The government and the House of Representatives (DPR) have finally passed into law the bill on National Resource Management for State Defense (PSDN).
By
Al Araf
·6 minutes read
The enactment of this law was very surprising, because it came amidst the political uproar toward the end of the 2014-2019 DPR session. As a result, the law’s substance creates a variety of problems in the defense sector, specifically with regard to civilians as a component of the national defense reserves.
Historically, the bill was initially called the Reserve Components for State Defense (KCPN), which was later renamed “National Resource Management for State Defense” and its scope broadened. The PSDN Law regulates four matters: the reserve component, the support component, state defense and mobilization. The KCPN Bill was the forerunner to the PSDN Bill, which the public rejected on the grounds that it stipulated mandatory basic military training for all civilians as part of the reserve component.
Criticisms of PSDN Law
In term of substance, the PSDN Law stipulates voluntary military service for civilians as part of the reserve component under Article 28, Paragraph 2. Civilians who will become part of the reserve component will undergo basic training for a mandatory period of three months (Article 35, Paragraph 1), and only those aged 18 to 35 years are eligible (Article 33, Paragraph 2). After they complete basic training, they are obliged to be in active service (basic training, refresher training and mobilization) and inactive service (resume their regular jobs) for a certain period. The maximum age for the reserve component is 48 (Article 47).
Under this law, any civilian reservist who refuses to comply with their mobilization order will be subject to a maximum criminal penalty of four years (Article 77, Paragraph 1). Any civilian in the supporting component who refuses comply with their mobilization order is liable to a two-year prison sentence (Article 77, Paragraph 2). This certainly violates the principle of conscientious objection (refusing to bear arms on moral or religious grounds), which is a cardinal principle of civilian service in many countries and is recognized under international human rights law.
The PSDN Law generally classifies threats to national security into under categories: military threats, non-military threats and hybrid threats (Article 4, Paragraph 2). More specifically, the reserve component is to be used to respond to military threats and hybrid threats (Article 6, Paragraph 4 in conjunction with Article 29). The use of the civilian reserve component in responding to hybrid threats gives rise to multiple interpretations, because the law provides no definition or explanation of “hybrid threat”.
The law defines military, non-military and hybrid threats to include aggression, terrorism, communism, separatism, armed rebellion, natural disasters, environmental damage, border violations, piracy, theft of natural resources, epidemics, drug crimes, cyberattacks, nuclear attacks, biological attacks and other threats that endanger the country\'s sovereignty, the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and national security (Article 4, Paragraph 3).
Involving the civilian reserve component in responding to non-military and/or hybrid threats can pose serious problems for Indonesia’s security governance. The PSDN Law legalizes the militarization of civil society into a reserve force that can also be used to deal with domestic threats, which can potentially trigger horizontal conflicts.
In Indonesia’s history, those in power militarized civil society clandestinely to maintain their power, which often led to violence and human rights violations. Prior to the 1999 East Timor ballot, those in power created the Pamswakarsa, a civilian militia. In 1998, the Pamswakarsa units were deployed to quell the large student demonstration against the Special Session of the People\'s Consultative Assembly (MPR). Those in power created many Pamswakarsa units during martial law In Aceh from 2003 to 2004.
In terms of national defense, the nature of the military – its raison d\'etre – is to wage war. In a democratic country that has armed forces, their main function and task is to wage war. The military’s duty other than war is to provide assistance. In that context, the civilian reserve should only be used in war (military threat). Using the civilian reserve to respond to non-military or hybrid threats violates the very principles and nature of the military establishment.
The politics of the PSDN Law will allow the state to intrude on civilian lives.
Moreover, using a civilian reserve to pursue the interests of martial law is inappropriate (Article 63), because martial law is generally applied to domestic threats, as implemented in Aceh in 2003-2004. It is very dangerous to mobilize the civilian reserve during martial law, because this will cause localized horizontal conflict.
The PSDN Law maintains the old, inward perspective on threats to national security. This is why the civilian reserve can also be deployed against internal threats. This contradicts the vision of President Jokowi, who looks outward toward building a maritime nation.
The politics of the PSDN Law will allow the state to intrude on civilian lives. Without detailed rules of engagement for involving civilians, the law can be used against civil groups that are critical of government on the pretext of national security.
Sociologically, those who have undergone three months of basic training must be kept under observation, since they could potentially impact security. Do not let basic training become an arena that provides free training for terrorists, separatists and other domestic criminal threats.
Another issue concerns the reserve component in terms of natural and manmade resources as well as national facilities and infrastructure to which the PSDN Law does not apply its voluntary principle. Private and civilian resources, facilities and infrastructure only need to pass the Defense Ministry’s verification and classification procedures (Article 51) to be incorporated as a reserve component, without their owners’ voluntary relinquishment. Therefore, this law does not recognize or uphold the right to property, which is a human right.
Legal and regulatory violations
The PSDN Law is also a substantial violation of existing laws and regulations. It stipulates that the defense budget can draw funds from the State Budget (APBN), regional budgets (APBDs) and other accountable funding sources (Article 75). In fact, Article 25 of Law No. 3/2002 on State Defense and Article 66 of Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian Military (TNI) stipulate that the State Budget is the sole source of the defense budget.
The President needs to reconsider the enactment of the PSDN Law because it still contains substantially problematic articles.
Aside from this, applying military justice to the civilian reserve during active service – basic training, refresher and mobilization – during times of peace is inappropriate (Article 46). Aside from conditions of martial law, all civilians must submit to the jurisdiction of the civilian justice system. The military justice system does not apply in situations outside martial law. In times of peace, military justice only applies to its primary component, the Indonesian Military (TNI).
The President needs to reconsider the enactment of the PSDN Law because it still contains substantially problematic articles. The President still has time to conduct a legislative review of this law before it comes into force. Establishing a reserve component without more detailed and appropriate regulations will create new problems for security, freedom and democracy in Indonesia.
Al Araf, Director of Imparsial, Doctoral Candidate at the University of Brawijaya Law School.