Jokowi, the Cabinet and the Coalition

KOMPAS/AGUIDO ADRI

Yunarto Wijaya

Jokowi is about to embark on his second term in office. While some may have expected a sense of relief after he secured a second and final term as the president, the political reality is very different.

The post-election complexity this time around is quite likely to be higher than in the past, as suggested by early indications in the process of forming the next Cabinet. A public discourse has emerged on the inclusion of Prabowo-Sandi supporters in the Cabinet. The experience of the 2004-2014 presidential election showed that changing allegiances is nothing new for political parties in Indonesia. The Golkar Party, the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB), for example, switched sides to be part of the United I Cabinet of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in 2004. In 2009 and 2014, Golkar did the same thing, even though in the 2014 election it was done in the middle of the period (along with PAN).

This time, the possibility of political parties switching sides is likely to be more controversial for at least two reasons. First, the presidential election in 2019 has been more emotional and polarized than ever before. To some supporters of the two opposing candidate pairs, switching sides is considered treachery. Second, the phenomenon of switching sides is seen as another failure of the simultaneous election, because in Decree No. 14/PUU-XI/2013, the Constitutional Court saw the simultaneous elections as a way for the formation of permanent coalitions, strategic and long-term negotiations and a President who is not dependent on the House of Representatives (DPR).

The dissolution of the Indonesia Maju Coalition (KIM), which supported Jokowi-Amin, and the Indonesia Adil-Makmur Coalition (KIAM), which backed Prabowo-Sandi, shattered the Constitutional Court\'s hopes. The dissolution of these coalitions formed for the election is also used by some parties to justify some “shake-up” or at least marks the possibility of political parties switching sides, as happened in the previous period. However, even without the addition of another supporting party, it is almost impossible for Jokowi to use his prerogative in forming a Cabinet. He still has to negotiate and bargain. This is inevitable in a presidential system with many parties. Opting for a unilateral strategy (prioritizing his prerogative rights) in forming a Cabinet is only possible if the president has other constitutional ways to get laws passed through the legislative institution or is able to veto laws made by the legislature (Amorin Neto, 2006).

The president’s dilemma

In this case, Jokowi is in a dilemma. On the one hand, his supporting political parties (KIM) in the legislature control a majority (60.7 percent). However, this is only slightly above what is called by Raile et al. (2009) a minimal winning coalition. Mathematically, Jokowi has a "dependence" on medium-sized political parties, such as NasDem (10.3 percent), the PKB (10.1 percent) or Golkar (14.8 percent) or even a small party like the United Development Party (PPP) (3.3 percent). A shift in attitude from any of the three medium-sized parties will easily drag the government into a critical position in the legislature. Moreover, we must remember that the discipline of party members in the legislature is also low.

This was experienced by SBY in his second period. Despite forming a fat coalition, the government is often hampered by its own coalition members in the DPR.

On the other hand, increasing the number of coalition supporters in the Cabinet also does not guarantee consistent support in the DPR. The assumption of a government party followed by party discipline and party members’ discipline in the legislature only applies to the parliamentary system. As noted by Cheibub et al. (2004), it is very wrong to assume that a coalition in the Cabinet also means forming a coalition in the DPR. This was experienced by SBY in his second period. Despite forming a fat coalition, the government is often hampered by its own coalition members in the DPR.

While a higher number of coalition members brings no guarantee of consistent support in the DPR, it undoubtedly increases the cost of governing. This cost consists of coalition commodities (minister posts and ministerial budgets) and the allocation of funds for pork barrels. According to Periera et al. (2006), the cost of governing will be higher when, first, the number of coalition members is high, second, the ideological range among supporting political parties is wide and third, when the distribution of minister posts is disproportionate to the strength of the political parties in the legislature.

In Jokowi\'s case, the first two factors are present. The number of coalition parties is currently quite large: five in the DPR and five more without seats in the DPR. The ideological range is also wide, ranging from the patriotic Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), NasDem, Golkar, the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), the Indonesian Unity Party (Perindo), the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI) and the Hanura Party to the Islam-based PKB, PPP and Crescent Star Party (PBB). The third factor will also be present if additional parties enter the Cabinet. This will automatically mean that the allocation of resources for parties in the KIM is below earlier expectations, necessitating some form of compensation.

The interval between two elections is increasingly interpreted as another campaign period, effectively leading to permanent campaigning.

