KPK (Threatened) to be Paralyzed

KOMPAS/HERU SRI KUMORO

Abraham Samad

Apparently the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is the only state institution whose existence is disliked by many parties. Of course, those who do not like the KPK are those who have interests that are not in line with the anti-corruption agenda of the KPK: the corruptors and their coalitions.

They are the main enemy of the KPK, as well as the enemy of the Indonesian people whose mind is sound. They create a coalition of interests. The coalition of interests does not only physically injure the KPK -- its personnel are terrorized and criminalized -- but also institutionally.

The KPK Law has been tested several times in the Constitutional Court, by questioning several KPK enforcement authorities. Some of the material tests were carried out in conjunction with the pretrial submission that was filed by a corruption case suspect. Of course, the aim is to amputate the KPK\'s authority so that he is free from the traps of the law.

Now, the House of Representatives (DPR) again wants to revise the KPK Law. The first page of Kompas (5/9/2019) published the DPR\'s strategy through the revision of the KPK Law. Kompas.com (5/9/2018) even ran an article with the headline "Quiet operation for the revision of the KPK Law". Yes, indeed this is a silent operation, as it was decided in a closed meeting of less than 20 minutes.

The DPR with "thick ears" simply ignores widespread protests by civil society who reject the revision. Moreover, this revision agenda runs in the middle of the selection process for KPK leadership candidates. The selection committee of candidates for the KPK leadership also had "thick ears" against civil society inputs. There has been no commissioner selection that has taken place so sensationally as the selection of the candidates for the KPK leadership.

There are at least six crucial points in the planned revision of the KPK Law. Some of them will paralyze the KPK. First, the KPK wants to be included as a law enforcement agency in the executive or government branch of power (under the President), while KPK employees are civil servants (ASN) who are subject to the law.

Second, the issue of wiretapping. This revision requires that wiretapping must go through the KPK Supervisory Board\'s permission.

Third, the KPK must synergize with other law enforcement agencies according to criminal procedural laws.

Fourth, each agency, ministry, and institution must report the state administration assets (LHKPN) before and after the end of the term of office. This is done in order to improve the performance of the KPK.

Fifth, there is an organ called the KPK Supervisory Board which is tasked with overseeing the KPK in carrying out its duties. The KPK Supervisory Board, which consists of five people, is assisted by a supervisory implementing organ.

Sixth, the revision allows the KPK to stop investigating and prosecuting corruption if the investigation and prosecution is not completed within a maximum period of one year.

Paralyzed KPK

The first, second, fifth and sixth revision points will paralyze the KPK. Why? The first tactic, if the KPK is under the structure of executive power, the independent status of the KPK automatically disappears. In fact, independence is a key condition for the establishment of an anti-corruption body/institution. When the KPK is under the executive, the KPK will work by following the executive programs, such as ministries or other bodies under executive authority. In this situation the KPK will experience a conflict of interest with the government\'s agenda, which is vulnerable to corruption. The KPK will also clash with the Prosecutor\'s Office whose constitutional design is under the President, in the "struggle for influence". In the end, the KPK will turn into a Corruption Prevention Commission, just doing corruption prevention tasks, nothing more.

The second tactic, the revision wants to paralyze the collective collegial system of the KPK leadership in making decisions by extending the tapping channel by involving the Supervisory Board\'s permission. It seems that the drafting of the revised KPK Law did not know the standard operational procedure (SOP) of the investigation, including wiretapping at the KPK. Before wiretapping is carried out, the permit must pass through many desks: the chief of the task force, the director of investigation, the deputy for prosecution, then the table of five leaders. Thus, the fifth collegial collective system of the KPK leadership is part of the supervision system. It is not necessary to involve other agencies that will extend the wiretapping path with the risk of leaking it before it is run.

The third strategy, the revision would like to form an organ called the KPK Supervisory Board which is tasked with overseeing the KPK in carrying out its duties. What is the urgency of establishing a supervisory body when the KPK has an advisory board? If the reason is to oversee the KPK from potential abuse of authority, who can guarantee that the Supervisory Board will be free from interests? The KPK already has a detection system and internal enforcement procedures if there are leaders or employees who abuse their authority. There is an Internal Supervisor (PI) who applies the zero tolerance SOP to all examinees, the leadership is no exception. The collegial collective system of the five KPK leaders is also part of supervising each other. Moreover, if there are serious violations by the leadership, a code of ethics assembly can be formed to process it.

The fourth strategy, the revision would like to give the KPK the authority to stop the investigation and prosecution of corruption if the investigation and prosecution is not completed within one year. This is the same as the authority of the prosecutors and the police, an authority that is frequently put under the spotlight by civil society. Moreover, so far the KPK has always maintained its evidence in every Corruption Court session even without the investigation of the termination warrant (SP3) authority. Because the process of investigation, questioning and prosecution in the KPK is connected in "one roof" with one deputy, the deputy of prosecution. So, the KPK should not be ordered to compromise with the corruption case it investigates by giving the authority to issue SP3.

Redundant

So, there is no urgent legal interest to revise the KPK Law other than political interests. The DPR needs to be reminded that there are many other bills that are more important to discuss than planning to revise the KPK Law. The voice of civil society is the voice that comes from common sense, non-interest. Its interest is simply that Indonesia is free of corruption.

It would be more useful if the energy is diverted to discuss the issue of corruption in the direction of changing the Corruption Law. How the Corruption Law is able to cover the mode of corruption by embezzling the assets/wealth of state officials that are widely stored abroad. How can the Corruption Law be able to reach out to the practice of money politics in an extremely massive scale in general elections. How the Corruption Law is able to reach political parties as subjects who can be held liable for criminal corruption. And many other corruption issues that can be discussed with civil society.

Abraham Samad, Chairman of KPK 2011-2015