Democratic Deficit in Election Year
At the end of 2019, some of us are worried about the future of democracy. At the beginning of the year, some of us were worried about the prospect of the (simultaneous) general election.
When the 2019 simultaneous election ended, there was a relief as if a heavy burden had been lifted off our shoulders. The public expressed appreciation. According to some surveys, the majority of respondents considered the elections fair. However, their implementation was not without problems.
From a series of quality election indicators, some need careful attention. First, the 2019 simultaneous elections confirm that the implementation of elections in the Reform Era is still looking for its form. An impression of trial and error is unescapable. The rules of the game do not only continue to change from one election to the next but are also marked by legal uncertainty. Examples of the latter include rules on former corruption convicts running for office, requirements for candidates for the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) and also the verification of parties participating in the election.
Second, the implementation of the 2019 general election also reflected a failure to fix a number of chronic problems that have existed for years, including chaos in the preparation of the fixed voter list (DPT) and common vote-buying practices, but very little could be processed further. The position of the mass media is also always debated, but there was no solution acceptable to all stakeholders.
The implementation of the 2019 general election also reflected a failure to fix a number of chronic problems that have existed for years.
Third, the simultaneous election revealed issues regarding election management. One of those is related to the executive staff of election organizers at the grassroots. Serious problems related to recruitment have been neglected. The large number of field workers who died while carrying out their duties was also a result of recruitment procedures not being as strict as at the city level, not to mention the neutrality of election organizers at this level, because some were affiliated with political parties or supporters of one of the presidential candidate pairs.
Fourth, the election dispute conflict resolution this time was much worse than in the past. More than ever before, mobilizing mass action tended to be an instrument of political pressure instead of trying to get electoral justice. This, in turn, opened up space for certain parties to ignite riots that were luckily curbed before getting increasingly out of control.
Fifth, although it was only an "incident", the Gerindra maneuver to "smooth" a number of legislative candidates such as Mulan Jameela and Sugiono to enter the House of Representatives (DPR) needs attention. In addition to the issue of justice, this practice would in the future be a new mode. In this case, electoral candidates would no longer focus on the competition for votes but on lobbying the DPP, since this would be a major determining factor. Besides having the potential to give birth to new transactional politics, this condition could also be considered "outsmarting" voters, who may feel their voices are of no value.
Sixth, the simultaneous election also confirmed another concern that has thus far not been given enough space in the public discourse, namely holding the elections simultaneously means the presidential election overshadows the legislative election. Voters did not really care about choosing parties or legislative candidates. They tended not to pay close attention to what the political agenda promised by parties or legislative candidates and felt no need to know their track record. In the case of the DPD, quite a few voters did not even know who the candidates were and who was eligible. The legislative election was just like an opening band at a music concert.
Seventh, the high threshold for parties to nominate presidential candidate pairs indirectly stripped the election of its basic spirit. In term of efficiency, limiting the number of candidate pairs to two was very appropriate, because it avoided the possibility of a second-round election. However, from the voters’ side, the situation was different.
The limited options forced voters to apply a "discount" strategy. Consciously, many voters had to overlook the fact that their policy preferences were actually relatively far from the candidates on offer. For example, some voters would vote for the pair 01, even though in terms of campaign promises related to the Social Security Management Agency (BPJS), they were closer to the promises offered by the pair 02. Others ignored the fact that they did not like either the presidential or the vice-presidential candidate of the ticket they backed. This was figuratively represented by the phrase: "I chose Sandi, not Prabowo" or: "I chose Jokowi, not Kiai Ma\'ruf". The only other option was abstention.
Democracy deficit
By discounting their preferences, voters sacrificed their taste and perhaps their self-esteem. However, after the presidential election, some voters were faced with an odd situation: Prabowo joined the Indonesia Onward Cabinet. This phenomenon gave birth to many a joke, such as "presidential election with the taste of a neighborhood chief election". At the same time, polarization in society continues. This situation completely invalidates the excuse that Prabowo\'s decision to join was a manifestation of mutual cooperation principles and/or togetherness.
Even more "amazing" was the emergence of various ideas that, basically, were nothing but an effort to undermine the direct election. The ideas that came out in essence wanted to return the election to the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) for the president and the Regional Legislative Councils (DPRDs) for regional heads and extend the president\'s maximum term in office to three periods. Undermining something that is considered good is not only confusing but also arouses anxiety. The popular election is a pillar of Indonesia\'s freedom indicators, as reflected for example on the freedom index released by Freedom House. According to this index, Indonesia scores 2 points for the implementation of elections from the range of “free” (1) to “not free” (7) in the 2013-2019 period.
The idea of undermining the direct election is not new.
Even though such ideas are far from decided, the campaign to undermine the election is something that is too serious to ignore. In this case, the essence of the election as an equality of opportunity to vote and be elected would be limited merely to the elite space. That would render the election just a space for the elites to choose their own government, apparently on behalf of the people\'s interests. Floating the idea of undermining the election must therefore be understood as a systematic effort to create political discrimination in the name of efficiency, mutual cooperation, or maybe even under the pretext of "Pancasila democracy". Discrimination leads to anxiety, deprivation and social frustration, because the space for common people to push for social equality is increasingly limited.
