Indonesian and Indo-Pacific Geopolitics
East Asia Summit leaders pose for a group photo during the 13th East Asian Summit Plenary on the sidelines of the 33rd ASEAN summit in Singapore, Thursday, Nov. 15, 2018. From left to right are Vietnam\'s Nguyen Xuan Phuc, South Korea\'s Moon Jae-in, Philippines\' Rodrigo Duterte, New Zealand\'s Jacinda Ardern, Myanmar\'s Aung San Suu Kyi, Malaysia\'s Mahathir Mohamad, China\'s Li Keqiang, Russia\'s Vladimir Putin, Singapore\'s Lee Hsien Loong, Thailand\'s Prayuth Chan-ocha, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, Australia\'s Scott Morrison, Brunei\'s Hassanal Bolkiah, Cambodia\'s Hun Sen, India\'s Narendra Modi, Indonesia\'s Joko "Jokowi" Widodo, Japan\'s Shinzo Abe and Lao\'s Thongloun Sisoulith. (AP Photo/Yong Teck Lim)
The differing opinions between Dinna Wisnu (Kompas, 26/3/2019) and Ida Humaidah (Kompas, 28/3/2019) on whether Indo-Pacific “provides an opportunity” or “poses a threat” for Indonesia merits further discussion.
Both views show that the meaning of the Indo-Pacific region is highly subjective. For some people, the term may mean a combination between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.
The term “Indo” in “Indo-Pacific” may also mean the inclusion of India in the established architecture in the Asia-Pacific region, which means regional expansion. Meanwhile, the meaning of Indo-Pacific may also be linked to several values, such as a region enclosed on its corners by democratic countries that uphold principles of transparency.
Geopolitical and virtual concepts
A classical academic view defines geopolitics as an actual geographical span and physical reality that shapes international politics. However, the debate between Dinna and Ida shows that geopolitical designs are often virtual, instead of actual, in nature (Tuathail & Agnew, 1992). Its definition varies between formal-academic use, practical use that involves practitioners and policymakers, a popular narrative reflected in various stories, artwork and fiction, and contemporary narratives shaped by international systems, globalization, informationalization of nation-state and the spread of technology.
As a geopolitical narrative, the current use of the term “Indo-Pacific” is highly linked to the declarative statements about “what the world looks like right now” and “what we must do” (Tuathail, 1999). Observe, for instance, Dinna’s argument that the Foreign Ministry’s initiative to hold a high-level dialogue on the Indo-Pacific cooperation as being based on a “naivety”. Ida responded to this by calling it “a Cold War mentality”. According to her, we “must be more confident” in looking at the Indo-Pacific concept.
The lack of an intersubjective understanding on the essential meaning of Indo-Pacific may be influenced by several things, including different points of view. Nevertheless, such differences of opinions should be seen as a good thing as each geopolitical view tends to risk a simplification of geography into a singular vision that may not be effective or respectful toward important spatial and temporal variations.
In a foreign policy, the dominance of certain geopolitical views tends to simplify problems and set aside foresights that are necessary to observe strategic and complex issues. Take, for example, Bosnia’s “Balkanization” problem that was closely linked to the international neglect of a genocide problem as the Balkan region was seen as a fringe region. The Indo-Pacific in our imagination may be filled with various maritime agenda. However, we will not be able to deny that this geographical expansion may in turn force us to face the difficult choice about India as a strategic partner vis-à-vis the Kashmir problem that may create a transnational crisis of identity politics at any time.
Understanding geopolitics as a discourse may no longer provide an objective basis for policymaking. Nevertheless, in line with international systemic changes, it is important to observe the gaps created by actual and virtual realities. Factually, we can recheck the relationship patterns between the United States and Indonesia’s neighboring countries throughout history. Dinna argues that inconsistencies in the idea of democracy in US policies may turn Indonesia and its neighboring countries into “easy targets for troublemaking”.
