KPU and Narratives for Presidential Election Fraud

KOMPAS/WAWAN H PRABOWO

Zainal Arifin Mochtar

The presidential election for Indonesia has been started by voters in the voting booths. Its result has not been determined.

There are still predictions and information. The quick count has given both of them, the predictions and information. However, the determination is not a quick calculation. Victory claims are also not the determinant of electability. There is a state institution that is specifically regulated in the constitution to determine this, namely the General Elections Commission (KPU). Unfortunately, the KPU also experiences so many problems which are not simple.

Is the KPU cheating?

Could the KPU cheat? This is tantamount to asking: is it possible for humans to make mistakes? The answer does not need to be too far-fetched: of course it is possible, since to err is human. However, it is at that point the system and working mechanism control the possibility of cheating. The KPU is currently working on a system, which is built for election governance. First, the KPU consists of many elements. The KPU and the ranks of commissioners at the central levels as well as KPU staff in the regions and officers working for the KPU. The number is of course very large. In this huge range of vertical controls, is there someone who might cheat? Of course it is still possible.

However, tiered systems and controls will reduce that possibility. There is a very strong public monitoring. There are two candidates who each have very complete copies of the data up to C1 forms. Also, the recapitulation, which is carried out in stages, mean that the levels being mentioned above still have the high possibility to control qualitatively and quantitatively over the existing data. This tiered recapitulation is also attended by representatives from each candidate\'s team.

Indeed, in several regions there were candidates who refused to sign, but the refusal did not have any proven basis as to why it was rejected, what the shortcomings were, until it was natural to reject and not to sign it.

The presidential election tiered recapitulation system is what minimizes the possibility of the narratives of fraud. Unless there are still those who believe that the KPU along with all ranks in the regions up to

the lowest-level officers make a joint agreement to commit fraudulent actions. Involving so many people at the same time to cheat is actually difficult given the existence of witnesses at each stage of the tiered recapitulation. Can we say that the KPU must have conspired to jointly commit fraud along with the witnesses of each candidate pair?

One of the things that appears this time is an accusation of massive fraud and the existence of demands from the camp which promotes allegations of massive fraud so that there should be disqualification against the opposing presidential candidate. This accusation of course must be calculated correctly with regard to its magnitude and distribution. The legal language being used is of course the measurement of being structured, systematic and massive. Is it easy to determine it?

Second, is it possible that seven commissioners as the highest authority in the KPU cheat on the presidential election? The tiered system above has actually answered that. The stages minimize the role of KPU commissioners at the central level to monopolize the truth of data or cheat to undermine the quality of the elections.

At the same time, there are mechanisms and systems of legislation that regulate the work and quality of the KPU. Independent state institutions such as the KPU are selected through a process that involves

the president in forming the selection committee and the House of Representatives (DPR) that conducts fit and proper tests. This model is used in so many countries although with certain variants. The model confirms that the election battle by the parties will prevent the control of the interests of certain parties to the KPU.

And, if looking at the KPU at present, the commissioners are supported collectively by the parties supporting each of the candidates. They are supported equally. Even though we know, usually independent state institutions are very likely to be influenced by political interests through the process of due diligence and propriety in the DPR. So, when they are supported in a strong and balanced manner by all parties supporting the two candidate pairs, it seems impossible for the commissioner to flirt easily.

Actually, it is very easy to see whether political interests are forced and divide a state institution such as the KPU or Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), namely the existence of a collective collegial decision-making process. Collective decision making will easily show the possibility of political interests dividing the decision making at the institution. In the KPK, there were several decision-making practices

that had split the KPU commissioners, in certain processes within the KPK organization and case handling. However, this division is almost nonexistent in the KPU. Almost all decision making is carried out collegially and collectively and in acclamation and without division. From here it can be seen, the absence of the many political interests which divide the decision making by the KPU.

