2019 Presidential Election: Old Strategy, New Content

HERYUNANTO

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It has nearly been two months since campaigning began for the 2019 presidential election. Instead of a battle of ideas (read: the direction and ideas for development), the campaigns are full of negative campaigns and fake news.

Upon further observation, the two candidate pairs generally seem to be stuck in their (presidential) campaigns from 2014; not just in terms of repetition, but also deepening and expansion. Narrowing this further, the two candidates appear to be applying “emotional branding” tactics.

The literature says that emotional branding focuses on efforts that appeal to voters’ feelings and emotions. In order to do this, the candidates – as political brands – must demonstrate understanding for the voters’ lives, aspirations and motivations through the communication narratives and tactics they choose to employ. The voters will feel as though they are empowered and connected to a particular candidate. In turn, they will feel compelled to participate in society and to encourage solidarity.

Deepening and expansion

The decision to continue with the old strategies is understandable. At the macro level, the candidates do not fundamentally differ in their positions on key policies. Using different narratives, both Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Prabowo Subianto offer an Indonesia that is powerful, independent and progressive in developing state-owned enterprises (SOEs), provides equitable development, controls conglomerates and sides with the poor (vulnerable people) in providing various subsidies. As Dean, at al. (2015) wrote, when no significant difference exists in candidates’ ideology or policy vision, the competition will focus on emotional aspects to establish differentiation among campaigns.

Furthermore, the 2014 presidential election polarized voters to gradually establish a strong voter base for Prabowo. It is no exaggeration to say that community solidarity and a highly militant sense of unity has developed among this voter base. The driving force and glue is not the “superior” figure of Prabowo, but the issues he has raised. To be more specific, these issues are directly related to identity politics.

A similar thing has happened with Jokowi. He also has a solid supporter base, but they have not united as a single community. They are divided among various groups, some of which even have conflicting stances and views. The figure of Jokowi is their glue and driving force.

In the 2019 presidential election, the two candidates will still rely on the same things they did in 2014: Prabowo on his identity politics and Jokowi on his personal charm. To maintain and develop their individual voter base, the two are raising enthusiasm among their supporters. This enthusiasm allows voters to participate in a situation they are already familiar with, and thereby encourages and heightens their partisan behavior (MacKuen, et al., 2007).

This feeling of enthusiasm encompasses hope, pride and empathy (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993). The Prabowo camp mainly awakens a hope for victory, and began this long before the start of the official campaign period with the #2019 gantipresiden (#2019 changethepresident) hashtag. This was followed by a number of regional election victories among the candidates promoting this hashtag, with the most important aspects being their use of the same approach on identity issues, as happened in the North Sumatra gubernatorial election.

In contrast, the enthusiasm of Jokowi supporters is simply a reaction to the hope exhibited by the Prabowo camp. The #Jokowi2periode (second term for Jokowi) and other hashtags are a symbolic representation of the voters’ political choice. However, it also represents the worry of the Jokowi camp, which did not anticipate the abovementioned pre-campaign movement. As Just, et al. (2007) said, hope on the one side encourages worry/fear on the other.

The overall thrust of the basic strategy has been revealed. The camp of Prabowo supporters are not relying on the figure of Prabowo, but on the symbolic message of the revival of Islam (political Islam) and “pribumi” (indigenous people) behind the #2019 gantipresiden hastag. On the other side, Jokowi supporters are relying on the figure of Jokowi – understandably so, considering Jokowi’s position as the incumbent.

The identity politics that had formerly remained abstract is experiencing a kind of consolidation in the 2019 presidential election, because it is linked to the Jokowi government’s actions and policies, whether or not they were carried out. The issue of Chinese foreign workers, for example, is being used to solidify the opposition’s messages on “the danger of aseng (Chinese) and asing (foreigners)”.

The same goes for the legal cases involving religious figures, which are being used by some Prabowo supporters to consolidate their “anti-Islam” messages. It has turned out that selecting Ma’rul Amin as Jokowi’s running mate has not eliminated these kinds of messages. Aside from transforming him as an “Islamic defender”, Ma’ruf, the chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council, has also been “desacralized” with various stigmas ranging from his being “used” by the government camp and to accusations as a power-seeking opportunist.

This consolidation on one side is an effort to awaken worry in the other. This will, in turn, prompt voters to depart from their partisan stance to take a more open approach in their choices. They are prompted to examine the candidates further, even though the results do not necessarily mean a change in their choices (MacKuen, at al., 2007).

In the experimental study of Lau, et al. (2007), it was discovered that worry forms upon a significant difference in the initial information the voters had and the new information they receive. This difference can ensue from the candidates’ quality or from the candidate’s position on any number of issues. However, this is more applicable when voters further examine their preferred candidates as well as the other candidates.

Therefore, it can be said that the consolidation of issues related to identity politics is directed at disrupting Jokowi’s base. This disruption is intended to urge voter defection, as well as to target swing voters. As the challenger, Prabowo’s primary fuel is, of course, economic issues. Pessimism, incapability and broken promises are his main themes.

