Dilemma of Dealing with ISIS "Alumni"

KOMPAS/DANU KUSWORO

Noor Huda Ismail

The Al-Baghdadi caliphate project has been disbanded. However, hundreds of Indonesian citizens, especially women and children, still remain in refugee camps.

Is it possible that they are given a second chance to return to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)? Or are we praying that they will die there? Isn\'t it their wish to die under the auspices of the caliphate?

The issue of the "alumni" of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS; or NIIS in Indonesian) is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they are like time bombs or sleeper cells. This view is widely shared by the many Indonesian people who have had difficult lives, so why should we add to the problem?

There is another job that is more important than taking care of these NKRI traitors: The fear among ordinary Indonesians. This is consistent with the public fear that the government manages when dealing with terrorism.

Bad records

The "fear" argument is supported by the fact that some of these former ISIS members have terrible records. For example, the 2002 Bali Bomb attack was planned and carried out by an international network of former Afghan fighters. These “Afghan alumni” then transferred their military knowledge to new recruits in Indonesia and in the southern Philippines.

To this day, former fighters of international conflicts still have a role there. The 29 June 2019 arrest of Para Wijayanto, an alumnus of the short military training course at Hudaibiyah Camp run by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), confirms this hypothesis.

According to the authorities, this man born in Kalijati, Subang, West Java, is believed to be the current leader of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). As the JI leader, the authorities have accused Wijayanto of his alleged involvement in sending JI members to Syria on a "humanitarian" mission under umrah (minor Islamic pilgrimage) or tourist visas.

Why is the role of these ex-ISIS members so unique? In this author’s opinion, aside from the fact that they are thought to have fulfilled their tasks in carrying out a “lawful” jihad based on sharia in defense of oppressed Muslims abroad, they are also thought to be part of international networks and to have extensive knowledge on Islam.

Their high social status is certainly unknown to the general public, including officials. To borrow from leftist writer Antonio Gramsci, these alumni can be referred to as "organic intellectuals" – educated people born from amongst themselves who have the ability to "counter hegemony" in the NKRI’s political system.

They live in a shadow state because they have no territory. Therefore, even though they were born Indonesian, their political imagination has surpassed the nation-state. In other words, they feel that they are part of a "global ummah (society)", a worldwide political institution that is bound together under Islamic solidarity. One impact of this perspective is the belief that "the followers of Islam are suffering wherever they are".

For them, there is no geographical boundary that separates the cries of Muslim babies and women in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and the Rohingya with themselves, who are living in relative safety and peace in Indonesia.

They cry while solemnly reciting the nazilah qunut (special prayer for help), imagining the suffering of other Muslims in other places.

However, managing fear is only effective in the short term, because many of these “conflict alumni” have succeeded in reintegrating into society by becoming good fathers and husbands, respected religious clerics, successful market traders and social activists who help solve community issues; there are also those who have become academics who have earned their doctorate. In fact, some of them have become security specialists – like Ali Imron and Nasir Abas – who consult security forces on the dynamics of the “conflict alumni” still actively engaged in "counter hegemony" activities against the NKRI.

Managing alumni for "good viruses"

From the explanation above, it can be concluded that former fighters of international conflicts cannot be categorized as just “terrorists”. Their way of life varies depending on the social environment (field of experience) of where they live and what they read (field of reference) after returning to Indonesia. That is, it is important to understand the processes and social ties of these people.

Those who fail to distinguish between jundullah (Allah\'s army) that conduct jihad in dar al-harb (war zones) and those that live in the dar ahdi wal amni (safe state) that is Indonesia are those who become terrorists.

However, those who succeed in muhasabah (reevaluating their old understandings and way of life) – like Ali Fauzi, the stepbrother of Mukhlas and Amrozi – could become "good viruses".

Ali Fauzi is very active in the Yayasan Lingkaran Perdamaian (YLP; Peace Circle Foundation), advocating and mentoring terrorist convicts at nearly every prison in the country. He has also earned a doctorate at a well-known university in East Java.

Seeing such developments, perhaps the government has become more confident about handling ex-ISIS members.

In Medan is Afghan alumnus Khairul Ghazali, who runs a deradicalization Islamic boarding school for the children of people who served prison time on a terrorism conviction. Seeing such developments, perhaps the government has become more confident about handling ex-ISIS members.

Before the new Terrorism Law was passed, the government – through the Foreign Ministry’s directorate for protection of Indonesian citizens (PWNI) – assisted in the repatriation of 18 Indonesian citizens, including women and children, who had joined ISIS.

Two adult men of this group served prison sentences. After going through a deradicalization program at the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), 16 of the group were able to start new lives.

Some of them, like the brothers Naila, Dhania and Febri, have appeared in public without prompting to unveil the lies of ISIS. One of the brothers has finished senior high school and is now studying at a top university in Bandung.

Such reintegration efforts show that, when managed properly, ex-ISIS members have the potential to become "good viruses", especially in preventing threats to national diversity, which has been growing stronger of late.

The idea to establish a “universal caliphate” is very fluid. If ISIS fails in Syria, it moves on to other areas in Marawi, Boko Haram and even Afghanistan. Therefore, it is not surprising that five Indonesian citizens were recently caught in Afghanistan, lured by the “caliphate” idea said to exist in that country’s Khorasan region.

Turning ex-ISIS members into becoming "good viruses" is certainly not easy, because of social stigmas and the lack of any guarantee that they will not return to their old radical thinking.

Creating "good viruses" is nothing new in social intervention efforts, and was first employed in public health. For example, as part of the anti-smoking campaign, former smokers became "good viruses" because teenagers who were experimenting with smoking tended to listen to them more than an attractive internist who had never smoked.

If such an effort is not made, ex-ISIS members could make their own way home, undetected.

Therefore, I believe that, in the midst of the wave of public rejection against these ex-ISIS members, the state must be present to assess who they are, how they joined ISIS, what they did there and what they would do if given a second chance to return to the NKRI. If such an effort is not made, ex-ISIS members could make their own way home, undetected.

After ISIS collapsed in Raqqa, nine Indonesian citizens returned to the country on their own. Fortunately, the authorities were able to arrest them at the airport. When they were interrogated, two of the nine were found to have undergone ISIS’ military training camp and intended to train ISIS supporters in Central Java.

No clear data exists on how many Indonesians are currently in the Syrian refugee camps. US President Donald Trump has issued an ultimatum via Twitter that all ISIS prisoners would be released if their countries of origin do not take care of the matter.

Australia has repatriated several of its citizens who were former members of ISIS in Syria, as have America and several European countries. There is no other choice for the state than to develop "community-based reintegration programs" with strong legal procedures, systematic and structured social mechanisms and, no less importantly, actively involving the Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, families and communities to combat stigmatization and help them become productive members of society.

As for the ex-ISIS members, they must also open themselves to change and be willing to become a "good virus" against the narratives of intolerance that active ISIS supporters continue to spew today, especially on online platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Telegram and WhatsApp.

Noor Huda Ismail, Doctorate in Political Science and International Relations, Monash University, Australia