Re-Match of Two Heroes
Questions as to who will be running in the 2019 presidential election were finally answered. What surprised the public were not Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, who will compete against each other once again, but rather their controversial running mate picks.
Questions as to who will be running in the 2019 presidential election were finally answered. What surprised the public were not Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, who will compete against each other once again, but rather their controversial running mate picks.
Speculation had been rife that Jokowi would choose Mahfud MD as his running mate, but he was replaced in the final seconds. The tug of war in Prabowo\'s camp over the vice presidential candidate was equally exciting. Sandiaga Uno was finally agreed upon after replacing Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY), who had been proposed earlier.
Elite compromise
On paper, Mahfud and AHY were actually the best choice for Jokowi and Prabowo, respectively. Mahfud, for example, has comparative advantages, at least in three aspects. First, Mahfud is a person who electorally has the potential to contribute to Jokowi\'s votes. According to the National Indicator Survey, July 2018, Mahfud ranked first as he was considered by the public to be the most appropriate to accompany Jokowi. The President clearly needs a vice president who is able to steal support from the opposing bases.
According to the Indicator survey, Mahfud had the ability to seize the pockets of Prabowo, more so than Ma\'ruf Amin. Many of Prabowo’s voters and supporters of the 212 movement considered Mahfud to be the most appropriate figure to run alongside Jokowi.
Second, Mahfud MD not only has a santri background but also has technocratic advantages. He has complete branding: having Islamic credentials that can be accepted by all circles and the technocratic superiority narrative. According to the Indicator survey of 451 opinion leaders in 30 cities throughout Indonesia, Mahfud\'s figure quality is ranked highest compared to dozens of other names.
This personal quality is measured by a combination of five dimensions: competence, integrity, reliability, charisma, and personal (Miller, Wattenberg & Malanchuk, 1986).
Mahfud\'s last selling point is that he has high integrity and is considered capable of filling the shortcomings of the Jokowi government in the first period, especially in terms of law enforcement commitment and corruption eradication.
However, Mahfud\'s comparative advantage was swept away by the rejection of party elites with various pretexts. Given his age, Mahfud is considered a threat to the elite in the upcoming elections. Mahfud\'s candidacy as vice president could have paved the way for him to advance as president in the 2024 election, something that several political parties want to avoid.
Many of Jokowi\'s coalition elites want the playing field to be flat in 2024 so that the older Ma\'ruf is considered not an important competitor even if he won in 2019. Moreover, Mahfud is also considered a disruption to the status quo of the party, where Mahfud used to work.
Therefore, the selection of Ma\'ruf as a vice presidential candidate must be read as a compromise of the elite of Jokowi\'s coalition parties. Jokowi\'s position is indeed in dilemma. If Ma\'ruf had been ignored, the solidarity of the coalition would have been disrupted. The threat of several parties leaving his coalition and forming a third forced Jokowi to choose Mahfud.
If a third coalition was formed, mathematically it would be difficult for Jokowi to win the presidential election in one round, given the 50 percent plus 1 support requirement. Moreover, Jokowi\'s electability is not too high. The Jakarta gubernatorial election, when Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama was ousted in the second round, gave Jokowi no other choice but to accept Ma\'ruf as part of efforts to take the middle road.
Ma\'ruf certainly is not without added value. The emergence of his name made Jokowi\'s political opponents think a thousand times about using identity politics. I do not want to say that the potential to use Ethnicity, Religion, Tribe and Intergroup (SARA) issues will disappear altogether in the 2019 presidential election fight, but at least the dose of using the medieval issues may not be as strong as in the 2014 presidential election and the 2017 Jakarta regional elections.
Ma\'ruf as chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council, as well as general chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board (PBNU, made anyone opposed to Jokowi reluctant to bombard Jokowi with anti-Islamic, anti-ulema, and the like issues. Ma\'ruf became a symbolic fortress in countering the medieval issues. When identity politics subsides, elites and the public will be forced to enter into programmatic, substantive and quality debates. Here is precisely the challenge. Ma\'ruf must also be tested for competence and capacity in responding to the challenges of the global economy, social inequality, and other technocratic issues.