The idea of undermining the direct election is not new. Like the idea of implementing the Jakarta Charter, is has been brought up several times. In the case of regional elections, it had already been executed as a law, before finally being nullified though the issuance of a regulation in lieu of law (Perppu) at the end of the SBY administration. The argument never changes: The direct election is liberal and therefore not in line with Pancasila. This is usually infused with additional arguments, such as: expensive and generally disadvantageous. In some circles, direct elections are considered an insult. To them, the principle of one man one vote violates the principle of expertise. "How can the voice of a cleric be the same as the voice of a pedicab driver?" is a typical argument for supporters of the idea of indirect elections.
In the same package, there is the recurring idea of returning political power to the MPR. The argument is congruent, although not the same. For the supporters of this idea, the MPR embodies the fourth article of Pancasila: reflecting the principles of consensus and mutual cooperation. As reflected in the New Order and also the Old Order, it was the MPR that provided space for various groups to sit as people\'s representatives without being elected. They were appointed by assuming the privileges inherent in certain organizations or maybe even later certain figures.
What is important here is that the argument for reviving the MPR and for undermining the election brings together two groups that are usually at odds: those who claim to be true Pancasilaists and conservative Muslims. Both are equally unhappy with the current practice of democracy, which they consider to be too Western (read: liberal). Dislike of anything Western is not a new trend. For some time now, there has been a tendency to reject or neutralize liberal democratic values: freedom, equality and checks on power.
Referring again to the Freedom House index, for example, Indonesia has consistently scored 4 points (partially free) since 2014 in the civil liberties component on a range of “free” (1) to “not free” (7). The SMRC survey (May-June 2019) confirmed this: The feeling of fear of expression also increased sharply. An LSI survey (from September 2019) confirmed a tendency of increasing intolerance. In political literature, this situation is called illiberal democracy. In a nutshell it means this: “elections: yes, liberal democratic values: no”. In short, democracy in this country is about to be neglected again. And, that road is very possible. As Foa and Mounk (2017) note, the process of consolidating democracy is not a one way to the future; there are opportunities for stagnation or moving backward. Deconsolidation occurs when the public begins to distrust the rules of the game which are pitted against the will of the people; when the durability of the rules of the game weakens and citizens start to be interested in the authoritarian idea.
In the case of Indonesia, the main mover of deconsolidation is the political elite. Thanks to social media, this idea is pumped in such a way that some people tolerate and even support constraints on freedom, such as when the government casually blocks websites or turns off internet access. Some people are silent or even encourage discrimination, as reflected in the difficulty of building houses of worship, selectively supporting the use of articles on insulting political figures or on religious blasphemy.
For the record: First, acts of restricting freedom or discriminatory treatment are not only carried out by government officials but also civil groups. Second, practices that tend to limit and/or violate the rules of the game of democracy are mainly directed at ordinary people. This is different from the pattern in the competitive authoritarian system, where the ruling government tends to apply restriction, persecution, criminalization, manipulation and the like to the opposition (Levitsky dan Way, 2002).
Once again, there is a deficit of democracy in Indonesia.
In short, our civil liberties are in decline, and there is pressure to dwarf elections. Though the latter is only an idea at present, it is more than enough to trigger anxiety. The stance of Jokowi and also the Democratic Party, which has confirmed its position in defense of direct elections, do not automatically alleviate that anxiety, because what happened in 2019 shows that the political elite can do anything that it – in the normal estimation – would not dare to do. In particular, there is a kind of social trauma after the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Law was revised and after Jokowi reneged on his promise to issue a regulation to revise the law again.
Is our democracy therefore in danger? Following Erdmann (2011), we are currently experiencing a decline in the quality of democracy. We might continue in this situation, but, as he notes, there is a risk of slowly entering a hybridization phase (a combination of authoritarianism and democracy) or a swift move toward the dissolution of democracy. A warning of Alexander and Wezel (2017) is important in this context. According to them, there is a high chance of deconsolidation of democracy when class polarization sharpens and when the lower class is being marginalized. In the Indonesian context, perceptions of foreign domination become effective fuel to build negative sentiment on economic conditions in general.
This is coupled with a strong perception that the economy and business activity are weakening while prices are rising. The recent hike of health insurance premiums, which are considered too burdensome for the insured, is case in point. Bitterness over their economic standing allows the public to turn away and adopt an authoritarian notion or at least accept the idea that a "democratic diet" is necessary.
Not yet over
Once again, there is a deficit of democracy in Indonesia. Those who support the idea of constraining democracy seem to think that the democratic curve can be slightly lowered to achieve stability, which is assumed to help attract the investment needed to boost the economy. The assumption is that democratic standards can be raised again if the economic condition makes it possible. However, there is a risk that reversing democratic degradation will be far more difficult than its supporters imagine. Moreover, there are some who want to go even further by thoroughly getting rid of democracy.
At this point, we become aware of the fact that we lack defenders of democracy, especially among the political elite. Although they (once) benefited from democracy, some of the political elites now feel that democracy is greatly draining their resources. The level of profit in democracy is no longer attractive. The elites are not loyal to democratic principles because they also feel that the public does not seem to object strongly to the reduction of freedom or perpetual inequality.
One thing is clear: 2019 might not be the best year for Indonesia in terms of politics. However, at least this year provides an important warning signal that our democracy is in the degradation zone. However, democracy in this country still has a chance to return to the safe zone, because – to use a soccer analogy – the competition season is not behind us yet. There is no need for us to dream of reaching the top of the league right now, but even a mid-board standing is arguably an extraordinary achievement. So, let us save our democracy. And, for that, the comfort zone of the political elite must be disturbed. Without it, they will think that the community behaves like a buffalo, blindly following others or its master’s instruction.
Yunarto Wijaya, Executive director of Charta Politika Indonesia.