Putting Out the Flames in Papua
For 50 years, the fire of the Papua conflict has continued to smolder, and has now flared up once again.
For 50 years, the fire of the Papua conflict has continued to smolder, and has now flared up once again. Triggered by the racial discrimination and abuse in East Java on 15-16 Aug. ahead of Indonesia\'s Independence Day, the public’s response in Papua and West Papua led to anarchic actions that continued until the end of August.
Their demands developed from an initial apology for the racial treatment and strict enforcement of the law against the perpetrators to greater demands that even included a Papuan referendum. It must be acknowledged that the mass action in Papua was born as a reaction to the racial discrimination in East Java, but even more fundamentally, as human solidarity through the accumulated momentum of the acute and prolonged conflict in Papua.
The racial discrimination that triggered the anger in Papua is just one of the complex problems that gave rise to the Papua conflict. Aside from the issue of discrimination, the Papua Studies Team of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), as published in its 2009 research study, Papua Road Map, has discovered three other root causes of the Papua conflict, including historical status and politics, the failure of development and state violence and human rights violations (Widjojo, 2009). These four root causes persist to date – now 10 years since the Papua Road Map was published – to fan the flames of conflict in Papua. Like a time bomb, the conflict can burst into flame at any moment, and that time has arrived now.
Failure to curb conflict
We of course hope that the flames of conflict in Papua will soon subside and be extinguished. It must be admitted that the government has not resorted to maintaining its silence and has instead tried to extinguish it. The Reform Era governments have shifted its efforts in conflict resolution from the security approach of the New Order era to a development approach that prioritizes the improved welfare of the Papuan people. This means that the government has abandoned the use of bullets and military operations as the only means for ending the conflict. However, the flames of conflict are difficult to extinguish, because the government remains coercive, partial and inconsistent in its approach to resolution.
Even though the military revoked its “area of operations” status for Papua long ago, coercive measures that closely resemble the security approach – such as the use of force, coercion and even violence – are still being employed in managing problems in Papua. As a result, a number of alleged human rights violations against Papuans have emerged. At least 11 alleged cases of human rights violations have occurred in Papua during the Reform Era. Of these, it has been suggested that the three cases in Wasior (2001), Wamena (2003) and Paniai (2014) belong to the category of gross human rights violations.
In fact, resolving conflicts requires the state to present its compassionate face, and not its aggressive face. This is especially important if the country wants to allay Papua’s memoria passionis [memory of human atrocities] of past military operations.
The development approach of granting special autonomy in 2001, which was expected to help resolve the conflict, has proven ineffective because it was implemented partially and inconsistently. Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province (Otsus Law), which was drafted by academics and the elite in Papua, is more comprehensive than merely economic development. It also contains articles on upholding and respecting human rights, providing historical clarity on Papua, recognizing Papua’s cultural symbols, taking affirmative measures and various other efforts to develop Papua. Unfortunately, the Otsus Law has fallen far below expectations, as many of its provisions were not implemented.
Overlapping laws and/or the lack of regulations on the technical implementation of the Otsus Law have caused the many problems as the source of its failure. For example, the government states that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (KKR), which was to provide historical clarity and formulate a reconciliatory measure, was not formed because the Constitutional Court revoked Law No. 27/2004 on the KKR in December 2006 (Kontras, 2010; Budiatri, 2017).
The failure to establish the KKR is only one among the many efforts to address political, historical and human rights issues mandated by the Otsus Law that were not implemented. Of the many provisions in the law, most of those that were implemented only concerned the developmental aspect, whereas development issues are not the only cause of conflict in Papua.
The coercive, partial and inconsistent efforts at conflict resolution – which has been made evident in the alleged human rights violations and the ineffectuality of the special autonomy policy – has become blended with a variety of other complicated issues, such as nonintegrated interministerial/interinstitutional and/or central-regional policies, the continuing formulation of top-down policies, the absence of a grand design for Papua\'s special autonomy, and the convoluted map of actors in both Jakarta and Papua. As a result, the approach to conflict resolution the government has adopted is not effective enough to end the Papua conflict; instead of ending it, the approach heightened the potential for the conflict to worsen, due to the Papuan people’s declining trust in a government that continually failed to resolve its root causes.
Urgency for Papua dialog
The widespread demonstrations that took place in Papua and West Papua are a reminder to us that the manner in which the Papua conflict is managed must change. Coercive, partial and inconsistent measures must be replaced with a new, comprehensive and compassionate approach.
Based on its research since 2004, the LIPI Papua Studies Team urges dialogue as the new approach to ending the conflict. In this case, “dialogue” is more than just a meeting between the President or government representatives and Papuan leaders, but refers to taking a strategic approach to discussing problems, finding bilateral solutions and creating binding agreements among all actors of the Papua conflict (Elisabeth, 2017).
Frequent doubts have been raised that dialogue could be used in resolving conflict in Papua. This is because the Papuan counterpart does not form a hierarchical structure like in Aceh, so it is very difficult to identify representatives that possess public legitimacy to engage in dialogue. This condition should not be viewed as an obstacle to the dialogue approach, and should instead be understood that the dialog with Papua will take a different format than the Aceh dialogue.
Because of the unique characteristics of the actors in the Papua conflict, the dialogue must be inclusive in involving many parties, including the central government, local administrations, Papuan communities, migrant communities, religious groups, activists, youths, academics, the Papua National Liberation Army (TPN)/Free Papua Movement (OPM), the Papuan diaspora, and other stakeholders. The parties to the dialogue must then discuss all root causes of the Papuan issue together. The dialogue approach should also be employed in discussing sociopolitical and human rights issues, and not just the development issue. Dialogue can thus be the key to inclusively and comprehensively resolving all issues.
While dialogue used to be taboo, many now believe it to be an effective way to extinguish the flames in the Land of Papua. Indonesia also has a historical record as one of the few countries that has successfully used dialogue as a method of resolution, such as in the case of Aceh and Ambon. Indonesia is also recognized for its strong commitment to promoting peace through dialog, such as in the Rohingya conflict in Myanmar and in the southern Philippines case.
This should arm the government with the confidence to avoid any further delay in engaging in dialog. Furthermore, President Jokowi expressed his support for pursuing this approach two years ago and appointed Coordinating Political, Law and Security Affairs Minister Gen. (Ret.) Wiranto, then-chief of staff Teten Masduki and then-Papua Peace Network coordinator Pater Neles Tebay (dec.) to the task of readying the sectoral dialog. Although this sectoral dialog that President Jokowi initiated has yet to take place, it can be revived as a step in extinguishing the flames of conflict in Papua. As Papua conflict researcher Muridan Widjojo (dec.) stated: "Dialogue does not kill anyone; if it fails [at first], dialogue can be repeated."
We of course realize that the success of the dialog approach hinges upon the commitment on the part of both the government and the various Papuan actors to see it through. But it is certain that delaying dialogue means allowing the flames of conflict to continue raging to grow into an even bigger conflagration.
Aisah Putri Budiatri, Researcher, Papua Studies Team, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)