Coalition commodities
The drama of the selection of Sandi as Prabowo\'s vice presidential candidate was also controversial and noisy. Before the determination of Sandi as the vice presidential candidate, Deputy Secretary-General of the Democratic Party Andi Arief attacked all directions by calling Prabowo a "cardboard general", who was subject to logistical strength rather than logic. He also accused National Mandate Party (PAN) and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) of receiving Rp 500 billion each as compensation for supporting Sandi. Gerindra Deputy Chairperson Arief Poyuono struck back by calling Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) "the true cardboard general" because many SBY cadres were involved in corruption cases whose money was stored in cardboard boxes.
This coalition commotion can be explained in terms of coalition commodities, which were exchanged among parties before making a choice to Jokowi or Prabowo. Our Constitution clearly mentions the nomination of presidential and vice presidential candidates must go through the vehicle of political parties. Law No. 7 of 2017 then sets the threshold for nominating at 20 percent of the House of Representatives (DPR) seats or 25 percent of the national valid votes. The party\'s bargaining position automatically rises because anyone cannot advance the presidential election without party approval, and the party\'s ticket will not be "sold for free".
There are three coalition incentives pursued by the parties which explain the choice to Jokowi or Prabowo. First, the coattail effect or down-ballot effect. In the simultaneous presidential and legislative elections, there is an assumption that is widely believed, namely the party\'s vote is determined by the presidential-vice presidential package the party supports. The problem is that Jokowi\'s or Prabowo\'s figures are already strong in their respective associations. If public satisfaction with Jokowi goes up, the electability of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) is lifted, despite the fact that the party supporting the government is not only PDI-P. On the other hand, if Jokowi\'s approval rating decreases, Prabowo\'s popularity rises and his electoral blessing is monopolized by Gerindra, even though the opposition party is not only Gerindra.
Therefore, other parties were trying to propose their figures as the vice presidential candidates for Jokowi or Prabowo. Jokowi, who is supported by six old parties and three new parties, inevitably prioritizes names from non-party parties to avoid jealousy of his internal parties.
Then what coalition incentives are the main attractions to join Jokowi? Power sharing in the cabinet. This is possible because all credible surveys still place Jokowi as a favorite choice, allowing his supporting parties to get incentives after winning. This is where the severity faced by Prabowo lies. The surveys still put Prabowo under Jokowi so that the power sharing offer was considered too far and not concrete. Therefore, Democratic Party, PKS and PAN which support him insist on forcing their figures to be invited as Prabowo\'s running mates.
Actually compared to other names that were referred to as Prabowo\'s future vice presidential candidate, AHY is the most rational choice. First, AHY has the potential to increase the electoral market share for Prabowo. Prabowo himself was already attached to Islamic attribution so that the name of the chairman of the Syura Council of the PKS, Salim Segaf Al-Jufrie, or PAN general chairman Zulkifli Hasan had no significant electoral value added for Prabowo. Secondly, AHY is perceived to have logistical power so that he can meet the needs of the campaign and compensate to other parties whose elite are not elected as vice presidential candidates. Third, nevertheless AHY comes from the clan of SBY, who was proven to win twice since the presidential election regime was implemented in 2004.
It turns out that behind-the-scene negotiations are not easy. The name AHY did not appear as a potential vice presidential candidate recommended by the scholars of the National Movement to Safeguard Fatwas (GNPF). Logistics issues are also considered not as big as imagined. If Prabowo had insisted on choosing AHY, that might have meant losing the support of the PKS and PAN. If these two Islamic parties left the coalition, Prabowo would have lost the legitimacy of "Islam". Finally, Sandi came as a lifesaver. PAN and PKS remained confident in Prabowo as Sandi is a member of Gerindra. It would have been different if AHY advanced to become a vice presidential candidate; the coattail effect would have been monopolized by Gerindra and Democratic Party. Not to mention the cardboard issues brought by Sandi, who according to Andi Arief, was able to reduce the thirst of party logistics.
The 2019 presidential election will be the replay of an old song. Two fighters return to the battlefield, but not with the best running mates. Picking Ma\'ruf will require Jokowi to work extra hard in approaching young voters, whose proportion reaches 52 percent of voters. Meanwhile, Sandi, who was not a recommendation from the ulemas, may cause Prabowo to lose the support of ulemas. Politics is not easy.
Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Political Science lecturer at the School of Social and Political Science at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN); Executive Director of Indonesian Political Indicators