Is Reinstating the GBHN Necessary?
Ginandjar Kartasasmita
After 20 years of the Reform Era, various elites (politicians and academics) have expressed their intent to reinstate the State Policy Guidelines (GHBN) for development planning as in the past. The discourse has expanded into discussions on the role and function of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR).
As all is based on good intentions, even President Joko Widodo had expressed his views regarding the discourse. This piece intends to discuss the question as to whether the desire to revive the GBHN is a credible and substantive view or simply rhetorical. Is the desire to revive the GBHN not fueled by frustrations due to the changes of an increasingly open political system, as well as decentralized and non-centralized power that have made development efforts more complex and not as effective as during the New Order era?
The writer would like to contribute to enriching the discussion, based on his direct involvement in the GBHN discussions of 1983, 1988 and 1993.
Process of formulating the GBHN
Soeharto, as the President, appointed the General Secretariat of the National Security Defense Council (Wanhankamnas) to ready the materials for the GBHN by gathering aspirations, views, suggestions, inputs from the public, political parties, mass organizations, professionals and the regions. This process took a long time to complete.
Furthermore, the Wanhankamnas General Secretariat submitted the GBHN documents, accompanied by a fairly thick appendix, to the President. The President then formed a team to finalize the GBHN documents. This team was called Team Eleven in 1978 and 1983, and Team Nine in 1988, based on the number of members. (The writer was once a former team member.) The team submitted its final results to the President, who then presented the draft GBHN to the MPR during the MPR General Assembly to open a new legislative session.
The MPR followed by forming the Working Body, which was divided into 2 Ad-Hoc Committees (PAHs). The PAH I deliberated the GBHN and the PAH II deliberated non-GBHN materials. Each committee reported on the relevant draft MPR decrees to the Working Body. The Working Body then submitted the GBHN documents resulting from PAH I discussions and other decrees from the PAH II to the MPR
General Session (MPR-SU). The MPR-SU of formed three commissions: Commission A to discuss GBHN, Commission B to discuss non-GBHN materials, and Commission C to discuss the President\'s responsibility. The commissions handed over the results of the discussion on GBHN-related decrees, non-GBHN materials and presidential accountability to the MPR General Session. (The writer once led the PAH for the GBHN and the GBHN Commission.)
After approval, all were determined to be the decision of the MPR.
Questions that need assessing
As the political elite discusses their intent to revive the GBHN, several important questions need to be examined. Who will produce the GBHN? If it is an MPR product, what is the MPR’s position? Will it create a new version of the MPR, revive the old MPR or expand the existing MPR? The biggest problem is the relationship between the President and the MPR be: Will the President be under the MPR and abide by its decisions?
Following democratic reform, the President is directly elected by the people, just like the members of the MPR – that is, the members of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional Representatives Council (DPD). What is the relationship between the authority and responsibility of the MPR as the “GBHN producer” and of the President as its executor? What will happen if the President does not implement the GBHN as the MPR mandates? Could the President fall under and abide by the MPR when both the President and the MPR (DPR and DPD) are both directly elected by the people?
The logical answer is that the President is appointed by the MPR. If so, then it means that the people’s sovereignty and authority are reduced, that the people\'s right to choose their leader (the president) – the highest democratic right – is forcibly relinquished and returned to the (700) members of the MPR (DPR and DPD). This means that the Constitution must be amended yet again.
This presents three major problems. First, won\'t this mean a revival of authoritarianism or a political oligarchy? Second, the President and the MPR (DPR and DPD) are elected simultaneously during the same period, whereas the GBHN requires a lengthy process. Which President will implement the resulting GBHN? Will it be the current President or the next one? Which MPR will be held to account for the implementation of the GBHN? Will it be the (current) MPR that produces it, or the next one? Third, will returning to a linear system through the GBHN result in better planning to overcome the increasingly complex development problems – that is, the complex global condition, multiple power centers, open information, technological developments and knowledge and a public that possesses a sophisticated mindset and expectations for wealth?
Nostalgia for authoritarianism
According to this writer, the discourse on the intention to revive the GBHN is due more to nostalgia for a past believed to be more certain in its developmental direction and process. The dissatisfaction with the progress of development is actually a consequence of the current political system and is a product of reform under the paradigm of democracy and decentralization. Returning to the system of the past can be interpreted as an effort to restore the autocratic, anti-democratic and centralized system.
In this context, the writer would like to quote Samuel Huntington (1991) on authoritarian nostalgia: ”New leaders of democracy might emerge as ’arrogant, incompetent, or corrupt, or some combination of all three’...”; “The intractability of problems and the disillusionment of the public were pervasive characteristics of the new democracies…”; and ”Authoritarian nostalgia was an expected response to democracy at that stage.”
The challenge for Indonesia is building a democratic system, an economic system and a decentralized system that can generate prosperity for the people.
Many democratic countries with a market economy have successfully made it through the transition stage (that Indonesia is experiencing at present) and are able to create sustainable public welfare as European countries have done in the past, followed later in Asia by Japan, Taiwan and Korea. History shows that if managed properly, democracy is better than authoritarianism, an open economy is better than a closed economy, and decentralization is better than centralization. The challenge for Indonesia is building a democratic system, an economic system and a decentralized system that can generate prosperity for the people.
Strengthening the established system
Thus, what needs doing is to build up the institutions and functions of democracy, market economics and decentralization so that they drive development – governance and democratic institutions such as the elections, political parties, civil society, clean and reliable representation systems, as well as market competition that is fair and controlled and not just free; more rational decentralization that brings decision-making as close as possible to the people; open opportunities for people to build better lives by utilizing resources and local wisdoms, not just to satisfy the political desires and to become an instrument for the power of the local elite.
Above all, it is about building the spirit of state administrators, community leaders, actors and stakeholders that put togetherness first by upholding moral principles.
The role of government in must be affirmed development planning, particularly its framework and direction. The government implements strategic policies on sovereignty, security, independence, stability, certainty, legal guarantees and the rights/obligations of citizens. The government conducts activities that the private sector cannot (yet), managing and directing government investment that encourages improvements in individual businesses. The government encourages market operations; the government includes the public in its processes.
The government promotes community groups (and regions) that are unable to develop access to or compete in manufacturing under a market economy. State-owned enterprises have a (parastatal) function to represent the state in strategic roles and affect the lives of many people.
The use of technological advances should be evenly distributed to the many in order to increase productivity, reduce consumption costs, and advance education and training to the lowest levels of society. Development planning and management institutions should be strengthened from the central to the regional levels – sectoral, intersectoral and interregional – in terms of systems, organizations and human resources. In welcoming the era of the digital economy, the public sector must be able to truly function as an effective regulator: building digital ecosystems and infrastructure that strengthen competitiveness and increase resilience; preventing technology from benefiting only a few; preventing the digital gap from increasing to widen the income gap.
In closing, it must be underlined that development planning is a combination of political and technocratic processes along their respective paths and sequences. However, excessive political intervention must be avoided so it does not cause a break in the principles of correct planning and result in an ineffective product. As such, there is no need to revive the GBHN, but a need to improve and strengthen the systems that we have developed as part of the reform process.
Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Former National Development Planning Minister/National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) Head, 17 March 1993-21 May 1998
