Towards a Foreign Policy Focus

Prabowo Subianto's visit to China and Japan seems to confirm the direction of Indonesia's future foreign policy.

As a middle power and the largest country in the region, which has a new president, Indonesia's future foreign policy policies are awaited with great anticipation by many countries.

The G20 and ASEAN High Level Conference (Summit) events which were excited and considered domestically as successes apparently left no trace at the global level. This feeling of complacency is excessive considering that the chairmanship of these two large forums is just routine and rotation, not due to strict elections.

Therefore, we are shocked because after the "party is over", the European Union instead brings Indonesia to the World Trade Organization (WTO) because of its nickel mining downstreaming program.

Also read: Foreign Policy Direction 2024-2034

Changes in foreign policy

Will Prabowo Subianto bring changes in foreign policy? So far there have been misconceptions that need to be straightened out. Foreign policy is formulated not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by various relevant stakeholders, coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the final decision is in the hands of the President. And, in accordance with its main tasks and functions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will carry it out.

As politics always undergo adjustments and modifications, foreign policy generally changes due to, firstly, a change in regime and in accordance with the platform of the ruling party. Secondly, transformations in adapting to global geopolitical dynamics.

However, the categorization of the most influential foreign political changes to date was proposed by Hermann CF (1990) through four gradations of change.

First, adjustment change (adjustment change): changes in efforts, which do not change the goals or methods of a policy. Second, program change (program change): refers to changes in methods, but not goals.

Third, change in goal (goal change): change in goal (purpose). Fourth, and most fundamental, concerns the redirection of actors' orientation towards world events, which can involve simultaneous changes in many policies.

Domestic, regional and global influences

At the domestic level, at the end of his term of office, President Joko Widodo still had a number of pending matters remaining, including the continuation of the construction of a new capital city, the Jakarta-Surabaya high-speed train project, the energy transition and the downstreaming of mineral mining.

Meanwhile, as defense minister in Jokowi's cabinet, Prabowo still leaves behind controversy due to "crazy" spending on defense equipment, including Mirage 2000-5, F-15EX and Dassault Rafale fighter jets, Airbus A400M multirole aircraft, H225M helicopters, FREMM and Maestrale class frigates, submarines Scorpene and Midget, Maung tactical vehicles, and a number of other weapons, worth more than 34 billion US dollars (Tempo, 24/8/2023, and CNBC, 9/1/2024).

Prabowo even immediately "stepped on the gas" to Beijing and Tokyo, which political party officials and many parties considered "not good" (Kompas, 4/4/2024). Apart from there being no precedent and the election results were still being disputed at that time because the legal process was still ongoing, also because currently Prabowo was still de facto an aide to President Jokowi. The visit, which was said to be an effort to maintain, deepen and develop bilateral relations, clearly aroused curiosity or suspicion in regional and Western countries.

At the regional level, as the "elder" of ASEAN, Indonesia is faced with the Rohingya problem and the isolation of Myanmar even though it continues to proclaim inclusivism. Apart from that, bilateral disputes between member countries, the situation in the South China Sea (SCS) which is being stirred up by Beijing and Washington's rivalry in the Paracels and Spratlys, has clearly had an impact on this regional organization. Even though it is not a territorial claimant, friction with China in the North Natuna EEZ shows that the ASEAN Way is no longer effective and weakening.

In the current context, Indonesia's foreign policy must prioritize eternal national interests, as there are no eternal friends or enemies, especially considering the past experience with East Timor.

So far, ASEAN has reached agreements to regulate the region through ZOPFAN, TAC, Bangkok Treaty, and Code of Conduct LCS, which still require improvement due to the unclear implementation. ASEAN seems to have struggled to adapt to the fast-paced geopolitical dynamics of the region. The Philippines took a shortcut by embracing the involvement of the US, Vietnam appears to have flirted with its former rival, and incidents of ships in LCS have almost caused armed conflict multiple times.

Sadly, although ASEAN will not become a military pact, Indonesia has submitted itself to prepare a defense perspective in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP, Ministry of Defense, August 23, 2021), whereas the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Outlook on Indo-Pacific of Indian Ocean states focuses on realistic cooperation.