Third, the process in the KPU is often not singular. Its preparation involves so many parties. Even the drafting of the rules involves the DPR at certain stages. It means there is strong and collective control on the KPU. Fourth, related to allegations about fraud through the KPU’s Vote Counting Information System (Situng). The legislation mechanism has anticipated various possibilities in the vote counting using information technology, including attacks and battles in cyberspace.

Therefore, Situng is not binding and used as a backbone in determining the winner of the presidential election. What is used is still the tiered recapitulation that will be widely controlled. If so, why is Situng done? No more and no less to give broad confidence to the public that there is a process of calculating the election results. Situng is done in order to answer the people\'s curiosity about the calculation

process, which if the recapitulation is done manually, will take a long time. That is why, Situng opens the opportunity for collective correction. The logic should not be reversed by saying there is an error in Situng, so that there must be cheating. It is precisely this error that proves the public can participate in guarding the quality and minimizing the possibility of errors.

Presidential election fraud?

From this explanation, as a whole -- without intending to say that the KPU must not be fraudulent -- it seems impossible for fraud to occur because the system and mechanism work to guard it. However, does it mean that it is impossible for there to be any fraudulent elections? Presidential election fraud is possible, at least on three levels. First, pre-election in the form of the use of state power and various interests to win a particular candidate pair. Second, during elections by using vote buying and various actions to buy votes to form the desired election process. Third, rigging the vote counting process in various ways to influence the calculation results.

The logic of cheating can be qualitative or quantitative in nature. Quantitatively, there are indeed several pieces of information which spread through social media. Cheating that plays at the lowest level is at the polling stations. There are a number of proven hoaxes. There are also others whose truth has not been verified. The problem is how massive is the number? The number is important to avoid the logic of nila setitik rusak susu sebelanga (one rotten apple will spoil the whole barrel). There were 813,000 polling stations.

Cheating can happen, but how significant is it compared to the number of available polling stations? Rather than building a logic and narratives about fraudulent elections and mass action, it would be far better if the team that made the fraudulent accusations began to collect in detail the data and its magnitude so that it can be brought before the Constitutional Court. The aim is not to repeat the dispute over the 2014 presidential election, in which there was a narrative about fraud that was claimed to be supported by truckloads of complete evidence, but the evidence did not come until the trial of the 2014 presidential election dispute was over.

The time to collect is very limited because the law states that only three days from the KPU\'s official announcement, registration of the disputes must be done. Even, if using the logic of the dispute in the Constitutional Court, the number to be proven must be the number that can change the vote acquisition and have implications for the electability of the candidate. Therefore, quantitatively, there must be a legal logic that proves that "there is a certain number of fraud cases, it affects a certain number of votes and that number can change the rank of the candidates and influence the electability of presidential candidates".

Qualitatively, of course, by judging from the side of how strong the fraud is and proving the involvement of the presidential candidate in an effort to defeat the other candidate pair. The interesting question here is: who is cheating? How do fraud mechanisms occur? What is the direct involvement of the candidate pair by ordering the occurrence of fraud? Proving it is certainly not simple, but it becomes mandatory when arguing that there is fraud.

Evidence of dispute over the presidential election with accusations of structured, systematic and massive fraud is usually not simple in the Constitutional Court. The extent to which the structure is involved and the involvement of a clear range of command from the candidate pair, which hold the power of the state and civil apparatus when forcing subordinates to be one-sided. How systematic it is, measured by fraud, which is regulated using a system. And, how massive is it done by calculating the magnitude and affected areas of the action. Its sacred word is the proof in the trial process at the Constitution Court. It is not feasible to build a large narrative about fraudulent elections, even with the threat of violence and mass mobilization and other unconstitutional actions. It is far from the democratic impression imagined in a democratic country based on the constitution. Using the device constitutionally is important. Winning and losing in a constitutional and dignified battle is also very important. Let\'s do it together.

Zainal Arifin Mochtar, Lecturer, Law School, Gadjah Mada University (UGM); Researcher, Center for Anti-Corruption Studies (PUKAT), UGM Law School