Throughout history, democracy has never been the major determiner in the relationships between the US and Indonesia’s neighbors. Often, the US is more comfortable in partnering with countries with matured institutional quality (Kuhonta, 2004), in which it has more power to consistently enforce its policies in the regions that it controls. This explains, for instance, why the US sees Singapore, with its infrastructural excellence, as a more reliable partner, even when the superpower has the relatively democratic Philippines as its formal ally in the region. Relationship patterns in the region has provided its unique delimitations for the US in justifying its regional politics.
However, such issues do not necessarily force Indonesia and other ASEAN countries to rely on things like governance as a basis of optimism in countering the effects of Sino-American strategic competition. Multilateral initiatives driven by ASEAN are often based on thorough considerations of balance of power (Emmers, 2001). Past achievements tend to make ASEAN fixates on ideas of cooperative security, in which countries in the region do not see security as excluding certain parties while including other dimensions, such as domestic security, environmental preservation and disaster resilience, into security.
The main problem with the optimism on Indo-Pacific lies in the tendency of economic cooperation’s limited reliability in achieving goals. Please mind that current business competitions in information technology often obstruct cooperation. US companies’ suspicions on Chinese business intelligence activities and competitions in leading progress in 5G technology and artificial intelligence has led to difficulties in imagining that US businesses will prevent Washington from applying restrictions and retaliations on Beijing.
In such a condition, the term virtual becomes important. The foreign minister’s principles and initiatives for the Indo-Pacific must be prioritized but the choice in naming may be problematic. Indo-Pacific may not be a new term, as this has circulated in academic and policy circles for years. Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa mentioned the term long before the US replaces its Asia-Pacific Command into Indo-Pacific Command. Rizal Sukma used the term Pacindo to refer to the region that may be the same as Indo-Pacific. President Joko Widodo’s Global Maritime Fulcrum vision may even be derived from the geopolitical vision of uniting the two oceans without actually calling the region Indo-Pacific.
Other than in Indonesia, skepticism on the country’s initiatives are also circulating in journalistic writings and track II discussions. Supportive parties see that the actual principles proposed by Indonesia may not actually require the country to formally use the Indo-Pacific term. Several Chinese academicians are also suspicious that the Indo-Pacific term is closely linked into a containment policy. If a name is related to various ideas, virtual naming becomes political. Therefore, if we wish to keep promoting the Indo-Pacific concept, [the Foreign Ministry] has much work to do.
Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Vision?
First, in virtual geopolitical contestation, the foreign minister should be the main bricoleur in actively holding dialogue at every front. For an idea to be accepted, the relevant terminologies must spread not only in a practical realm but also in academic, popular and contemporary spaces.
Second, to link objective and virtual realities, strategies are required on different levels. The name of the Foreign Ministry’s Asia Pacific and Africa Directorate may be changed into the Indo-Pacific and Africa directorate to monitor whether unique regional agendas can split Indonesia’s focus on maritime, infrastructure and sustainable development cooperation.
However, most importantly, Indonesia must realize that diplomacy is not the same as strategy. The currently-developing Indo-Pacific initiative is a diplomatic one, in which the values and agendas are deeply influenced by what has existed before. Indonesia actually requires an Indo-Pacific strategy. A good strategy is built not by mere reappropriation of diplomatic procedures and channels but in priority development. Making Indo-Pacific a policy priority must mean that Indonesia has a new strategy that can explain our position and policy on the most crucial and explicit issue: the Sino-American rivalry.
Indonesia must be more adept in holding further discussions on whether the idea of cooperative security remains effective amid cyber and technological rivalries. Besides that, in prioritizing the maritime agenda, ASEAN thus far lacks coherence in building its maritime focus, especially if the idea is linked to an infrastructure agenda that may obstruct ASEAN’s unified stance in regional maritime issues, such as illegal fishing and the South China Sea. Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific concept may push forward insensitive agenda that promotes cooperative habits but may not produce outputs with significant strategic impacts for Indonesia’s foreign policies. In this context, the debate as represented by Dinna as Ida may open a new path, at least for building a national strategic consensus. Therefore, such debates merit mainstreaming.
Andrew W Mantong, Researcher, International Relations Department, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
