Ideological battle?

Azyumardi Azra

· 5 minutes read

Approaching election day on April 17, there is growing discourse that the 2019 election, especially the presidential election, is an ideological battle. The discourse, debate and controversy, both in print and electronic media, on this matter were triggered for the last time by the statement of AM Hendropriyono, former head of the State Intelligence Agency, that the 2019 (presidential) election was an ideological battle between supporters of Pancasila and supporters of Indonesia becoming a caliphate.

In its further development of the controversy, the ideological struggle is reported to have also occurred between parties referred to as "pro-PKI" against "pro-Islam" (Islamists); or between "pro-Aseng" parties, whose liberalization policies on the one hand are facing "pro-people" parties who reject economic liberalization.

Then, there develops a kind of anxiety and fear that cannot be easily eliminated by the people. Therefore, the writer has been asked by several strategic circles and institutions to discuss the issue.

Is the 2019 election an ideological battle?

There is no simple answer to this question. However, what is certain is that the assumption of the 2019 presidential election is a kind of ideological battle is actually not too new. Sometime earlier, a number of Indonesian political observers had begun to anticipate the development to that direction.

One of them is Max Lane, an Australian researcher and consultant who has been researching Indonesia for more than a quarter of a century. This can be seen from his article, A New Ideological Contestation Emerging in Indonesia? (Singapura: ISEAS, 2017).

In his article, Lane argued about the existence of a number of political symptoms and phenomena that indicate the revival of ideological contestation between President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo and his supporters on the one hand and the opposition on the other.

Lane saw the seeds of ideological contestation before and increase in the post-2014 presidential election period. However, Lane admitted that he did not know about the development of the next ideological contestation, especially related to the 2019 presidential election.

Writing in 2017, Lane did not speculate about the symptoms of the ideological battle later. However, the writer of this column agreed when he saw that the roots of the ideological battle, among other things, during the 2017 Jakarta regional election.

Even though the Jakarta regional election was on a local scale, its impact affected national politics, including the 2019 presidential election. Major actions carried out by Muslims against the candidacy of incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) also produced Islamic political activism.

The success of Muslims who later called themselves 212 Alumni to win the candidacy of Anies Baswedan resulted in political and religious euphoria. Besides that, it gives rise to a momentum to fight for what they call the Muslim agenda.

The momentum of Islamic identity politics 212 was not very successful; on the contrary it apparently experiences fragmentation. Various maneuvers the movement 212 that are not political parties do not have significant bargaining power and influence to direct Indonesian political development towards religious identity-based politics.

This phenomenon was seen when Prabowo did not choose one of the figures they supported as his vice presidential candidate; did not follow the decision or recommendation of the ijtima ulama held by the movement 212. On the contrary, as a presidential candidate, Prabowo chose Sandiaga Uno as his vice presidential candidate.

Meanwhile, the figure who was also an important figure in pushing for the rise of the movement 212, KH Ma\'ruf Amin, who is also chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council, was taken by the presidential candidate Joko “Jokowi” Widodo as his vice presidential candidate. There are still figures of the movement 212 who join the camp of political parties supporting Jokowi\'s presidential candidate.

Viewed from this angle alone, the ideological battle that is considered to occur in the 2019 presidential election is far from accurate. The configuration of Indonesian politics ahead of the 2019 election is quite complex to be simplified into two parties that are ideologically in contrast in binary opposition.

If seen more closely, the political coalition of candidate pair number 01 is a combination of two ideological tendencies of political parties. First, political parties oriented to Pancasila nationalism (PDI-P, Golkar Party, PKB, Nasdem Party, Hanura Party, PKPI, Perindo Party, PSI); and second, political parties oriented towards Islamic nationalism (PPP and PBB).

Even though there are slight differences in ideological pressure from each political party, the two groups are fully committed to Pancasila, NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), the 1945 Constitution, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Moreover, the Islamic style that exists in the whole political party is moderate, wasathiyah Islam, which inclusive and tolerant.

Meanwhile, the coalition of the candidate pair number 02 also features political parties with two tendencies; Pancasila nationalism [Gerindra Party, Democratic Party, PAN, Partai Berkarya (Working Party)]; and Islamic nationalism (PKS). These political parties also have full commitment to Pancasila, NKRI, the 1945 Constitution, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Islam, which is included in these political parties, is also wasathiyah Islam, which is moderate, inclusive and tolerant.

The problem which develops later is the fact that the candidate pair number 02 also include most Alumni 212 and also former HTI. They are sympathizers or supporters of the formation of the Caliphate and the application of sharia. However, presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, in the fourth debate (30/3/2019), affirmed his full commitment to Pancasila, NKRI, the 1945 Constitution, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika; and rejected the Caliphate. Nevertheless, it seems that this ideological tug of war occurs in the candidate pair number 02 camp.

Therefore, the ideological battle is clearly not a dominant phenomenon in the 2019 presidential election. The main stream of Indonesian political power remains within the framework of Pancasila, NKRI, the 1945 Constitution, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Other ideologies outside that, such as the Caliphate, are only in margins; do not significantly affect Indonesia\'s political dynamics.

AZYUMARDI AZRA,

Professor, Culture and Humanities School, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University.

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