Challenges of the 2020 Regional Elections

Less than 250 days remain until the 23 Sept. 2020 simultaneous regional elections (pilkada) that will be held across 270 regions in Indonesia: nine provinces, 37 municipalities, and 224 regencies (Kompas, 20/1/2020).

It appears that the public is still in the dark: They are undecided about which candidates they will choose, even though time is ticking.

The voters lack political literacy in terms of whom they will elect on 23 Sept. The situation remains calm and quiet, like an unwarmed engine, in the nine provinces, 37 municipalities, and 224 regencies that will hold the 2020 elections, except for the campaigns in those regions that have local political dynasties, for example the mayoral races in Solo, Medan, and South Tangerang. The three regions’ candidates include the children and son-in-law of the President and the Vice President, who are a magnet for media coverage. As for the rest, the political dynamics of the 2020 regional elections are absent.

Even though the political temperature has not heated up, it is possible that the Pilkada 2020 will face challenges that are not dissimilar from the simultaneous regional elections in 2015, 2017, and 2018. The organizers and the voting public should anticipate several challenges to push for simultaneous elections of higher quality.

"Pseudo-democracy" within parties

Learning from the simultaneous regional elections in 2015, 2017 and 2018, the electoral dynamics will be colored by the raucous campaigns among the regional candidates of each party. The range of issues will remain relatively the same, as to which party has fulfilled the electoral threshold and which parties must form a coalition. These coalitions will not be based on either a political platform or ideology, but rather on current party interests. It will not stop there, even for parties that have reached the electoral threshold: the parties must choose whom they will nominate. Each party generally has criteria for nomination, but all are well aware that electability and “nutrition” (funding) are the main considerations in party backing.

In terms of the internal process, several parties exercise democracy in choosing a candidate. One is the centralized system, in which provincial and/or regency/municipal branches propose candidates, from which the party’s central executive board (DPP) makes a final decision. Another is the bottom-up system, in which a candidate rises from the lower tiers and is then endorsed by the DPP.

The third is a system of appointment, in which the DPP leadership – in particular the party chairman – selects the candidate directly without involving the lower tiers. This system is generally applied to external candidates that have been deemed to possess the potential for winning the elections. The last system is the wholesale system, in which all political parties agree on one candidate due to their high electability and unlikelihood of losing to other candidates. This is the cause behind the emergence of a sole candidate in a local election.

In terms of nominating regional heads, it is almost impossible to find parties that have decentralized the process.

In terms of nominating regional heads, it is almost impossible to find parties that have decentralized the process. This is due to an anomaly caused by a previous nomination and selection process, in which the process was handed over to a party’s regional branches and ended in political disputes when the regional chairs nominated themselves or members of their families (political dynasties).

This prompted a “halt” to decentralization, and the party’s central headquarters resuming control to avoid political disputes during the candidate selection process. The phenomenon indicates that party elites are actually not ready to apply the basic principles of democracy in the candidate selection process. They prefer deliberation/consensus as a less costly and easier means that avoids internal conflicts and controversy while guaranteeing the political interests of certain groups.

The reason for internal consolidation is to prevent divisive dynamics, so that party cadres can work together and cooperate in selecting their regional head candidates. That is why the candidate selection process is inseparable from bargaining through rent seeking (political payments), because the decision is in the hands of the few.

Challenges of independents

It must be acknowledged and appreciated that regional head candidates can run as independents due to an amendment to the 1945 Constitution as a way for the public to back alternative [non-party] candidates. The problem is that an independent candidate is still bound by the regional electoral threshold of 6.5 percent and a maximum of 10 percent of eligible voters on the fixed voters list (DPT).

This is difficult for independent regional head candidates to fulfill, and preparing the electoral documents is expensive. To illustrate, 113,544 voters were registered on the 2019 DPT of Blitar regency, so an independent candidate must have the support of at least 11,354 voters across 50 percent of the regency’s districts. If each statement of support must be submitted with a copy of the ID card and a Rp 6,000 stamp duty, the candidate must have around Rp 68 million in funding. This does not include photocopied documents and other administrative requirements. The voter support will be verified, and if the support of even one voter does not check out, the candidate is cut.

Developing an ideal regional electoral procedure that is not complicated, complex, or expensive is a steep road due to the electoral system. The declining number of independent regional head candidates, as in the 2017 and 2018 elections, shows that something is wrong and it needs to be corrected.

Lawmakers make it difficult, voters want "compensation"

The electoral system is a distorted, anomalous form developed under a constitutional amendment that lawmakers then complicated. Law No. 10/2015 clearly contains nuances inserted by lawmakers that restrict independent candidates. As a result, eligible, good, suitable, honest candidates that possess political and administrative capabilities face difficulties in qualifying as candidates, while they are also burdened with immeasurable costs.

In addition to money politics, our voters also still involved in negative political narratives such as black campaigns, political hoaxes, using ethnic, racial, religious and tribal issues (SARA), and other negative tactics.

This process is not separate from the issues of voter behavior. It must be admitted that the behavior of our voters is becoming increasingly transactional, with most still seeking "compensation". In addition to money politics, our voters also still involved in negative political narratives such as black campaigns, political hoaxes, using ethnic, racial, religious and tribal issues (SARA), and other negative tactics.

Electoral literacy is still highly influenced by the issues that candidates, campaign teams, and supporter groups regurgitate. The shift in voter behavior towards a more opportunistic and materialistic orientation has "tarnished" the regional elections through the practices of vote buying and vote selling. It is unsurprising that not many changes from the simultaneous elections in 2015, 2017 and 2018 are expected in the Pilkada 2020.

The regional electoral procedure is still marked by a number of alarming factors, such as emerging political dynasties, stronger party oligarchs, SARA politics and increasing transactional politics, as well as inappropriate behavior among party elites, candidates, campaign teams, and voters. All forms of political and behavioral deviation affect regional leadership and democracy in the future, the latter of which is growing increasingly worrisome. The pilkada package that is expected to change the face of local politics is still constrained by a variety of recurring problems. Tragically, only the packaging and image are different, while the old problems and the substance remain the same: political anomalies.

Moch Nurhasim, Resercher of the Political Research Center, LIPI