Coalition-Opposition in the Presidential System
It seems that there is nothing excessive with the old interesting words that "democracy is noisy". It even frequently must be filled with the world "extremely". All the noises have different tones, following each stage. Post-election and the decision of the Constitutional Court, one of the main hubbubs is building a coalition and the presence of an opposition for the government.
Everything originates from demands for sharing the seats in the Joko “Jokowi” Widodo-Ma\'ruf Amin cabinet. Both the parties supporting Jokowi in the elections and those in the opposition camp in the elections asked for the allocation of ministerial seats as a condition for the coalition.
Jokowi\'s supporting parties in the elections must have a different logic in the reason for asking for ministerial quota and building the coalition when compared to the reasons for Prabowo\'s supporting parties in the elections. If all parties want to build the coalition with the elected government, who will be the opposition? Is it important to build strong coalition and opposition in the government?
Government system
Frankly speaking, one of the most important things being discussed in the debate about building the coalition in the government is the inevitability related to the system of government. The reason is that the habits that are built in the presidential government system are actually different from the style on what happens in the parliamentary system. The tradition of the two of them is very different, maybe even diametrically.
Measures that are "just" from the policy make the PM very easy to fall, unless if it is strongly supported by the coalition being built.
In a parliamentary system, specifically the Westminster System, the coalition becomes very important, especially if the party fails to get support greater than 50 percent. Because after a single election system -- which is only legislative election -- gives birth to parliament, so that the main debate is how to build a government, especially when there is no majority control of the parties. So, the primus interpares will be appointed as head of government (prime minister-PM), which is very dependent on the ability to build the coalition. Failure to build the coalition will very easily lead to failure to get the PM seat. This is also the case when running the power as PM. Measures that are "just" from the policy make the PM very easy to fall, unless if it is strongly supported by the coalition being built.
Therefore, in a parliamentary system, both the coalition in forming the government and in running the government is very important, even though in reality, the language of replacing PM in a parliamentary system is often not simply due to political tug-of-war, but also to strengthen public trust in the government. Therefore, besides Margaret Thatcher in England, it seems that there is no prime minister who can survive in a very long span of time.
Different from the parliamentary, in the presidential system, the president and members of parliament (in Indonesia, the House of Representatives) are elected separately in two elections (legislative-executive), which result in the power of authority between the two is relatively the same as they are directly born of the people. Because they are equally born of the people directly, to bring it down is also not "as simple" as the parliamentary system. The president cannot be brought down because of policy choices, but rather because of violations of impeachment articles that are contained in the constitution.
Because the president has a strong position, and is directly elected by the people, there is no obligation to build a coalition in forming a government. Therefore, the coalition in forming a government is nearly unnecessary. It is a bit different from when running the government. Usually, political struggling and balancing of checks and balances make and demand that the president must establish warm relations with the parliament and that is why usually political and constitutional law experts say there is a need to build the coalition in order to smooth out the president\'s work.
For example, in preparing the budget carried out by the president, it is very difficult to succeed easily if it is not supported by the parties supporting the government in parliament. Even, if there is no support, the ideals of work offered by the president are feared to be messy because they will not be supported by budget politics in parliament.
Coalition in the presidential system
It means that it is actually very clear, there is no fundamental need for the president to build a coalition in forming a government. The president\'s prerogative area in appointing cabinet ministers does not need to be associated with support in the elections. This is why, from the beginning, we actually have to reject the fabricating threshold model of the presidential threshold.
Thus far, the threshold for the party or joint parties to nominate presidential or vice presidential candidates (presidential threshold) is used as if to equalize the interests of the coalition in forming the government and running the government. This logic trap is very visible so that even the Constitutional Court (MK) Decree Number 53/PUU-XV/2017 in the case of the presidential threshold testing follows the rhythm of the political interests, thereby making it equate the handover of the requirements for nominating the presidential candidate to be the same with the ideals of the presidential system.
Actually, the logic is not directly related. This has even been discussed very well in the dissenting opinion on the decision. Judge Saldi Isra and Suhartoyo said that the threshold regime in nominations that use the results of the legislative election is actually irrelevant and the logic of maintaining great support for the president could instead become a trap of becoming an authoritarian government.
Moreover, in the distribution of the ministerial positions, there is an impression that quality will be very likely to be abandoned.
