Towards the Papua Dialogue
Only dialogue can end the violence in Papua. Dialogue can take place only if Jakarta is serious about finding solutions beyond economic development.
Only dialogue can end the violence in Papua. Dialogue can take place only if Jakarta is serious about finding solutions beyond economic development.
This what Sidney Jones said in her report on Indonesia, “Radicalization and Dialogue in Papua” (ICG, 11 March 2010). She also warned in “Indonesia: The Deepening Impasse in Papua” that "the longer Jakarta refuses to discuss these issues, the more radical the demands that will emerge" (ICG, 3 August 2010).
The echoes of truth in Sidney Jones’ report are increasingly heard today. The essence of the problems in Papua has not changed in the 10 years since her reports were published. The perceived feelings of unfair treatment, disrespect and tidak diwongke (not treated as human beings) persist not only among Papuans who are anti-Jakarta, but also the majority of the people.
The bureaucrats in Jakarta who view the Papuan people as merely a series of figures are a frequent cause of the heartache. Measures of development that emphasize economic scale cause feelings of hurt that must heal. For example, an official stated that if the special autonomy fund were distributed among all Papuans, each individual would receive Rp 10 million, whereas if the fund were distributed across Java, each individual would receive only a few million. Many Papuan leaders were angered by this statement.
Efforts towards serious dialogue thus far have been hampered by Jakarta\'s unwillingness to look beyond economic problems to grasp the core issues of Papua. A sense of reluctance prevails that is difficult to explain, even though it is quite clear that talks with the Papuan people would be less than perfect if they only spoke about increasing the budget allocation or accelerating development. Life is more than just bread, rice, sago and pocket money.
Road to dialogue still open
I was involved in the Jakarta-Aceh negotiations of 2003-2005, which resulted in the Helsinki agreement that brought an end to the 30-year conflict, created historic peace and led Martti Ahtisaari to be awarded the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize.
Muridan et al said in the study that of the four pillars of the Papua issue, the historical contradiction and identity politics between Papua and Jakarta could only be resolved through dialogue, as in the Aceh issue.
The task of restoring peace was apparently not finished. On 1 Dec. 2010, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) appointed me to the Papua Conflict Resolution Team, together with Velix Wanggai, the Presidential Special Staff for regional development and autonomy, and Lt. Gen. Bambang Dharmono, who was later assigned to chair the Papua and West Papua accelerated development unit.
The team was asked to help SBY resolve the Papua conflict by exploring the possibility for dialogue. SBY said the Aceh dialogue model could be used. I recall very well SBY\'s words about the Aceh dialogue model. The study by Muridan S. Widjojo and his colleagues at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) titled "Papua Road Map, Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future" (2008) also supported the Aceh dialogue approach. Muridan et al said in the study that of the four pillars of the Papua issue, the historical contradiction and identity politics between Papua and Jakarta could only be resolved through dialogue, as in the Aceh issue.
Different, but similar
Can the Aceh model be applied in Papua? Isn\'t the Aceh conflict very different from Papua? These questions have been directed at me in an effort to explore dialogue as a solution.
It must be admitted that the anti-Jakarta groups in Papua do not fall under a single command like the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Papuan nationalist groups are spread among a number of autonomous organizations, both at home and abroad. The role of youth movements, especially those that involve students in big cities, is increasingly important today. These movements have taken the previously isolated armed resistance out of the jungle and turned them into political movements in urban areas. These relatively small and isolated armed movements have been replaced by greater participation and mass action (LIPI study, 2012).
The role of youth movements, especially those that involve students in big cities, is increasingly important today.
Despite their separation, one thing "unites" those who support the efforts towards dialogue: all parties are open to dialogue. They are extremely open about speaking to Jakarta, even though disappointment and hurt still dominate their responses. This indicates a similarity between Papua and Aceh: It is this willingness that was the bright light I discovered in exploring the path to peace in Aceh.
I reached this conclusion in the field – including the jungles and remote areas on the border with Papua New Guinea – when I held a marathon meeting for three months (May-July 2011) in my capacity as President SBY\'s special envoy to speak with as many representatives of the Papuan people as possible. In this effort, I have spoken with Papuan church leaders of various synods and denominations; met with Papuan student activists studying in various cities, especially Yogyakarta; met with a number of National Liberation Army/Free Papua Movement (TPN-OPM) leaders, including Col. l Jonah Wenda, the TPN-OPM spokesman and confidant of Brig. Gen. Richard Hans Howeni, a highly respected OPM figure.
In managing the Aceh conflicts, I used my professional background as a physician to understand what was happening. Following decades of work and practice as a gastrointestinal surgeon, one of the medical principles that I have always followed is never to believe an initial diagnosis. Another is to not base a diagnosis on hearing a patient’s complaints. A doctor must directly see and examine a patient\'s condition.
That also applies to conflict management. Finding a solution first requires directly listening to and observing the problem, meeting and talking directly with all parties of the conflict.
Everything that surfaces through various studies, seminars and discussions in newspapers, even intelligence information, must be proven through direct observation and listening. In the Aceh conflict, although the GAM leaders in Sweden said that they were willing to negotiate, it was still necessary to talk to the guerilla fighters in the forests to ascertain this. Similar efforts should be undertaken to bring about dialogue in Papua.
‘Soft power’ and representation
One of the fundamental efforts needed in Papua (which was undertaken, but appears to have been halted) is making a breakthrough by applying soft power: an informal and invisible approach to building trust between the two parties (Jakarta and Papua). The effort to explore dialogue must be approached by removing the "garb" and "trappings" of officialdom, as they were in Aceh.
I approached a number of parties as a Bugis and a physician, not as a deputy minister of public welfare. Jakarta must establish emotional ties by entering an emotionally charged environment of conflicting Papuan elements. The conversations in this endeavor must focus on similarities, not differences.
A number of reviews say that the efforts to enter into dialogue with Papua are hindered by difficulties in identifying figures that can represent the Papuan people. It has been further stated that such efforts to locate representatives of the Papuan people have been left to the Papuan people. In my opinion, this argument is not a barrier to dialogue.
Even though they may be separate and do not have a unifying command, this does not mean that the deadlock in finding Papuan representatives cannot be overcome. Allowing these groups to remain divided within their own movements will eventually drive away a resolution to the conflict. Jakarta must possess the initiative to encourage, even facilitate, these groups to find representation that is acceptable to all parties.
From my meetings with Papuan nationalist groups, it can be concluded that they are open to meeting and attaining similar views, and Jakarta must facilitated this if necessary. The meeting is expected to be held outside Indonesia for security reasons. Vanimo in Papua New Guinea or a city in Vanuatu have been raised as possible locations for the meeting.
One thing that is clear is that building mutual trust is a condition for facilitating the meeting, especially with Papuans in Jakarta. Fostering this trust requires humility to listen to and empathize with the Papuan people’s complaints. The next requirement is the political will of all elements in Jakarta to sound the hammer of dialogue. It appears that this has been virtually nonexistent in the past.
Farid Husain, Guarantor and negotiator of the Indonesian Delegation to the Helsinki peace process, 2005; Special Envoy of the President (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) for the Papua Conflict, 2010-2012