At the same time, the consolidation of identity issues is also directed at solidifying Prabowo’s base. The way it does this is by transforming worry into anger. Angry voters are no longer careful about deciphering information and tend toward stereotyping (Hudi and Feldman, 2007). It would be unsurprising if taglines such as “Mecca Axis vs, Beijing Axis” or “Allah Parties vs. Satan’s Parties” emerge and are welcomed, as these would allow Prabowo’s base to rationalize their political choice.

Overall, a mix of hope and anger will emerge because these emotions are frequently expressed as aspirations on a variety of issues and policies at political rallies. Any political event will be engineered in such a way so as to indicate the presence of an extraordinary threat against the candidate or the ideals of their supporters – or couched in terms of protecting and defending supporters who make errors of speech or even violate regulations.

In contrast, the incumbent camp realizes that their main strength in the contest lies within the figures they consider to be their strongest assets – and their greatest risk if these figures are sidelined. This is seen from the intense communication that expounds on the attributes of Jokowi’s personality (populist, friendly, down to earth and just). In referring to the personal brand of Aaker (1997), these are part and parcel of Jokowi’s honest character.

His character was effective in 2014 because, first, it offered something new (antithesis) in light of the leadership characteristics a la Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (military, manly, intellectual and good-looking), which had become entrenched as the leadership standard for nearly 10 years. Secondly, Prabowo’s character (military, established, strict and bold) is relatively on a parallel with SBY’s character

The developments since 2014 focus on excitement (young and vibrant spirit) and competence (hard-working). Jokowi’s personal characteristics enable voters to identify easily with him Jokowi and the handful of other figures that personify him as a “Jokowi admirers”.

The problem is that in the 2019 election, Jokowi is the incumbent. As the incumbent, his work is evaluated on two fronts: his voters and Prabowo’s voters in 2014. His communication strategies that reveal a new dimension to his personality such as vlogging and donning sneakers, riding big motorcycles and the like only strengthens the positive appeal of his personality traits.

The voters need something new, particularly in relation to his official seat, but they cannot be extreme. For example, trying to represent Jokowi as “manly” would be inauthentic to voters and will therefore be disregarded or even have the opposite effect. On the other hand representing Jokowi as a reliable figure (read: a master at being responsive to and resolving problems), for example, would be more in keeping with earlier perceptions of his personality and suited to his position as the incumbent.

In this, Prabowo has anticipated the strength of Jokowi’s personality in his selection of Sandiaga Uno as his running rate. Sandiaga is presented as successful, religious, social, good-looking and smart. Moreover, Sandiaga has stood on a greater number of political stages. This is an attempt to not only to “neutralize” Jokowi’s charm, but also shift attention away from Prabowo.

The Jokowi camp, of course, realizes the incumbent’s compulsion to show its successes. The voters must be convinced that they were not wrong in choosing him. The Jokowi camp prefers to awaken pride in Indonesia’s progress and hope for a brighter future. The problem is, they have been communicating these in a relatively dull manner, mainly focusing on figures. They carry minimal narratives and are thus ineffective, especially among undecided voters.

In addition, the Jokowi camp is also trying to raise worry among voters by reiterating Prabowo’s character and track record, primarily to show their unsuitability with the position of president, especially in relation to diversity and the country’s future. The theme is an effective choice for strengthening his base, but has not been effective in disrupting Prabowo’s supporters. Diversity is frequently couched as a battle between Pancasila and religiosity, which has the potential to heat up tensions during the campaign period.

Turning point

Despite its effectiveness, the emotional approach is not without its dangers. The first danger is that brand users (read: voters) could create their own narratives that are very distant from the candidate’s intension. The candidate’s brand will become inauthentic if it is “sacralized”. It could also become irrelevant to general voters if a small group promotes its own political agenda by hijacking the candidate’s brand.

This could be tolerated up to a certain point to maintain the “unity” of the voter community, to allow supporters the space to express themselves, or to use as a “vaccine” against the opposing side’s viral negative campaign. Nevertheless, this could “do a 180” in the case of an “overdose”.

A political “branding overdose” will anger the opponent’s anxious supporters and therefore strengthen their attachment to their preferred candidate. This will also encourage some supporters to become overanxious and thus force them to seek new information on their preferred candidate.

Moreover, a candidate’s brand also has the potential to undergo what Thompson, et al. (2006) called the "Doppelganger brand image". This happens when the public, social organizations, information leaders, bloggers and political activists independently create negative narratives about a candidate\'s brand as a form of sociocultural resistance. Such negative narratives are not restricted to the candidate’s name, logo and taglines, but also their political programs. They take a candidate’s brand and turn them into parodies or use negative symbols and meanings to represent them with the intent to belittle, insult, blame and other ways of mitigating the “branding overdose”.

Branding overdoses and distorted brands changes the meaning behind the candidate’s original brand, and the damaging effects that result can be unexpected. At this point, the two camps must reexamine their emotional branding strategy. Mistakes in anticipating and addressing these two dangers can have fatal consequences to a campaign, especially with regard to today’s increasingly polarized presidential contest.

Yunarto Wijaya, Executive Director, Charta Politika