular vision. There is no singular image among Palestinian strategic leaders regarding what kind of Palestinian state they wish to establish. Consequently, it becomes easy for external parties to ferment internal rift in Palestine. One example is that the use of firearms is often exploited to corner Palestine in diplomatic forums.
Palestine’s inability to synchronize and synergize the three strategies is rooted in the internal discord within Palestine itself. In this context, Indonesia can push for an internal reconciliation in Palestine to improve the synergy of Palestine’s independence struggle. Efforts to unite the armed struggles of Hamas and other military organizations and the multilateral diplomacy of the Palestinian government are necessary.
This can be achieved through bilateral relations, considering Indonesia’s unique position in Palestine’s domestic political constellation. Indonesia has a unique camaraderie with the two major Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah. This will support efforts to synergize the Palestinian independence struggle.
Such a structural effort must still position diplomacy through the UN as the main pillar. Efforts to gain UN recognition, thus far, have been successful in UN bodies other than the UNSC. With its position as a UNSC member for the upcoming two years, Indonesia can initiate several resolutions that are more neutral towards Palestine.
Second, the centrality of the US in Palestine’s peace process/independence struggle has forced Indonesia to serve as a bridge and campaigner for Palestinian interests. Involving other huge countries apart from the US may be a possibility, but Indonesia needs to carefully calculate, so that their involvement will not harm Palestine in the long run.
Lastly, it needs to be noted that the Palestine issue should not be exploited in domestic politics. Indonesia must learn from how the Israel issue has been mixed into domestic politics in the US, resulting in the blind vetoing of UN draft resolutions. Indonesia must also learn from how the Palestine issue has often been used in internal political competitions in Arab countries. It is true that Indonesia is clearly partial in the Palestine-Israel conflict. However, we really need to ponder clearly and thoroughly what strategies we wish to adopt in pushing for Palestine’s independence.
Broto Wardoyo, Lecturer, International Relations Department, University of Indonesia
