Four Threats to Democracy
I concluded that there were four big threats to the success of democracy in Indonesia: radicalism, communism, separatism and corruption.
Ahead of the second-term inauguration of President Joko Widodo, I remembered my first visit ever to Indonesia in 1962-1964. This relates to my concerns for the future of democracy in Indonesia. At the time, as a political science PhD student, I chose national integration in developing countries for my dissertation topic, with Indonesia as a case study.
I was interested to learn how far people’s bond to their ethnicity and religion threatened national unity in a diverse society that had just recently gained its independence. Under the mentorship of Clifford Geertz, I journeyed into the topic anthropologically. I lived in one place and tried to participate in locals’ political activities. The place that I chose was Simalungun regency and its capital Pematangsiantar in North Sumatra.
My Indonesian language teacher explained to me that the region reflected Indonesia’s diversity in terms of religion, ethnicity and social class. Political activities that I studied were those of political parties represented in the regency and city legislative councils (DPRD). Fortunately, the sharing of legislative seats in 1962-1964 still accurately reflected the results of Indonesia’s first democratic election in 1955.
I felt lucky to have obtained an accurate and reliable snapshot throughout my two years on the field. The portrait allowed me to assess just how positive the political party system’s influence was in a democratic country at the time. I concluded that there were four big threats to the success of democracy in Indonesia: radicalism, communism, separatism and corruption.
Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama were two big political parties – constituting almost 40 percent of the vote in the 1955 election – that were still fighting for the Jakarta Charter. If they were able to gain power, democratic institutions and procedures most likely had to adhere to some sort of a sharia institution controlled by ulemas, like in Iran today.
Communism offers its own version of government, a Leninist or proletarian dictatorship. In 1955, after winning 16 percent of national votes, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) became one of the “big four” in national politics. The party continued to grow afterwards. In Simalungun, the PKI consolidated power among plantation workers.
Concerning separatism, in 1962-1964, public security in Simalungun and Siantar had just been restored following the insurgency of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), branded as a separatist movement by the Indonesian government. People’s suffering at the times was heartrendingly captured by Ashadi Siregar in his latest novel Menolak Ayah (Rejecting Father). Threats of separatism were most felt in Aceh, which was granted a special region status by President Soekarno just a few years before.
Of the four threats to democracy that I found at the time, what had been most unthinkable beforehand was. I should have realized from the start that, as time went on, corruption would undermine people’s trust on the legitimacy of a democracy. In Siantar, this was how it went. In 1964, a new mayor was elected by the city legislative council. I was joyed as this could test my early conclusion on the effects of a city-level politician’s loyalty to his or her ethnicity, religion, social class and political party. I had even predicted which candidate would win the election. I was wrong. The eventual winner had been a dark horse that not many people had been talking about. Several people admitted that they had received money when I asked them about it at their own home. The admission was not through words but through the universal hand sign of money.
Not entirely gone
In 2019, to what extent do these problems still threaten the quality and durability of democracy in Indonesia? None of them has actually been resolved. Most surprisingly has been the rise of radicalism. In the early years of Reformasi, several observers, including myself, concluded that radicalism had become a toothless movement thanks to Soeharto’s policies and the political activities of such figures as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid and organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. As it turned out, however, radicalism is alive and well, as proven in the downfall of Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama during the 2016-2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election’s campaign season. What policies must the Jokowi administration take moving forward to resolve these threats? My suggestion is that his helpers two weighty journal articles.
In a Dutch sociocultural journal Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land en Volkenkunde (2018), Marcus Mietzner, Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Rizka Halida reveal how religio-political entrepreneurs have successfully enflamed a radical spirit among the people. This had never been seen prior to the mobilization.
The Jokowi administration chooses a strategy of criminalization on populist groups that violates legal norms and launches patronage-oriented accommodation policies with unclear direction.
In Pacific Affairs (June 2018), Mietzner sharply criticized a series of Jokowi’s policies since 2016. “The Jokowi administration chooses a strategy of criminalization on populist groups that violates legal norms and launches patronage-oriented accommodation policies with unclear direction. Consequently, the government’s efforts to protect the status quo of democracy from populist attacks have turned around and threatened democracy itself”.
Communism has died everywhere, at least as an ideology of proletarian dictatorship. I think that we have to be grateful that the party no longer exists. Its main goal was to replace democracy with the party’s sole power.