And even though the abovementioned factors can be mitigated, a lack of solidity in the Cabinet or legislature remains possible. As the incumbent, Jokowi no longer has the prospect of another period in office (after the 2024 election) as something to attract and bind political parties to him. As Altman (2000) said, a coalition Cabinet can break up because of an approaching election, in addition to the factor of diversity of ideology and the feeling of being treated unfairly. In the case of Indonesia, the urgency to conduct an early campaign is even stronger. The interval between two elections is increasingly interpreted as another campaign period, effectively leading to permanent campaigning.

Despite being part of the ruling coalition, political parties always feel that their electoral effect is insignificant, even if the government can be said to have succeeded in fulfilling their campaign promises. Therefore, they feel the need to be prepared early. There is a need to improve electoral gains and at the same time strengthen associations with presidential candidates who have the potential to win the next election, or even to prepare own cadres to run for president/vice president.

This has happened in the controversy around the use of cantrang (seine nets) for fishing.

This pull requires political parties to renew themselves, including repositioning themselves. This could prompt Jokowi\'s supporting parties to more frequently express different stances with the government on issues/policies at the DPR. The PKB, for example, will inevitably beg to differ when it believes the government policy harms the (economic) interests of nahdliyin (followers of Nahdlatul Ulama). This has happened in the controversy around the use of cantrang (seine nets) for fishing.

With regard to the addition of coalition members and the pull of 2024, minister posts could be another source of problems. In the context of symbolic politics (the presence of younger ministers) or to support negotiations, it is not impossible that Jokowi may recruit as a minister a figure he feels may have good prospects as a presidential candidate in 2024. The presence of such figures is not without potential problems. The best scenario is that such a minister would work hard to up their performance as initial capital for their eventual campaign. They will become new icons and increase public satisfaction with the overall performance of the government. In the worst-case scenario, this type of minister will utilize the ministry\'s resources for his own agenda, including preparing an exit strategy by positioning himself as an "honest" or "sidelined" person.

Coalition management

Hence Jokowi faces a complicated situation, but not without a way out. The key is the ability to manage the coalitions and opposition. He needs to activate the executive apparatus appropriately. Chaisty et al. (2012) grouped the executive apparatus into five clusters: political agenda power (legislative power granted to the president/decree), budget authority (control over public spending), cabinet management (distribution of ministerial seats), partisan power (presidential influence on one or more coalition parties), informal institutions (other categories that are in line with the context of each country).

This executive device is a coalition resource that can be exchanged with both ruling and opposition parties. Maneuvering of the supporting political parties (KIM) or competitors (KIAM) is also concerned with the availability of coalition resources. Maneuvers communicated to the public are not necessarily the true goals. At this point, the management of the coalition should not stop and be interpreted as limited to political transfers (especially for ministerial seats). Jokowi has other executive options that can be bartered in exchange for policy support or passing regulations in the legislature.

First, coalition management is a daily and not a one-off process. The minister\'s chair is a one-time investment. Facing day-to-day political dynamics, Jokowi can play other executive tools, such as ministry budgets, other public office positions (heads of agencies or other posts), political support (in regional elections) and political concessions. If he feels the Cabinet has begun to experience lethargy or has to overcome external shocks, Jokowi can play the reshuffle card. This should be considered to accelerate the formation of a new Cabinet. Early Cabinet formation has at least two advantages: First, work can be carried out immediately without having to wait for the inauguration in October, and second, a reshuffle is needed to overcome a situation of bureaucratic paralysis or resistance of other parties because of a perception that ministers in certain ministries will not be reelected.

Second, the transfer of executive tools is not the end objective of a coalition. This is only a means to create an effective government to fulfill campaign promises. In this case, Jokowi can also play co-extensive cards, namely forming coalitions with opposition parties in the legislature if coalition members in the Cabinet take positions opposing the government\'s position (Cheibub et al., 2004). This card can give Jokowi have high bargaining power to encourage consistent support from the coalition of political parties in the Cabinet. Opposition parties playing this card can also benefit, namely from the association with certain regulations or policies. With the right campaign, that association will strengthen the opposition party\'s credibility as a party that can be relied upon if it becomes a ruling party.

Third, to maintain support from his coalition parties in the Cabinet, Jokowi can also play his legacy card. In this sense, the positive effect of success or the failure of development needs to be transferred to individual ministers and political parties, rather than all accumulating on the president\'s figure. The best example, though not completely perfect, is the work of Susi Pudjiastuti to fight illegal fishing. If ministers and/or political parties can utilize government programs to build ownership issues or lift their reputation, Jokowi\'s legacy is not just a program but also an open leadership style and encourages others to develop together.

Yunarto Wijaya, Executive Director of Charta Politika Indonesia