Again, there is a different need between the coalition to run the government and to form a government. Even if there is a need to build a coalition to run the government, it does not mean that it must be forced and associated with forming a government cabinet. Let the different needs be answered by the president not with a single answer through the distribution of ministerial seats. Moreover, in the distribution of the ministerial positions, there is an impression that quality will be very likely to be abandoned.
And, without being realized, such logic actually undermines the public\'s trust in the government, especially over the promises that have been disclosed by the President with the intention to build a cabinet that is zaken. And, the party\'s undermining by asking for ministerial positions is actually a disruption to the prerogative itself. Moreover, what cannot be forgotten is the implicative danger of the presidential system if it is associated with support in parliament (House of Representatives). The logic of a presidential system actually runs on a path that should not get too high support in parliament even though at the same time it should not get too low support in parliament as well.
In short, too low support in parliament is very likely to make the government die out in style and cannot implement its policies easily. Exactly what is exemplified above is in the budgeting area. Without simple majority support, it is difficult for the government to be able to easily implement the desirable development ideals. The President is very easily disturbed by various unnecessary actions as a result of the very excessive supervision system in Indonesia, which has the power of supervision in the presidential system.
We have an example. President Abdurrahman Wahid who was easily brought down at that time. Indeed, the constitutional system has changed and further strengthened the presidential system so that the president is not that easy to be brought down. However, our memories can also be shown by the example of President Jokowi at the beginning of the 2014-2019 government, which fortunately was able to quickly embrace several other opposition parties which were turned into a simple majority coalition in running the government.
On the contrary, if the support is too large for the president, in an absolute majority or more, the president is very tempted to be poorly monitored and has the opportunity to become authoritarian. Our trauma in the history of the New Order actually shows this. Soeharto took control of the bureaucracy, the parties, and the soldiers made him tempted to become a real authoritarian. Why is that? Because the presidential system is indeed built with the nuances of the pendulum of power that swings very far and very strong for the president. Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Paper when forming the constitution of the United States had stated that the president in this presidential system resembled the power of the king\'s sovereignty, which we tried to limit simply through the constitution. He established power as head of state and head of government.
With great power and sustained by enormous support by the institution that is supposed to be a superintendent, it will be very easy to make the president not be controlled properly. Moreover, if there are symptoms of strong support from the Indonesian Military (TNI) and the police. It is highly possible that whatever the president wants will be easily carried out, even by using legal power in upholding state order and sovereignty. In the midst of the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 37 of 2019 on the TNI Functional Position which has seemed to arouse the "Dwi Fungsi" (double functions) of the Armed Forces, the fear against the threat of temptation towards authoritarianism must be avoided earlier.
And indeed, that is the main "disease" in a presidential system, namely the relationship between the president and parliament measured by the level of supervision. It means that the coalition must not be very strong so as to kill the concept of supervision through opposition. At the same time, the opposition must not be so strong that the president cannot move freely.
"Limited fitting" coalition
Therefore, if a coalition is to be built, a coalition that is measured in a "limited fitting" way is far better than forcing it to become fat and out of control. How to create the "limited fitting" cabinet is actually very likely to be measured by guaranteeing an adequate quantity and quality opposition. The quality-quantity pposition that can still determine the running of supervision concepts such as interpellation, questionnaire, and the right to express opinions. If all of them move closer to the president, it can be ascertained that even for the quorum, raising those rights may not be fulfilled.
Moreover we all understand, political commotion in Indonesia is not the same as hubbub at the grassroots.
The chosen ministers must have integrity, capability and acceptability. Integrity with a clear track record without doubt. Capability in the form of ability and willingness to work with their expertise. At the same time they should also be acceptable in public and politics. The three elements are far more important to be discussed than just relying on which parties they are in and where they anchor their party coalition. That there is a need to build harmony after the hectic presidential election, actually it is not mandatory to show the distribution of ministerial positions and force admission into the cabinet. Moreover we all understand, political commotion in Indonesia is not the same as hubbub at the grassroots.
Politics is much faster to find equilibrium than at the grassroots. The president\'s work in building this republic is increasingly needed to reunite harmony at the grassroots. Even if there is a need to build a coalition, build it properly to support the ideals of development and be limited but can still make the president be free and not tempted towards authoritarianism. If forcing a fat coalition in which all join the winner of the election, once again, the government will easily fall into authoritarianism. If the word authoritarian is considered excessive, at least it can be trapped into the zonder control government.
Zainal Arifin Mochtar, Lecturer of Law Sciences at the School of Law, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta