The Resilience of Political Coalitions

KOMPAS/DIDIE SW

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It has been confirmed that two coalition camps – Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s – will face each other in the 2019 presidential election. The political coalitions are expected to act as initiators as well as political aggregators.

All parties must realize that political coalitions are a necessity. Both sides must be given the same space in our democracy, because the party coalition is the fruit of reform and guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution. Current patterns will continue to recur because our general election system requires parties and/or a coalition of parties to form a government. Based on the result of the 2014 general election, it is almost certain that the parties cannot support the presidential and vice presidential candidates alone.

The coalition is a political pathway for replacing national leadership. Whether a coalition is solid or not will have a major impact on the nation and state. Therefore, the issue of political and democratic stability is tied to the degree of solidity, or lack thereof, of a coalition.

Problematic coalition "culture"

When looking at the coalition patterns of both camps, they are almost similar. The camps have formed a similar party ideology – one that is nationalist-religious. In Jokowi\'s camp, of the seven supporting parties, two adhere to "religious-Islamic" ideology, namely the United Development Party (PPP) and the National Awakening Party (PKB). Although the PKB declared itself an open party and one that is based on Pancasila, symbolically, it can still be categorized as a party with "religious-Islamic" ideology. Prabowo\'s camp also holds a nationalist-religious view. In it are the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Democratic Party and the Gerindra Party.

This ideological mixture is indeed not a strong reason for forming a coalition. Both camps are more inclined to run their coalition based on the minimal winning coalition (MWC) model. The difference is, one is the incumbent and the other is the opposition.

Generally, this MWC coalition model will experience some “hereditary” problems. First, in the electoral process, problems will arise in terms of voter turnout and political support. Will the party machine work in the 2019 general election without full support?

Politicians can find themselves taking on their own colleagues from a party or coalition. Inter-coalition competition has an impact politically, which also has an effect on the presidential candidate the party supports. The dynamics are further impacted by who contributes to a victory – it can be the party, a party candidate or presidential or vice-presidential candidates.

Problems tend to drag on internally within a coalition. This happens because, as seen in other countries, which have similar types of multiparty coalitions, there is a phenomenon in which there is an absence of unity on motives and coalition goals.

Problems also occur during the formation of the Cabinet because there are too many interests that will influence the elected president in arranging his Cabinet. It could be that the Cabinet that is built no longer reflects the working cabinet because the party has too many interests.

Another problem is the potential for disruption in relations between the elected president and coalition parties. If the president’s supporting party experiences a decrease in votes in the general election, then it will be deemed unfair in the divided Cabinet. General election results that do not see a majority win of at least above 25 percent will put the elected president in a difficult situation. This is a logical consequence of office-seeking, as the coalition is supported more by a party\'s power structure or the acquisition of seats in the legislature to secure an elected president, rather than the vision-mission platform.

In such a situation, the coalition\'s resilience is influenced by its formation or structure. The ad hoc structural nature of a coalition is not systematic and threatens to bring political fragmentation within a coalition. Furthermore, problems arise when there is the assumption that the party elite are a single entity that reflect the entire party structure under them.

A lack of clarity about party unity will lead to differences in support – some of the elite may end up supporting the incumbent, while several others would side with the opposition. Differences of views in the party elites is not only typical of Indonesian cases, but they are also common in several other countries due to coalition formulae that are not based on ideology and shared platforms.

Coalition catalyst

Schofield and Sened (2006) say that the strength of a coalition depends on the party. The influence of the general chairperson is important to the longevity of the party. Similarly, it is up to the general chairpersons of a coalition to communicate.

In that context, the incumbent camp has more catalytic incentivizes, as its coalition is guarded by the incumbent candidate and ruling president. Furthermore, the general chairperson of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) is the key to making decisions in difficult situations and is supported by several politicians who hold positions of power. Catalytic incentives in the opposition Prabowo camp, are less visible because the party does not rule, but there is Sandiaga Uno, a successful team and a number of other figures who are largely united under the same spirit.

The two camps actually face a similar situation, as both realize that the potential for competition, both internal and otherwise, comes with the territory of building a coalition. Prabowo’s coalition is smaller and, as such, is in theory easier to manage, but the threat of a lack of resilience is far greater than in Jokowi’s camp.

As various issues can trigger division, how the coalition thrives is related to a number of issues, including internal competition, conflicting interests, political bargaining, and profits and losses.

Moch. Nurhasim, Researcher at the Political Research Center of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)