Medan Bombing, Planned Bali Terror Act, Women\'s Network

Indonesia was again rocked by a suicide bomb in an attack on Medan Police headquarters in North Sumatra on Wednesday, 13 Nov. 2019.

The suicide attack was a bold move, because it targeted a facility that was supposed to be safe, where many police officers were on duty to provide security for the civilians who were at the office.

Targeting police stations for a bombing attack is not new. A changing trend in terror targets has been occurring since 2009, from far enemies (foreigners; groups, communities and other symbols of capitalism) to near enemies (military, police, government).

The shift in terror targets became evident when the National Police’s Densus 88 counterterrorism squad arrested several members of radical and extremely violent groups, which these groups deemed as a threat to their very existence. The change in target applies to not only the extremely violent group that emerged in the early post-Reformasi years – Jamaah Islamiyah and its splinter group – but also Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), Jamaah Ansharut Khilafah (JAK) and their splinter groups, all of which are affiliated to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Even though these two groups are ideologically at odds, they have a common enemy: the police. Consequently, many of the suicide attacks carried out by radical groups like JAD or JAK have targeted the police. Last year’s suicide attacks at the Surabaya Police headquarters and in Kampung Melayu, for example, targeted police stations and policemen who were on active duty.

KOMPAS/AUFRIDA WISMI WARASTRI

Officers carry boxes from an alley of the house of the suspected perpetrator of a suicide bomb attack against the Medan Police office in Belawan I village, Medan Belawan, North Sumatra (Thursday, 14/11/2019). The suspect is believed to be a Quran reading teacher.

"Ojek" and terror strategies

The primary target was also the same in the attack on Cirebon Police Station. And now, the suicide attack in Medan again targeted the police. This is a sign for the police to be more careful and more vigilant in checking any visitors to their office, because police stations are being targeted by extremely violent groups. The use of metal detectors might be a possibility, given that a manual check was not enough in the Medan bombing, but more sophisticated equipment that can detect explosives is needed.

Indonesia Legend Driver, a civil society organization of Gojek and Grab ojek (motorcycle taxi) drivers, immediately responded to the suicide attack on the Medan Police, issuing a statement on 14 November 2019 to condemn the violence. The statement also stressed that there was no connection and never would be any connection between ride-hailing ojek drivers and terrorism.

Indonesia Legend Driver activists said that they all loved the country. They were also strongly opposed to all forms of violence, radicalism, terrorism and vandalism that disrupted national security and stability, especially those that discredited ride-hailing ojek drivers.

They feared that the Medan incident would engender fear of ride-hailing ojek drivers among their customers, because the Medan bombing left an impression that ride-hailing ojek drivers were terrorists or were affiliated with terror groups.

Using the attributes of ride-hailing ojek services to cover the extremist group’s planned attack is a new tactic. Violent groups use various strategies in carrying out their attacks, in terms of the kind of perpetrator, the methods of attack and the use of certain attributes.

KOMPAS/RADITYA HELABUMI

Officers of the National Police’s Densus 88 counterterrorism squad present a number of suspected perpetrators of acts of terrorism in a press conference at the National Police headquarters, Jakarta, Thursday (17/10/2019).

Just look at the Thamrin bombing, which was carried out openly by terror actors who did not use religious symbols. The perpetrators were even dressed casually in jeans, T-shirts and caps. The public was surprised by the "normal” appearance of the terrorists. Sunakin, alias Afif, one of the Thamrin suicide bombers, actually undermined the public perception that terrorists could be identified with certain religious symbols.

Similarly, the public reacted with shock to the Medan bombing, which used the attributes of a ride-hailing ojek driver. Not only did it use the attribute of ride-hailing ojek, the most favored mode of public transportation today in urban communities, but it also showed that terrorists could not be characterized by the symbols of religious identity.

I remember something a former terror convict said: "If they wear clothes that represent their religious identity, you don\'t need to be afraid. However, it should become a concern when they wear different clothing, dress in ordinary clothes like the general public. It is a sign that they will act.”

The use of the uniform of a ride-hailing ojek driver as a “disguise” in the Medan suicide bombing was the terrorist group’s strategy to trick the authorities. Being disguised as a ride-hailing ojek driver would allay any suspicions among the authorities, similar to cases in which women or children (teenagers) carry out suicide atacks.

The use of such attributes is a strategy to conceal the terrorist’s identity and to divert attention from authorities. And although the police had observed the disguised ojek driver with suspicion, the perpetrator could still enter and carry out the planned attack.

ANTARA FOTO/DOK POLRES PANDEGLANG

Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Wiranto (second left) was attacked by an unknown person during his visit to Pandeglang, Banten, Thursday (10/10/2019).

Almost all suicide bombings are committed by males, both adults and adolescents, and are difficult to recognize as potential terrorist because they dress just like everyone else.

Women\'s terror networks

The interesting thing about the Medan suicide bombing is the full involvement of the perpetrator\'s wife in a planned attack on a target in Bali. Many questions arise on observing the woman’s commitment.

First, was the wife going to carry out the attack on her own (lone wolf)? Second, who motivated the wife to commit to the planned attack? Third, if the planned attack was a suicide bombing, was the wife trained in bomb-making, who trained her, where did she obtain the materials to make the bomb and who funded it? Fourth, did the wife plan to carry out the terror act in Bali on her own volition, or is she a victim of brainwashing by another party, like her trainer or her online contacts?

An article by an online news portal on 14 November 2019 said that the wife was exposed to radicalism much earlier than her husband, who had carried out the Medan bombing. This means that she was radicalized through online and direct communication by someone in a terror network.

The news portal reported that the wife was in contact with a female terrorist inmate at the Class 2 Women\'s Prison in Medan. The wife often visited the female terrorist at the prison, and it is thought that the Bali attack was planned during these visits.

There are important lessons to be drawn from this. How can someone who is behind bars coordinate a terrorist attack? Did this female terrorist inmate who provided the channels for the wife to connect with her terror network? Did the female terrorist inmate help the wife plan the attack? If the female terrorist inmate did indeed "mentor" the wife, we can no longer regard female terror actors lightly.

This case shows that women can fulfill militant roles as well as plan acts of terror. Thus far, women have been limited in their role as perpetrators, and did not initiate or plan terror acts. If the incarcerated female terrorist is the brain behind the planned Bali attack, women have roles that are equal to men: they not only act as perpetrators, but can also mastermind acts of terror.

This is a new challenge for all parties involved, both the government and civil society in the efforts to prevent and combat terrorism.

The increasing role of women in terror acts is an interesting phenomenon to study. Even though they may not be part of the organizational structure of terror groups, their capacity should no longer be underestimated. This is a new challenge for all parties involved, both the government and civil society in the efforts to prevent and combat terrorism.

This phenomenon also provides valuable lessons for deradicalization efforts at prisons, as it appears that the government and civil society groups must change their approach in such programs. Other approaches must be found so these deradicalization programs not only move terrorists away from acts of extreme violence, but also change their mindset so they stop carrying out acts of violence, whatever their justification.

This is a challenge for the government and anti-terror civil society groups because terrorist acts are extrajudicial crimes. The state and the public must therefore work together to stop such acts. If these acts of violence are not dealt with immediately, many more people, including state officials, will become their victims.

Dete Aliah, Terrorism Observer