Regional Autonomy Steps in 2020
The reality shows that many regional governments do not have the capacity to manage their household affairs, especially leadership capacity.
This law has also been revised twice, namely by Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No. 2/2014 concerning the duties and authorities of the Regional Representatives Councils (DPRD), and by Law No. 9/2015 related to the duties of regional heads and deputy regional heads. Since the Reform Era, which started in 1999, the policy of decentralization and regional autonomy, especially special autonomy, is still looking for the right format for effective implementation of regional governments.
The reality shows that many regional governments do not have the capacity to manage their household affairs, especially leadership capacity. On the other hand, the central government is weak in conducting guidance and supervision. As a result, in many cases, there is what is called regional autonomy that is too far or out of control, as indicated by the high level of corruption of regional heads, the issuance of thousands of problematic bylaws, and poor public services.
In a unitary state, the source of regional government authority comes from the central government. Usually the distribution of authority from the central government to regions is limited (weak autonomy), not super-broad (strong autonomy) as is the practice of decentralization in the federal state. Decentralization and regional autonomy in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) during the Reform Era is felt like a "federal state" because the authority being transferred to the regions is large, wide and numerous.
Logically, with such authority, local governments are able to deliver good public services to their citizens, especially since the regional heads have been directly elected by the people. However, they are jauh panggang dari api (still not run as well as expected), as shown in a study by Rod Hague & Martin Harrop (2007: 294) who found local government weaknesses, namely "they are often too small to deliver efficiently, lack financial autonomy, and are dominated by traditional elites". It is the bitter fate of local governments, where they have not delivered and failed to manage regional finances, the regional governments are also hijacked by local elites. What should be the steps for our regional autonomy in 2020?
Three big issues
There are at least three major issues in the journey of our regional autonomy at present. First, the issue of direct regional elections. The hustle and bustle of the direct regional elections, which were held from June 1, 2005 until it was synchronized in 2015, 2017 and 2018 and September 2020, was marked by the common practices of money politics, dynastic politics, breaking up of joint ventures of regional heads with their deputies, and the sting operation by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to capture regional heads.
Similarly, the costs for the campaign in the form of advertising and campaign logistics, and witness costs at the polling stations.
The regional election system is implemented directly under the condition of voters with low income and financially independent political parties, thereby "forcing" candidates to incur high costs. What for? For renting "vehicles/boats" for their political parties at all levels of management, both at central and regional levels. There is also the cost of the success team in the form of salaries, office/vehicle rental, meetings, travel and operations. Similarly, the costs for the campaign in the form of advertising and campaign logistics, and witness costs at the polling stations.
To win the competition, candidates are also tempted to buy votes. "A laborer who hauls sacks of rice onto a truck is given Rp 100,000 per day, now we support candidates to the chair of the governor/regent/mayor for five years, big costs have to be paid", that is the "wrong" logic of most of our voters. Our regional elections become transactional, there is money, there are votes, nomor piro wani piro (which number wants to pay how much). People\'s sovereignty becomes a money sovereignty. If they are surveyed, surely 100 percent would support direct regional elections.
Meanwhile, the candidate\'s financial resources can come from the personal pockets of the regional heads and deputy regional heads, or political investors. Very rarely do we see the raising of funds for candidates who will compete. As a result, after being elected, abuse of power occurs to return capital through grants and social assistance, bribes for the procurement of goods and services, misuse of third party donations, bribery of licensing issuance, manipulation of programs and activities, politicization of the state civil servants, sale and purchase of positions, use of state facilities, even extortion against businessmen who invest.
Meanwhile, for the purposes of candidate campaigns, campaign logistics and witness costs at polling stations are borne by the government.
Therefore, our regional election system in the future should be carried out asymmetrically, namely there are those who are elected directly, indirectly, or just appointed by the central government, according to the condition of the people as measured by the local democracy index. This asymmetrical regional election practice is also applied in the United States with a strong mayor (direct) model, strong council (through the council), and city manager (appointed). Besides that, for the operational costs of political parties, the central government needs to increase political party funds of at least Rp 10,000 per voter. Meanwhile, for the purposes of candidate campaigns, campaign logistics and witness costs at polling stations are borne by the government.
Second, the issue of special autonomy for Papua. The Special Autonomy for Papua has recently been discussed again because of racism cases, that sparked chaos in Manokwari, Jayapura and Timika. Although the status of special autonomy has been applied since 2001, up to now the problem of Papua has not subsided. Armed physical resistance from separatist groups still occurs. The Papuan Poverty Index is the lowest in Indonesia, 27.53 percent (2018). The security approach is still echoed by the government. Welfare approaches such as trans-Papua development are not well understood by regional government officials. Local political parties cannot be formed yet because of the absence of its legal umbrella.