Besides, Indonesia would most likely have broken up had the PKI won. In many regions, religious ties remained strong. At the same time, we have to regret the violent violation of civil and political rights against PKI members and sympathizers until today. Democracy has been continuously tainted by such behaviors. This is despite surveys by trusted agencies such as the SMRC found that less than 15 percent of Indonesians are worried over the PKI’s resurgence. It will be best for President Jokowi to revoke Presidential Decree No. 28/1975 on the Treatment to Those Involved in G30S/PKI Group C.
If the tension subsides, I imagine that there will be positive side effects. Political parties in the House of Representatives tend to cater only to elites’ interests. One of the reasons: they are worried of pro-communist accusations if they truly represent the voice of the marginalized people. They need to be freed from these shackles.
The threat of separatism has mostly been resolved thanks to the policies of several presidents. BJ Habibie combines democratization and decentralization. Generally, people and politicians in regencies and cities support the new pattern. Through general and regional elections, the people can hold local governments and legislative councils accountable, while regents and mayors are given more funds and fiscal authority than during the New Order. Habibie also freed Timor Leste, which had never been an issue of separatism as the region had never been a part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) as proclaimed by Soekarno-Hatta.
Demands of the Free Aceh Movement, which was truly separatist, was thoroughly resolved by Vice President Jusuf Kalla during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) presidency.
The report also has several concrete and valuable recommendations, including the need for a new consensus and cooperation between the Attorney General and the National Commission on Human Rights.
During the Jokowi era, riots in Papua reflect the most difficult issue of separatism that has yet to be resolved. President Jokowi since the beginning of his campaign has promised that special attention will be given to Papua. The latest report of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) chaired by Sidney Jones, titled Policy Miscalculations on Papua (October 2017) praised Jokowi’s economic policies. However, Jones emphasized on three miscalculations: “that economic developments will automatically resolve political complaints; that past human rights abuses will be easy to resolve; and that cheating in regional elections can be neglected”. The report also has several concrete and valuable recommendations, including the need for a new consensus and cooperation between the Attorney General and the National Commission on Human Rights.
Lastly, corruption is an old threat. Decentralization has created hundreds of new regions, be it provinces, regencies and cities. In local governments, we can see a perfect storm of abundant resources and few obstacles. It is easy to see how local officials will gladly fall into the muddy traps of corruption.
Two important things
Due to complications in this issue, I will tread lightly in making suggestions to contemporary political players. However, there are two important things. First, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has been the most successful anti-corruption warrior. The KPK was established during Megawati Soekarnoputri’s presidency and was protected by SBY. In Indonesia’s ocean of corruption, it cannot do much. However, it has proven how noble dreams can be achieved in today’s society despite various obstacles.
The KPK has successfully frightened lawmakers, who wish to put it in chains. As it turned out, Jokowi kowtows to them, as seen in the government’s willingness to work together with the House in amending the KPK law. This has been rejected by supporters of good governance through criticisms, protests and demonstrations. The Indonesia Corruption Watch complains: “What is certain is that the law in its entirety will weaken the KPK and be a setback in corruption eradication”. The KPK law revision has just been completed. My tentative conclusion is that anticorruption forces must find new strategies without hoping too much on the KPK or the government for help.
An alternative way to fight corruption has been proposed by Burhanuddin in his brilliant new book, Vote Buying in Indonesia: The Mechanics of Electoral Bribery (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). Burhanuddin proposes a change in the design of the election body, law enforcement and voters’ education. He proposes that the open-list proportional representative system be changed to a closed-list proportional representative one.
Moreover, “considering how common voters’ willingness to sell their votes is, systematic education is needed to make them less tolerant on such practices”.
A district system, in which only one lawmaker is chosen per district, may also have a positive effect. However, “without law enforcement, vote-buying strategies will spread uncontrollably”. Moreover, “considering how common voters’ willingness to sell their votes is, systematic education is needed to make them less tolerant on such practices”.
The book is published through open access, in which anyone can download it. Dear readers, use this opportunity to dig into its analysis. The more we learn about it, the deeper this study will influence corruption eradication, especially in regencies and cities, the level I deem as most important in the fight for democracy in Indonesia!
R William Liddle, Winner, 2018 Culture Award