Areas with potential conflicts (India-Pakistan or Iran-Pakistan) are actually focusing on cooperation in maritime sector development, especially in relation to navigation security and safety. In the 1990s, Indonesia and Canada have actually initiated a seminar on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea by exploring research and development cooperation in maritime technology.

At the global level, in the midst of the decline of APEC, Indonesia is faced with a choice between becoming a member of IPEF or RCEP and BRICS or OECD. Indonesia also wants to participate in resolving the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza and the Russia-Ukraine war, in accordance with the constitutional mandate. However, whether we admit it or not, Indonesia does not have enough leverage (Wirengjurit, Kompas, 26/3/2024).

"Indonesia First"

Although Russia and the US have officially recognized Prabowo's election, visits to China and Japan appear to confirm the future direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. Adapting Mohammad Hatta's (1948) idea of ​​the policy of "rowing between two rocks", during the New Cold War, Indonesia currently has to row its boat between three rocks (Wirengjurit, Kompas, 18/7/2020) .

According to the schedule, for the next five years Indonesia will not be preoccupied with major events such as APEC, G20, or ASEAN summits. It is indeed time for Indonesia to implement a grounded foreign policy that brings direct and tangible benefits to the people, which means a policy that focuses more on bilateral and neighboring regional policies. Like Donald Trump with his "America First" policy, Prabowo can apply an "Indonesia First" foreign policy.

Firstly, in the field of trade and investment, China, for example, needs to emphasize the need for a "win-win solution" in the issue of oil and gas exploration in the North Natuna EEZ, by working on it together. China needs to be asked to control its aggressiveness in mineral mining and limit its workforce by empowering local workers more.

To Japan, it needs to be emphasized to implement the technology transfer that has been delayed since Toyota arrived in 1974 because until now Indonesia has been no more than an assembler (assembler).

Although Russia and the United States have officially acknowledged Prabowo's election, visits to China and Japan appear to affirm Indonesia's future foreign policy direction.

The Jakarta-Surabaya high-speed train project may be pursued as a three-country cooperation project. This has precedent, as during the first state visit of the Japanese leader to China in 11 years, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Xi Jinping announced 50 joint infrastructure projects. The infrastructure investment cooperation is under the Belt and Road Initiative framework, but the scale is even larger than expected before Abe's arrival in Beijing (Brewminate, 31/10/2018).

Second, at the regional level, Indonesia needs to restore the dignity of ASEAN and the honor (dignity) of Myanmar by embracing it again (inclusivity) to resolve the Rohingya problem, as Indonesia previously succeeded in Cambodia (war civil) and the Philippines (Mindanao/MNLF). On the other hand, apart from focusing on the North Natuna EEZ, perhaps the "girl-girl" affairs of the LCS need to be reduced.

Third, developments in the global South need serious attention. As the US "sheriff" in the Pacific, Australia's military spending in 2023 has exceeded 50 billion US dollars and in the next four years will be 223 billion US dollars (ADM, 12/6/2023). Under the AUKUS partnership (2021), the US will sell Australia three to five Virginia-class attack submarines starting in the early 2030s. Australia and the UK are also building the SSN-AUKUS class nuclear submarine which will mature in the next decade (ADM, 12/3/2024).

Meanwhile, in anticipation of the potential threat from their only enemy to the North (read: Indonesia), the US has stationed 2,000-2,500 Marine personnel with a rotation every six months in Darwin since 2021 (US Embassy, 28/3/2024), which is about 800 kilometers away from Indonesia.

Depends on the actor

In the current context, Indonesian foreign policy must re-prioritize eternal national interests, because there are no eternal friends or enemies, especially with the experience of East Timor. This means that these interests must be based on principles that apply in many countries, namely trust no one.

In its implementation, such a policy must be based on Harold Lasswell's adage that politics is who gets what, when and how.

Based on Hermann's category, with the steps above and considering regional and global geopolitical dynamics, it seems that Prabowo's role will be dominant in carrying out redirection of his foreign policy. However, Prabowo is known as a controversial figure, meaning changes can occur at any time.

Dian Wirengjurit, Geopolitics and International Relations Analyst