The Spread and Threat of The Terrorist Lifestyl

KOMPAS/DANU KUSWORO

Noor Huda Ismail

As of the end of June, the Indonesian National Police recorded a large harvest of terrorists. The latest Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) leader, Parawijayanto, was detained along with his wife on 29 June 2019 in Bekasi, West Java.

The police also confirmed the identities of the suicide bombers who attacked the cathedral in Jolo, Sulu, southern Philippines, earlier this year as Rullie Rian Zeke and Ulfah Handayani Saleh, the married Makassarese couple who had been deported by the Turkish government in late January 2017.

Are these two events interconnected? In other words, was JI also behind the vile attack? Or are these two cases different? Should we as a nation surrender to and continue to recycle conspiracy theories regarding terrorism, as in an "issue transfer"?

Types of terrorism

Simply put, three types of terrorist movements exist in Indonesia. First is structured terrorism. Second is hybrid (mixed) terrorism. The third and last is ad hoc (temporary) terrorism.

JI is a clear example of the first typology. JI is clandestine and has rigid organizational rules. Like a lizard that is attacked by an enemy, JI will immediately sever part of its tail. The severed tail is still moving, so it distracts the enemy while the lizard escapes.

Perhaps JI has learned the lizard’s survival mechanism: Whenever its leaders are captured – as in the case of Abu Rusdan, Adung and Simbah, who were all arrested by the police and tried – JI immediately searches for suitable candidates among its members to become the organization\'s next emir, or commander.

To ensure that the identity of this new emir remains concealed, JI washes its hands of any members who have been detained. For JI, being caught by the authorities is a stain on all its members and must be removed. Therefore, JI restricts access to its members convicted of terrorism, who many not engage in the organization\'s internal activities for a minimum of two years.

This operational pattern can be interpreted to mean that JI members may be arrested, but the organization is not dependent on individual members. In this context, JI offers an alternative lifestyle. They believe that the JI lifestyle is more Islamic and will save them from the flames of hell.

"See what\'s wrong with the teachings of JI? We ask members to practice good Islam, such as praying, zakat, fasting, haj, and of course, jihad," one JI member complained in an interview with the writer. "There is no KTA – a membership card – to join JI. So the process of joining and leaving [the organization] is also obscure," he said.

As a lifestyle, JI members adhere to the doctrines of guerrilla warfare. This means JI moves to match its supporters. JI cannot live without its supporters. Like fish, JI needs a pond to live in. It is in this pond that they offer a new lifestyle, providing daycare services, women’s salons, Muslim fashion companies, publications and even matchmaking agencies. Intelligence and counterintelligence skills are a prerequisite for JI members, who must be able to swim freely in a pool full of "enemies". They understand that war is deception.

Adopting the strategies of guerrilla warfare requires a community of supporters, and concealing the movement among normal, friendly and polite interactions in society is a necessity. This means that no JI member will openly appear to be part of JI. Therefore, the public impression of JI members is usually people who are polite, kind and mingle in society. It is no wonder that the JI leader that the police have just caught was the head of a neighborhood unit (RT).

The JI lifestyle – aside from being a choice that enables the organization’s continued survival – is also a way of fulfilling the bil hal obligation to preach, or basically da\'wah (proselytization) through behavior. JI members are fully aware that they are weak, ingrained with a kind of internal dictum: "Never confront the enemy directly; cheat them. Leave the enemy guessing. Accept their money, never accept their ideology."

If they continue with this pattern, the arrest of Parawijayanto is not the end of the story of JI, which once held a place within the Al Qaeda network.

The second typology is the hybrid. Hybrid is defined as "a thing made by combining two elements". In the context of terrorism studies, groups that can be included in this typology are individuals who are no longer a formal part of JI, yet are reluctant to give up their identity as mujahideen, "the defenders of the people".

They switch from jihad silah (armed jihad) to jihad lisan (verbal jihad). Instead of following the path of violence, they follow the path of political Islamic activism. It means they are ready to be the vanguards of the people with regard to events at the local, national and international levels that they deem are detrimental to Islamic interests. The most obvious example is their involvement in the 212 movement or the Tauhid flag-burning case. "We want to be recognized in the hereafter, not among the ranks of religious dissidents," said one member of a group of this typology.

