The Risk of a "Fat Coalition"
The meeting between Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Prabowo Subianto at the MRT station some time ago still leaves a question for the public. Is it true that the Gerindra Party will join the government coalition?
If it is true, how strategic would it be for Jokowi to accept an additional party in his coalition? Will a “fat coalition” make the government more stable and to what extent can Jokowi control the political rhythm inside the coalition if Gerindra or other parties in coalition 02 enter? This question arises after looking at the latest political development, which shows the occurrence of political repositioning within coalition 01 in response to Jokowi\'s new coalition plan. On Monday (22/7/2019), several general chairpersons of coalition 01 minus the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) held a political meeting. Within the next few days, according to the plan, the party secretaries-general will also meet. In the middle of the meeting, there was a report there would be another meeting between Jokowi and Prabowo.
Kompas daily (22/7/2019) published Djayadi Hanan\'s article, Solidity of Presidential Coalition. There, Djayadi gave a reason for the importance of Jokowi adding coalition parties in the government. It was revealed that even though Jokowi had already won 60 percent of support in the House of Representatives (DPR), by adding to the coalition parties, the government agenda can still run without any significant obstacles in the House. Djayadi even warned that it would be too risky for the President to keep moving forward without additional parties if there is one party that jumps to the other side.
There are currently several open options for the Jokowi coalition. Scenario one: Jokowi forms a fat coalition consisting of coalition 01 plus Gerindra, the National Mandate Party (PAN) and Democratic Party. This coalition would dominate with around 90 percent of seats in the House. If this happens, it will create a political apocalypse in the House and democracy will be suspended because of the insignificance of the opposition parties.
In the second scenario, Jokowi will only add one or two parties from Gerindra, PAN or the Democrats. If Gerindra enters, PAN or the Democrats may choose to be in the opposition ranks to get political incentives from non-Jokowi voters. In the third scenario, Jokowi does not form a new coalition and continues maintaining the pre-election coalition, which is filled with parties from coalition 01. If Jokowi chooses scenarios one and two, it is clear he will be overshadowed by political hassles and risks.
Jokowi hassles
A new fat coalition carries disastrous political risks, both for Jokowi and the public. At present, there is no specific need for Jokowi to add party support in the coalition. Jokowi\'s political position has actually been quite safe. A fat political coalition will make Jokowi have difficulty in negotiating policies and programs with coalition parties. With the government\'s low ability to pass bills in the DPR, it is difficult for the government to have strong bargaining power when proposing bills.
A fat coalition also does not provide guarantees that make the government stable. With a fat coalition, there will be a lot of tugs-of-war between the parties and Jokowi. If they disagree with Jokowi, it will be easy for the parties to build a new alliance in the internal coalition, which may complicate the government\'s position. Another inconvenience that Jokowi would face is synchronizing programs and policies. In one of the presidential debates, we witnessed the sharp differences between Jokowi and Prabowo in relation to investment policies, trade, debt, natural resource management and other strategic issues. This difference in political platforms would make it difficult to synchronize government policies. Another issue that Jokowi has to pay attention to is the matter of his image and credibility. Jokowi\'s credibility will be put at risk if there really is a fat coalition.
Jokowi must also be aware of the risks or political effects that could arise if a new coalition is formed. There is no strategic reason for Jokowi to add coalition members. The fat coalition will even be the one that will create the potential for internal resistance within coalition 01. This was seen from the fact that the PDI-P did not participate in the meeting of chairmen of coalition 01. Jokowi is also expected to face internal political instability if he adds new coalition members.
The fat coalition would not guarantee that Jokowi passes bills. In theory, ideally with the support of a majority in the House, it would be easy for the government to push for policies, programs or pass particular bills. However, majority support in the House does not translate to performance of government legislation. The legislative ability of the Jokowi government is more hamstrung than the previous administration. Of the 52 bills proposed by the government (excluding the cumulative bills) in the 2015-2019 National Legislation Program (Prolegnas), only six were passed into law.
In the first year of government (2015) and the last year (2019), no bills were passed. In 2016 and 2018, six bills were passed – three in each year. Of the six, three were new bills and three others had been included in the 2010-2014 Prolegnas. This data shows that the government did not have clear and measurable state legislative policies. This data also shows the government\'s low ability to lobby coalition parties. Meanwhile, as seen from the proposed Prolegnas bills in the 2015-2019 period, government productivity is also low. Of the 52 bills that entered Prolegnas, only 17 bills (33 percent) held the new bill status; 28 bills (54 percent) had been included in the Prolegnas bills proposed by the previous government; and seven bills held the revision status of old laws.
Coalition argument
In post-2019 election period, there has been a change in Jokowi\'s political commitment to the coalition that was formed before the election. This change in commitment could have political risks for Jokowi, including a change in the commitment of parties in the coalition. It could be that they will be wild and out of control. Jokowi\'s change is occurring because of concerns or distrust against coalition members and it could be that Jokowi does not want to focus his efforts on busily lobbying the House.
If the purpose of the coalition is to create political stability and the government feels safe from interference from the DPR, Jokowi\'s first term shows that in reality the political problems of the government are not from outside, but mostly from within. Potential instability can even occur from within as a result of internal dynamics among ministries within the government, which could result in a Cabinet reshuffle.
The task of the government is to ensure that the coalition is solid, not to buy up all party support to be safe from the threat of a party jumping to the other side. For this reason, Jokowi needs to convince others that the government provides balanced incentives. If there is eventually a party that is against one or two policies, this would indicate that the ability of the government to maintain coalition discipline is weak or that the government does not have the ability to manage the coalition. For the sake of the creation of a solid coalition, of course there is a price to be paid by Jokowi. If the coalition formation process is carried out fairly, the potential for any party to jump to the other side is expected to be small. Therefore, the government must explain its political commitments to each coalition member.
Parties that formed a coalition and supported Jokowi\'s candidacy in the general election actually faced certain political risks among the voters. With the strengthening of identity politics in the last election, it is also possible that certain parties will receive disincentives due to their support for Jokowi in certain electoral districts. In this case, I think, Jokowi must indeed commit to the initial scheme of the pre-election coalition. Moreover, the simultaneous elections was designed to allow for a long-term coalition, both before and after the election. As such, the parties had thought about coalition options long before the election.
If Jokowi chooses to form a fat coalition, it would certainly be impossible for there to be intense public policy discourse and it would expose flaws in our democracy. Democracy, whatever it is, requires two things: a strong executive branch and a strong legislature. A strong legislative body is only possible if there are significant opposition parties. Likewise, public discourse on policies is only possible if the DPR is filled with opposition parties that are also strong. To strengthen democracy, Jokowi should cancel plans to form a fat coalition.
Arya Fernandes, Researcher at the Political and Social Changes Department of CSIS