Moreover, in the implementation of special autonomy, there is still much work to be done, such as the preparation of the special bylaws (perdasus) that have not yet been completed, the master plan for the development of special autonomy which has not yet been compiled, sectoral laws and regulations contradicting the special autonomy law, the special autonomy fund which will end in 2021, and the weak supervision of the central government.
Therefore, in the year 2020, the central government and the provincial government of Papua and West Papua should sit together to build a consensus to agree on the following: the special autonomy fund should be extended for another 20 years with an improved arrangement through a specific grant mechanism, no longer through a block grant, regency/city division is controlled referring to Law No. 23/2014, the division of the province is carried out with the approval of the Papuan People\'s Assembly (MRP) and the Papuan People\'s Representative Council (DPRP) in line with Article 76 of Law No. 21/2001, strengthening local government governance in seven customary regions, provincial elections in Papua and West Papua are carried out asymmetrically through the DPRP, and the completion of the discussion of the Special Autonomy Government Bill in Papua Land in 2020, including the formation of local political parties in the context of strengthening democracy.
The state capital transfer must go through clear, detailed, and legal basis stages.
Third, the issue of moving the capital city. President Jokowi\'s decision to move the state capital from Jakarta to the East Kalimantan region (part of North Penajam Paser regency and part of Kutai Kartanegara regency) sparked a long and lively debate in the mass media. The state capital transfer must go through clear, detailed, and legal basis stages. It cannot be done as it is or just handled by the President himself. The involvement of the House of Representatives (DPR) and Regional Representatives Council (DPD) starting in 2020 is badly needed. In the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, there was an idea to move state capital to Karawang, West Java, but it was not followed through because the financial burden was too large. Pak Harto failed to make Jonggol in Bogor, West Java, a state capital.
President Jokowi needs to be appreciated for having the guts to take action in the midst of economic recession in Indonesia and the world. However, it is better to go through a careful plan and long stages, at least as follows: (1) there must be a comprehensive study first regarding the transfer of the state capital by a team formed by the President involving relevant ministries/institutions, experts, and community leaders; (2) if the President declares the results of the study to be feasible, then propose to the DPR a permit for the initiative to move the capital city.
Then, (3) based on the proposal from the President, the DPR and the DPD will immediately hold discussions with the government. If approved, the DPR will give a principle permit to the President. Execution of the principle license is given a time limit, for example, no later than 20 years; (4) based on the principle license from the DPR, the President forms a "world class" team to conduct technical studies, including detailed plans for the capital’s spatial plan, environmental impact analysis plans, infrastructure network plans, detailed engineering design (DED), infrastructure development, financing plans and budgeting, and institutional design and authority of the capital government administrators.
The fastest scenario, as long as the money is available, the capital city transfer is estimated to able to be carried out in the next 15 years (2034).
Later, (5) based on the results of the technical study, the President determines the plan to move the capital with a presidential regulation (Perpres); and (6) based on the Perpres, the government starts the physical construction of the new capital, in parallel with that the capital city bill and the ex-capital city bill are formulated. When physical construction is completed and the Capital City Law is completed, the capital city transfer is carried out. The fastest scenario, as long as the money is available, the capital city transfer is estimated to able to be carried out in the next 15 years (2034). It seems very risky if the transfer of capital city is forced in 2024. Our experience of moving the provincial capital alone took 15-20 years (the case of South Kalimantan and North Maluku).
Then what will happen to the Jakarta Province when it is no longer the capital city? With a variety of reasons inherent in Jakarta, the Provincial Government of Jakarta should be given a special status as a special autonomous region in the economic-business field with the name of the Jakarta Metropolitan Province. As a business-economic center, Jakarta is the seat of the head office for central government institutions that directly handle investment, monetary, and financial services, capital market
headquarters, national banks, international financial institutions, foreign and multinational companies, centers for economic/national and international business
The area of the Jakarta Province should in the future be expanded through an amalgamation (merging) scheme with several neighboring regions, such as Bekasi city, Depok city, Tangerang city and South Tangerang city. In this way, the Jakarta buffer zone will be integrated into a unified government and development so that it will make public services easier, accelerate the improvement of people\'s welfare, and strengthen competitiveness to capture the opportunities of globalization and regionalization. The form of regional autonomy remains one level, but with the delegation of more authority from the province to the cities and administrative regencies, especially those related to public service matters.
Djohermansyah Djohan, Professor at state-run Institute of Public Administration, director general of regional autonomy of the Home Ministry (2010-2014)