Rumors spread during the 2019 presidential election that this hybrid group used Prabowo Subianto\'s stronghold to achieve its own political goals. This allegation partly stemmed from the fact that one of the campaign team members of Presidential Ticket No. 02 was a biological brother of Abu Walid, an Indonesian leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (NIIS). Abu Walid appeared in an NIIS propaganda video and was killed on 23 Jan. 2019 in a battle between Syria’s coalition forces and the NIIS. This allegation, in the writer’s opinion, is certainly false: First, the NIIS ideology clearly rejects the democratic system; second, just because they are related by blood does not mean that the siblings share the same political views.

The third typology is the ad hoc terrorist group – groups that form in an impromptu or temporary manner – which is similar to the second typology in that it is a blend of the old and the new. However, this group moves in an interconnected manner with global terrorist networks. This pattern is clearly visible in the deployment of Rullie and Ulfah. The deported Indonesian husband-and-wife turned suicide bombers were new players in the terrorist network, so the security forces did not detect them. They exhibited no signs that they were suicide bombers when they underwent the Social Affairs Ministry’s social rehabilitation program in Jakarta. However, because they were still determined to realize the khilafah (“universal caliphate”) project and were facilitated by an old terrorism player, Andi Baso – who was wanted for the Samarinda bombing in November 2016 and believed to be living in the southern Philippines – they were able to move to the southern Philippines.

The writer believes that the current pattern of the terror movement can be read as this: in Indonesia through the Anshorut Daulah (JAD) network and the East Indonesian Mujahideen (MIT), in Malaysia through the Kalimantan and Sabah JAD networks, in Syria through the NIIS network of Abu Walid, in Thailand through Bangkok as a transit point, and in Afghanistan, particularly in the Khorasan region. Their funding comes from Trinidad and Tobago, the Maldives, Venezuela, Germany and Malaysia.

Antiterrorism strategy must evolve

Looking at the above typologies, it appears that the state needs to evolve beyond state-centered strategies in its antiterrorism efforts. This approach is a historical legacy of the 1628 Westphalian system that has been used since WWI. This system of non-interference depends on sovereign states to act independently in managing international relations, including transnational crimes such as terrorism. This system also primarily emphasizes the kinetic approach. In fact, in the current information age, the rampant propaganda of violent groups and widespread hoaxes that give birth to conspiracy theories, which are then swallowed whole by the general public, could be far more effective weapons than establishing new terror groups.

However, the question remains: How do we create leaders who are flexible and adaptable amid the realities of a state bureaucracy that is afraid of change and reluctant to leave its comfort zone.

A kinetic approach that utilizes ammunition, tanks, warships and even warplanes is nearly powerless against this type of threat. Here, the writer does not assume that the kinetic approach is irrelevant. However, it is wrong for the state to invest heavily only in kinetic measures, because this approach is not a recipe for success in the war against terror. The state needs to instead invest in increasing the capabilities of antiterror human resources to think outside the box without abandoning the old playbook that has proved a success against terror.

However, the question remains: How do we create leaders who are flexible and adaptable amid the realities of a state bureaucracy that is afraid of change and reluctant to leave its comfort zone?

First, the old methods will make it very difficult for us to achieve success in combating terrorism today, let alone the future. The threat of terrorism will continue to evolve, and awareness of this fact is the first step towards saving us from terror-related deaths.

Second, the state must have the courage to establish communication with all stakeholders abroad that are concerned about and play important roles in resolving the issue. These are typically peace activists, academics, religious leaders and community leaders. Their involvement should not be mere lip service or “accessories” to policy. They are important players because, although they may not represent governing institutions such as the state, they possess extensive networks and have long worked on this issue. Ironically, the state has often underestimated them like the prophetess Cassandra of Greek mythology, cursed with the power to deliver true prophesies that are never believed.

Noor Huda Ismail, Visiting Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore